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ABSTRACT 
 
Shaping Urban Form without Zoning: A Case Study of Houston. 
(December 2008)  
Zhu Qian, B.Arch., Tongji University, China; 
M.A., University of British Columbia, Canada 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Elise M. Bright 
 
Houston is the only major city in North America without zoning. The growth of Houston 
illustrates a traditional free market philosophy in which land use zoning is seen as a violation to 
private property and personal liberty. This dissertation explores how the lack of zoning has an 
impact on land use and urban form in Houston. It is based on a theoretical framework derived 
from economics and public policy theories for institutional analyses of land development 
controls.  
The dissertation uses cluster analysis integrating socioeconomic factors from census data 
to select three case study neighborhoods, and then applies GIS to analyze their urban form 
spatial characteristics with spatial data from Houston Planning Department. It also uses 
qualitative methods such as archives and documentations for the three neighborhoods. The study 
investigates the change of urban form in three case study neighborhoods over two decades. It 
also explores how local land use policies made by both the local government and non-
governmental sectors shape urban form in Houston.  
The study results show that despite the city’s lack of zoning, local land use regulatory 
policies made by the municipality have significant influence on urban development. 
Additionally, civic and private organizations such as super neighborhoods and homeowner 
associations fill the gaps left by the lack of land use zoning. These two aspects contribute to land 
use planning and urban form of the city.  
Houston presents a contradiction of limited government intervention and public 
investments and subsidies. Land use controls by private contract and by government legislative 
intervention are not mutually exclusive or immutable. The study finds that it is difficult to 
achieve mixed race and income neighborhoods, even without zoning. Equity goals are not met in 
 iv 
market approaches. Deed restrictions might be better at facilitating property sales and 
maintenance than at improving community welfare and governance. 
From the theoretical perspective, the study argues that a spectrum of market solutions 
and planning approaches at the ends are more relevant than the bipolarity view. Equity goals are 
not met in market approaches. For welfare and rights, public planning intervention is necessary. 
The market might provide physical land use diversity, but it fails to support socioeconomic 
diversity.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Research Background and Issues 
 
Houston is the only major city in North America without zoning. The growth of Houston 
illustrates a traditional free market philosophy in which land use zoning is seen as a violation of 
private property and personal liberty. In such a laissez-faire city, public-sector-initiated urban 
planning policies are limited, especially at the neighborhood level, in comparison with other cities 
in the country. Instead, many urban development policies and plans are made by the private 
sector and by business associations. Except for limited daily urban needs, transportation and 
infrastructure that are the responsibilities of the public sector, planning (especially that which 
effects economic growth) is initiated, developed, and monitored by the private sector (Fisher, 
1989). Bernard Siegan’s Land Use Without Zoning (1972) remains the definitive document on 
Houston’s “nonzoning”. According to Siegan, the market place provides economic incentives for 
segregation of uses and produces patterns of development similar to what is found under zoning. 
Siegan also sets forth the argument of Houston’s unplanned, unregulated development in a set of 
articles defending the City’s refusal to enact a zoning code. He asserts that land use regulation in 
Houston is extremely modest when compared to what is contained in most zoning ordinances 
because Houston has no ordinance that sets forth specific restrictions on the uses that may be 
established on any property. However, during the past three decades, Houston has adopted more 
planning tools and involved diverse organizations in land use.  
Recent studies address Houston from different perspectives such as urban geography 
(Kirby and Lynch, 1987; Vojnovic 2003), political science (Gainsborough, 2001), public policy 
(Fisher, 1989), and legal and economics (Berry, 2001). Houston is often portrayed as an 
archetype free enterprise, capitalist, or laissez-faire city (Feagin, 1998; Lamare, 1998; Lin, 1995). 
In the meanwhile, Houston’s minimal government intervention rhetoric in practice involves 
extensive and active federal, state and local government involvement in economic development in 
combination with a disinterest in social service and income maintenance programmes (Vojnovic, 
2003). Government intervention in Houston’s growth has been vital and has produced the 
extraordinary impacts expected from public involvement in local economic development. Despite  
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the fact that there is no quantitative research on Houston’s lack of zoning and its urban form, 
there has been narrative descriptions regarding Houston’s land use controls and urban form (see 
for example, Kirby and Lynch, 1987; Lin, 1995; Vojnovic, 2003). 
Then how, and to what extent, does the lack of zoning influence urban form of the city 
and its neighborhoods? How does local land use regulatory policy practice work in this unique 
political economic setting? How do civic and/or private organizations get involved in land use 
controls to influence land use at the neighborhood level? And how well do the private land use 
interventions work in the neighborhoods? What are some of the reasons for the neighborhood 
land use diversity and changes? This study tries to address these questions. 
The question of urban space and form has not been sufficiently examined in Houston 
research. There is a further aspect that needs attention, and that is the spatial analysis and internal 
transformation of Houston subject to the pressures of globalization and growth. Along with 
growth, metropolitan cities like Houston tend to move from monocentric forms towards 
polycentric structures. Houston’s twenty plus activity centers are the main nodes of the city’s 
polycentric structure. Furthermore, there are gaps in the debates, which include the finer grain 
understanding of the impacts of various forces and physical forms. A further complication is that 
many of the debates and issues are separated in academic research and publication. That is 
particularly true for the two debates which are primarily discussed in this research: the free 
market land use governance versus more government interventions in land use debate and that of 
the physical urban form. This research attempts to link the concepts. 
 
Aim and Objectives 
 
This research explores how the lack of government zoning ordinance has an impact on 
urban form and land use in Houston. It investigates three super neighborhoods, which have 
different private land use control status, to reveal the diversity of their land use patterns and their 
chronological land use changes. The hypotheses of this research are: 1) Despite the lack of 
zoning, Houston’s regulatory land use polices (with many zoning elements) have significant 
influence on its urban development and urban form, particularly at the citywide scale; 2) private 
land use controls (i.e. the deed restriction status) may result in the diversity of land use patterns 
and the different degrees of chronological changes of land use at the neighborhood level; and 3) 
such diversity and chronological changes are closely associated with the neighborhood 
socioeconomic characteristics, such as age of neighborhood, household income level, education 
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attainment, housing ownership, property value, etc. Neighborhoods with similar socioeconomic 
characteristics may have different land use pattern due to their deed restriction statuses.  
The dissertation examines the change of urban form and land use in the city and its case 
study neighborhoods without zoning regulation, and explores the reasons behind those changes. 
From the institutional perspective, it explores how local land use policies made by both the local 
government and non-governmental sectors shape urban form and land use in Houston, a city born 
out of several anti-zoning battles. Despite the city’s lack of zoning, local land use regulatory 
policies and some limited plans made by the municipality have significant influence on urban 
development. On the other hand, civic and private organizations such as super neighborhoods and 
homeowner associations fill the gaps left by the lack of land use zoning. The study examines how 
these two aspects contribute to land use planning and urban form at both city and neighborhood 
levels.  
The research uses both quantitative methods (i.e. GIS spatial statistical analysis) and 
qualitative methods (i.e. document review, formal and informal data gathering, and semi-
structured interviews in Houston). The dissertation seeks to provide insight into the relationships 
between urban form, the lack of zoning ordinance, and neighborhood planning. It also sheds light 
on the debates on limited government intervention in land development controls, and applicability 
and difficulties of applying two strands of theories, institutional economics and public choice, to 
the empirical case of Houston.   
 
Conceptual Framework 
 
Conventional land development control like zoning is usually justified by planners in 
social welfare theses as an important approach to alleviate market failure such as negative 
externalities or social cost, and provide public goods. Those public goods are believed to be 
disinterested by the free market to provide an adequate amount due to the high cost of direct 
pricing. These arguments are originally developed from Pigou’s seminal book The Economics of 
Welfare (1932). Zoning largely denies possible private negotiation and resolution.  
In challenging the Pigovian market failure and government intervention arguments, 
Ronald Coase in his seminal papers (namely The Nature of the Firm in 1937 and The Problem of 
Social Cost in 1960) raises the concept of transaction costs and proposes a thinking of free market 
and anti-government intervention. Coase questions the Pigovian efficiency calculus by focusing 
on the transaction costs of regulative policies. Coasians argue that since the market can handle 
externalities only if transaction costs are zero, Pigovian interventionist approach is unnecessary 
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and undesirable. Zoning does not improve land use efficiency and zoning is a zero sum game. In 
planning literature, a dichotomy seems to appear where the Pigovian paradigm is one for zoning 
and the Coasian paradigm is against zoning. Explanations of planning in social welfare terms 
associate planning with government intervention, juxtaposing the public sector with the free 
market.   
In institutional economics theses, Coasians consider government as being less efficient 
than the market, and takes zoning as such an inefficient example. This argument however needs 
to be taken with Coase’s caution that it does not do more than suggest that governmental 
regulation should be curtailed (rather than completely removed). He states that government 
intervention argument “does not do more than suggest that governmental regulation should be 
curtailed” (Coase, 1988: 119). The relevant problems are when to intervene and how to intervene 
for government to minimize inefficiencies and social inequities and how is the effectiveness of 
the intervention. Coase’s arguments and Coasians’ empirical studies suggest that the important 
point is not making a choice between zoning and non-zoning, but the institutions of either zoning 
or non-zoning.  
The review of Pigovian and Coasian paradigms does not provide clear answer to the 
reasons for public choice of land use control. Zoning is also a political response to land uses by 
the motivations behind it. But Coase deftly sidesteps the fundamental political and moral issues 
about the distribution of power, welfare, and opportunity (Banerjee, 1993). Regarding the 
question of why society chooses zoning (or non-zoning), Lai (1994) in his review of Coase’s 
theory of institutional economics suggest that it is a question of the nature of public choice in a 
land use restriction process. In property rights concept, an institution, like the planning system, is 
a result of public choice (Lai, 1997). A large part of the literature on zoning assumes that optimal 
regulations are imposed, but does not address the question of whether participants (bureaucrats, 
planners, developers, and residents, etc.) have incentive to follow the optimal rules (Pogodzinski 
and Sass, 1990).  
The Coasian and public choice theories imply that when geography, time, local politics 
and life style choices are added to the debate about zoning, it is difficult to decide what, when, 
where, who and how to control land use. There is, therefore, no general conclusion to the merit of 
zoning debate. Instead, the debate on zoning has to be case specific, context specific, locality 
specific as individual cases because local geographical, political, social, and economic conditions 
are significantly variable. The relevant questions might be why the society chooses a specific land 
zoning system and what are the political and socioeconomic reasons behind such option.  
A better understanding of social welfare and institutional economics theses might be the 
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distinction between public planning by government and private planning by non-government in 
the market, instead of a distinction between free market and government intervention. It is 
possible public planning and private planning coexist, and then the critical question to ask is how 
they coexist and to what extent they get involved in land use boundary delineation. Houston 
provides an excellent opportunity in this regard. There is a need to explore the rules or workings 
of development controls of private contractual zoning such as Houston, in which government and 
private sector interface. Contractual zoning can be understood as a property rights activity and a 
direct coordinating activity. This is particularly intriguing when planning co-exists with the 
private sector market place. For contractual zoning between private agents, the issue of scale of 
the area within which they are applied (city wide versus specific neighborhoods) is also 
debatable.    
While research on private contractual zoning (e.g. the comparative cases for Houston and 
Dallas) usually focuses on property values and its socioeconomic results (e.g. racial segregation), 
different degrees of land use restrictions may result in cross-sectional spatial form variations 
among geographical areas (e.g. neighborhoods). Chronological changes in land use restrictions 
may also result in spatial dimension variation in a neighborhood under a given land use control 
system. Both cross-sectional spatial form variations and chronological changes can be a 
comparative approach to reveal how lands with or without private contractual zoning evolve. For 
government intervention, even in the case of contractual zoning where such intervention is 
curtailed, the imposition of constraints for market operation does not directly interfere with the 
spatial aspects of production. Instead, those interventions are typically achieved through tax, 
subsidy, or production quota. However, by using a series of rules, policies, and standards for land 
use activities, and government infrastructure system, government funded mega projects, and 
urban regeneration, planners held land use intervention tools from spatial aspects which regulate 
the location, dimension, density, time of the production. Spatial dimension of land is the result of 
a specific institutional design. Further discussion of the conceptual framework for this study will 
be made in Chapter II. 
 
Research Methodology 
 
Based on the research hypotheses and the literature review, the research questions can be 
grouped into four interrelated headings: 
1) A relationship could be established between land use controls and urban form. 
Alternatives to zoning, in this research, were taken more as political rather than as 
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professional means, driven by political interests. The first questions addressed the 
political reasons for Houston’s land use system and its contributions to the city’s urban 
development in its history.  
2) Despite of the lack of zoning, Houston has regulatory land use policies with zoning 
elements. The second questions critically examined Houston’s land-use policies, planning 
and urban form at the citywide scale. 
3) Neighborhood land use patterns are formed by political institutions at community levels. 
Houston’s diverse land use patterns helped to understand the social, political and 
economic reasons underlying the neighborhood diversity of urban form. In the 
meanwhile, the practice of private covenants as a land-use control means provided an 
example of a collaborative planning approach where land users make decisions on their 
surrounding environment. As Zhang (2001) concluded in his research about Chicago, 
urban growth is rooted in the features of neighborhoods rather than a direct consequence 
of spatial-related factor. Urban form is a dynamic process which evolves over time as the 
outcome of changing land use polices and agreements. The third questions analyzed land 
use controls at the neighborhood levels using an institutional approach.  
4) Neighborhood local factors include the socio-economic situation of a neighborhood, 
including demographic changes, the community’s economic status, and its education 
quality. The factors also include housing stock and land use policies. This research 
considered local factors such as age of neighborhoods, household income level, education 
attainment, housing ownership, and property value. The questions resorted to quantitative 
analysis. The results were used to explore how the urban forms were determined by the 
deed restrictions and how well findings in neighborhood land use controls qualitative 
research could explain the spatial statistical results.   
The overall research strategy was focused upon a case study of the neighborhoods. Using 
GIS, the study conducted spatial statistical analysis for the urban form for each of the 
neighborhoods over two decade period (from 1985 until 2005). In addition, the statistical analysis 
compared the results among different neighborhoods. The urban form of the neighborhoods was 
measured by five dimensions: (1) Street systems; (2) Density; (3) Land use mix; (4) Accessibility; 
(5) Pedestrian access. The qualitative research focused on land use planning tools that had 
influence at neighborhood level in particular, such as subdivision plats, deed restrictions, super 
neighborhoods and their responsible organizations. The result of this empirical research was to 
analyze the impact of neighborhood planning approaches on urban form in an unzoned city, and 
to reveal the implications in land use planning and (non)zoning. Based on the anticipated research 
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results, the specific methods employed were documentation and archival records. Chapter III will 
further elaborate the research methodology used in this research. 
 
Structure of Dissertation 
  
The dissertation consists of six chapters. To begin, Chapter I introduces the research 
background and issues, articulates the aim and objectives of the study, and briefly describes the 
conceptual framework, the research methodology and the structure of dissertation. 
Chapter II addresses the theoretical and empirical perspectives in land development 
control. The theoretical research foundation for this study is derived from the growing literature 
on the land development control, especially the institutional economics theories and the public 
choice thesis. Meanwhile, the empirical and contextual foundation of this study is based on the 
body of literature on market supported planning and development control, the critics on zoning as 
the mainstream land development control, and Houston’s land development control system. The 
brief examination of relevant theories, models, views, and experiences in each of these areas 
provides a background and conceptual framework for the study, and eventually fulfills the 
objectives set for this research. The key ideas from these research studies are used to structure a 
conceptual framework for this study and to guide the empirical analysis of the field data 
collected. 
Chapter III is primarily a methodological discussion for the study. Following the aim and 
objectives set for the study, it first identifies the overall research strategy of this study, and then 
explains the rationale of choosing Houston and its three super neighborhoods as the case study. 
Data collection, qualitative and quantitative analysis and interpretation methods are also 
explained. 
Chapter IV highlights the significance of urban development and land use control 
practice in Houston. The author examines the challenges encountered in Houston’s urban growth 
and land development practice, focusing on urban development and growth, political culture, 
zoning attempts in history, annexation policy, major infrastructure, activity centers, government 
intervention in land use control, and non-government sector efforts in land use control. Instead of 
addressing extensive issues in Houston’s urban growth and land development control, this chapter 
provides a close observation of Houston by investigating the key characteristic components of the 
evolving urban growth, the political culture behind it, and land development controls from both 
government and non-government sectors. A better understanding of land development controls in 
Houston facilitates future strategies over land policy making and administration. 
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Chapter V examines land development control and measures urban form in Houston’s 
three super neighborhoods selected by socioeconomic status, and discusses the qualitative 
characteristics of the three super neighborhoods. In contrast to the previous chapter’s focus on the 
citywide land use issues, this chapter focuses on land development control issues and urban form 
at the super neighborhood level. The chapter first analyses the socioeconomic status of the city by 
using block group. It then selects three super neighborhoods according to their socioeconomic 
status, and measures their urban form by using five different dimensions. The chapter investigates 
how the history of land development, the changes of socioeconomic composition, and the current 
land use controls in three super neighborhoods have impacted upon urban spatial form. In short, 
this part primarily measures urban spatial form in three super neighborhoods and employs 
qualitative approach to explain some of the reasons behind the formation of the land use patterns 
in those super neighborhoods.  
Chapter VI consists of three sections. The first section discusses the policy implications 
of Houston’s land use plans, regulations, and governance under a land market mechanism with 
limited government intervention based on the evidence of land use governance practice and 
resultant urban form. In analyzing the problems revealed in the land development practice in 
Houston, the study attempts to find out the problems that underlie the current land use governance 
mechanism and draw out policy implications and recommendations. The second section revisits 
the debates on plan versus market, making the arguments from the lessons learnt from the 
Houston case. The third section focuses on the theoretical debate of the two strands of 
institutional economics theories, the Coasian theorem and public choice theory, which provide the 
conceptual framework for this study. The discussion analyzes the applicability and difficulties of 
these two theories in addressing land development and urban form in Houston, and explores how 
to use institutional economics thoughts in theory for the empirical case. The recommendations for 
future research are provided at the end of this chapter. 
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CHAPTER II 
LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 
 
Zoning, one of planning’s central mechanisms, is widely understood as a police power, a 
basic right of governments to make laws and regulations for the benefit of their communities, 
given to municipal governments to put restrictions and delineations on land use rights. For the 
purpose of promoting health, safety, morals, or the general welfare of the community, the 
legislative body of cities and incorporated villages is empowered to regulate and restrict physical 
dimensions such as height, stories, structure size, population density, and location for trade, 
industry, residence, or other purpose. Modern zoning originated in Germany in the late 19th 
century (Nelson, 1977:8). The planning acts of the early 20th century in the UK conferred zoning 
power on its local authorities (Grant, 1982). In the US, nuisance controls was put on a statutory 
basis in 1885 in California to discriminate against Chinese immigrants. The practice of zoning in 
the US can be traced back as early as 1916 when New York City passed an ordinance which 
divided the entire city into four zones: residential, commercial, “unrestricted”, and 
“undetermined”. Zoning became much more popular when the US Supreme Court declared it to 
be constitutioned in the Euclid case in 1926. This represented a significant extension of the police 
power in that it enabled a municipality to prohibit uses which were not “nuisances” in the strict 
sense of the term. Today, all fifty states have planning and zoning enabling legislation, most of 
which descended from Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA) or Standard City Planning 
Enabling Act (SCPEA).  
The eighty-year practice of zoning generates much discussions over the “good” and 
“bad” of zoning, and for some, even the necessity of zoning as a conventional governmental 
intervention in land use planning. These discussions cover those academic fields such as law, 
public administration, urban/land economics, urban geography, urban sociology, and legal issues 
in planning. The acknowledgement that zoning’s theoretical debate has its roots in mainstream 
economics comes relatively slowly to planners. Many discussions over zoning in other fields tend 
to isolate their discussions over zoning from the economic perspective. Even for those that do 
have a slight touch, deserved credits have not been given to economic theories. Certainly, 
planners, both in academia and in practice, are very familiar with at least two important economic 
concepts, namely market failure and externalities. Zoning is a necessary government intervention 
to deal with externalities and market failure. Such kind of justification for zoning has been 
challenged by the anti-interventionists who support the notion that zoning is unnecessary as it 
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distorts efficient land use pattern and that land use planning should describe or follow the market. 
Furthermore, in contrast to market failure, there is government failure in a political response like 
zoning. These arguments are well known and have their groups of proponents. They are derived 
from three mainstream political economic schools: social welfare economics theses, transaction 
costs theses, and public choice theses. Before deriving anything to structure research framework 
for this study, it is worth discussing those three strands of theories. They provide a powerful 
analytical approach to investigate zoning as policy and function.  
 
Social Welfare Theses 
  
Zoning is usually justified by planners in economic theorizations as an important 
approach to alleviate market failure such as negative externalities or social cost, and provide 
public goods. Pure public goods are, by definition, goods which are consumed equally by all 
(non-rival consumption) and goods from which the public cannot be excluded.  With those 
theoretical ambitions, zoning in practice is implemented to separate incompatible land uses, 
encourage compatible land uses, encourage positive or prohibit negative externalities through 
development control measures, and arrange and/or reserve public goods like open space, natural 
environment, roads and mass transit, public housing, community facilities, and infrastructure 
right-of-ways. Public goods are those goods that the free market is believed to be inherently 
disinterested in providing an adequate amount, because consumption is joint and not exclusive for 
certain types of goods.  
These arguments on externalities, social cost, and public goods are developed from 
Arthur C. Pigou’s seminal book The Economics of Welfare (Pigou, 1932). Pigou’s interventionist 
thesis revolutionized the libertarian neoclassical tradition and provides justification for 
government intervention on efficient resource allocation. Pigou in his book introduced the 
concept of external effects, or externalities, which is a type of market failure. Since the market 
only responds to private benefits and costs, it fails to equate marginal social costs. Thus, 
externalities may rise where the positive benefits obtained by a party are at the negative cost of 
another who is uncompensated for his/her value loss (the Pigovian theorists typically take 
‘pollution’ as a kind of negative externality). Those uncompensated social costs would create 
economic inefficiency, because the profit mechanism only works according to private benefits, 
and the social costs borne or social benefits reaped by third parties are not reflected in the price. 
Pigovian economists argue that the government should intervene in the market to correct the 
inefficiency by making up what the free market is believed to be unwilling to produce through a 
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compulsive tax system. They, of course, assume a positive role of government in the intervention. 
In addition, they assume that government interventions incur zero transaction costs (transaction 
costs refer to all costs other than the costs of physical production). For planning, the Pigovian 
theses are pro-zoning which provides strong justification for zoning, and even broader, planning. 
There are at least three inherent assumptions in Pigovian social welfare these--the locational, 
timing, and quantitative accuracy of reserved land for each zoning category, the reasonable 
spatial distribution, as well as competent and unbiased government intervention. In history, the 
Pigovian paradigm seems attractive to the planners because planning as a profession came into 
being during the Industrial Revolution when government interventions were use to deal with 
environmental problems that were believed to be caused by the market failure. Pigovian version 
of market reformation can be understood as an alternative to the Marxist market displacement 
model. By the 1950s and 1960s, the theoretical paradigm for planning as a government endeavor 
was determinedly interventionist. Theorists like Ronald Coase’s disputation of the Pigovian 
approach had little influence on planners during that time. 
Traditional text books on land use planning adopt Pigovian approach. For instance, 
Lean’s Economics of Land Use Planning (1969), Cooke’s Theories of Planning and Spatial 
Development (1983), Hoch et al., The Practice of Local Government Planning (2000), Berke and 
Godshalk’s Urban Land Use Planning (2006). Those pro-interventionist books support the 
necessity of government intervention in land use planning though the limitations of such kind of 
interventions are also acknowledged. The strong supports for Pigovian approaches can be felt in 
academic journal papers as well. For instance, Dunham (1958) defended government intervention 
in land use through SCPEA with the intention to positive social welfare, efficient land use in the 
process of development. Dunham argues that the legislation for zoning “speaks of ‘securing’ or 
‘preserving’, ‘avoiding’ or ‘preventing’ certain enumerated evils as the purpose for which zoning 
is permitted” (Dunham, 1958: 182). He goes on and argues that planner interference is consistent 
with a market economy when the market itself has limitation in dealing with the external impact 
on neighboring land. Oxley (1975), Moore (1978), Walker (1980), Klosterman (1985) and 
Whitehead (1984) are summaries of the market failure cases for land use planning. In their 
arguments, significant market failures in land use include undersupply of public goods, 
oversupply of externalities, inequalities in market power, inequlities in initial property wealth 
endowments, and inequalities in wealth derived from neighborhood public goods. 
Facing many early critiques on Pigovian tradition as an “oral tradition”, the Pigovian 
theorization has tried to be more mathematical. In analytical approaches, the proponents of this 
theoretical paradigm substitute their previous assumptions about the nature of some porudciton 
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functions (Helpman and Pines, 1977), dwell on the notion of time in their assumption (Baumol, 
1972; Fisher and Peterson, 1976; Crone, 1983). Others contest that externality should be 
considered as dynamic, and emphasize zoning’s wealth effects (Goetz and Wofford, 1979). The 
opponents of the pigovian theses however use “calculus on the blackboard” to attack the pigovian 
mathematical approach, meaning that their analysis is away from the real world. Besides the 
analytical approaches, there are primarily three areas of the Pigovian paradigm engendered 
critiques, which are transaction costs, externalities, incompatibility.     
Pigovian theorem’s primary weakness is its ignorance of high costs for zoning, namely 
transaction costs. Transaction costs include all costs except for the costs of physical production, 
such as public administration costs, compliance costs, opportunity costs from delay or loss in 
response to markets, costs for incompetent planning decisions, negotiation costs, contract 
enforcement costs, etc. In many circumstances, those transaction costs can be prohibitively high, 
while negative externalities are trivial to the society or individuals. The costs of avoiding those 
externalities by government intervention might far exceed the negative externality costs 
themselves. To this end, one is lured to measure externalities in one way or another, only find that 
both definition and assessment are extremely difficult (Lai, 1994).  
Pigovian externality arguments tend to mislead the understanding of externalities in the 
real world. The externality arguments might discourage mixtures of land uses found in inner 
cities, which engenders social benefits according to Jane Jacobs (1964). Such kind of 
misunderstanding results in an excessive preference for order in zoning in a way that the order 
cannot maximize the social welfare of communities. Furthermore, externalities may also be 
social, cultural, political or lifestyle, which all have important implications for zoning. But how 
those externalities play in zoning is an question unanswered. Avoiding negative externalities 
through zoning may yield short-term gains for those immediately affected, but the questions are 
whether the restrictions on land use and thus urban form, and the controls of built form 
innovation through zoning lower the quality of the benefits in the long run. A related issue raised 
by Sorensen (1994) but has rarely been considered for empirical cases is the question that 
geographical scale matters for externalities. Negative externalities at the local level may be 
positive externalities at a regional and national level. For instance, locallu unwanted land uses 
(LULUs) are an exmaple in point. The differences in people’s socioeconomic situation may affect 
their response to certain externality impact—one’s negative externality might be another’s 
positive externality. In his discussion on social cost, Cheung even argues that externalities are not 
evidence of inefficient resource allocation (1974). Even for the argument that zoning is the way to 
minimize externalities, it should be noted that there are many other ways of tackling externalities 
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including building regulations, nuisance laws, covenants, pollution tax and subsidies, and so 
forth.   
A zone is a class of land use functions and activities. In real world, certain specific 
functions and activities with a zone may be compatible with some functions and activities in 
another zone even though these two activities are broadly incompatible. That is why mixed-use is 
allowed and even encouraged by new urbanism. With the advances of technology, incompatibility 
in traditional viewpoint can be minimized or even avoided by technology. Some new 
technologies have made certain commercial or even industrial activities no longer an 
incompatible to residential. For example, electronic technology innovation has made printing 
environmentally compatible with residential uses. In addition, many commercials like private 
clinic are allowed by private covenants. Furthermore, compatibility is not an absolutely scientific 
concept. In regions or areas where unemployment and poverty are a serious issue, the existence of 
an incompatible and polluting manufacturing facility or an incompatible commercial complex 
which generates many job opportunities in a residential neighborhood might be a ‘positive’ effect 
for the residents, leaving other benefits like avoiding negative transportation impact and saving 
time spent due to commuting. Another example about airport and residential uses may illustrate 
that Pigovian analysis ignores some factors that can internalize social costs. The airport noise 
incurs social costs for noise mitigation which is borne by the neighborhood residents. However 
the social costs could be offset by either a lower rent or an increase in employment opportunity 
(Lai, 1997). Zoning largely denies possible private negotiation and resolution. Therefore, 
legislative and administrative zoning controls might excessively replace the freedom of individual 
land lease and covenants. For instance, pollution credits have already been a practice within the 
US for air pollution. In seeking a model to solve environmental problem worldwide, some World 
Bank economists are intrigued with the idea of creating an international pollution market where 
countries can buy and sell pollution rights. The idea that poor countries could raise money from 
the industrialized West by selling pollution rights is an appealing prospect for some marketists 
(The Economist, 1992; Cockburn, 1992). 
 
Institutional Economics Theses 
 
In challenging the Pigovian market failure (Pigovian theorization does not completely 
eliminate the market but corrects it) and government intervention arguments, Ronald Coase in his 
seminal papers (namely The Nature of the Firm in 1937 and The Problem of Social Cost in 1960) 
raises the concept of transaction costs and proposes a libertarian thinking of free market and anti-
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government intervention. Using the example of the economic conflict of interest in land use rights 
between a cattle raiser and a wheat farmer, Coase argues that if transaction costs are zero, both 
parties can trade their rights to internalize their conflicts. In other words, private contracts can 
resolve land use conflicts. He shows that administrative separation of land uses by governments 
to minimize negative externalities is not necessary socially advantageous. It cannot be assumed 
that governments would manage land use in a competent way any better than what the market 
would do. Coase questions the Pigovian efficiency calculus by focusing on the transaction costs 
of regulative policies. Coase’s seminal theory led to the rise of property rights economics 
(property rights here refer to institutional arrangements that constrain resource competition, while 
costs of such institutional arrangements are transaction costs as distinct from production costs), 
and has led to the growth of anti-interventionist and anti-planning thinking in planning, mainly in 
North America and Europe. In urban planning, this strand of theory has generated the conceptual 
notions like public failure (Wolf, 1987), state failure (Janicke, 1990), planning failure (Sorensen 
and Auster, 1989) and market environmentalism (Kwong, 1990). The theory also gained its large 
audience among political scientists and planners because of the demise of the planned economies, 
such as the economic reforms towards liberalization in China, and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union’s and the Eastern European communist regimes, which supported the theory and provided 
evidences for the theoretical debate. During the 1980s, the Thatcho-Reaganite decade saw the rise 
of embracing and celebration of the market economy. Deregulation, decontrol, privatization, user 
fees, and market pricing became the new models for delivering public services, replacing the old 
order of public goods provision (Dyckman, 1983).  
The proponents of Coasian anti-interventionist theses generate rich discussions 
competing with the Pigovian theses. Some of the researchers include Crecine et al. (1967), Siegan 
(1972), Master et al. (1977), and Fisher (1978, 1980) who are primarily from economic analysis 
of law perspective; and Mark and Goldberg (1981), Anderson (1982), and Benson (1984), who 
are from economics perspective. Zoning, as a government intervention approach, is considered 
useless in increasing efficient land allocation. In a sharp contrast, land use without zoning would 
achieve more efficient land use. Siegan (1972) uses Houston, the only major city in the North 
America without zoning as a strong case to support the argument that non-zoning and market 
driven land use are more efficient. Market solutions are superior for economic efficiency. The 
impact of the Coasian approach can be clearly felt in planning education and academia. Robert 
Ellickson’s papers on zoning (1973, 1981), David Mills’ papers (1989) and the adoption of 
Williams Fischel’s (1987) The Economics of Zoning Laws as a text book for zoning are examples. 
In planning literature, a dichotomy seems to appear where the Pigovian paradigm is one for 
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zoning and the Coasian paradigm is against zoning. Explanations of planning in social welfare 
terms associate planning with government intervention, juxtaposing the public sector with the 
free market.   
Social costs may be either greater or less than private costs. When marginal social costs 
of production are greater than that of the private cost function, a negative externality of 
production occurs (e.g. pollution), as a result of firms externalising their costs onto a third party 
in order to reduce their own total cost. As a result of externalising, there is an increased cost of 
production on society creates a social cost curve that depicts a greater cost than the private cost 
curve. With respect to cost, there is also an issue of price elasticity of demand, which is a 
measure of the sensitivity of quantity demanded to changes in price. It measures the relationship 
as the ratio of percentage changes between quantity demanded of a good and changes in its price. 
For example, water has inelastic characteristics in that people will pay anything for it, while sugar 
is elastic because there are many substitutions for sugar. 
An important presumption in the Pigovian model is that one party in land use conflicts is 
assumed guilty and would not come to a private settlement with the other party in the conflicts. 
However, in reality, this is reactive and forces the victim to seek and negotiate payment from the 
perpetrator. Coase shows that conflicting interests depend on the cost-benefit comparison of the 
activities instead of an arbitrary condemnation of one party. In the meanwhile, many activities 
generate social costs along with social benefits. Government intervention may prevent the cost 
but at the expense of social benefits. The Coasians argue that since the market can handle 
externalities only if transaction costs are zero, Pigovian interventionist approach is unnecessary 
and undesirable. Coase captures Pigou’s notion of the distinction between the private and social 
product, which covers the concept of nuisance in land use and the concept of environmental 
pollution (1959). He holds that the market can internalize external effects or externalities if 
transaction costs are zero. When transaction costs exist, in order to minimize the costs, markets 
are modified in predictable ways through large firms and corporations and institutional 
governance (not necessarily government intervention) to define and monitor market actors rights. 
Zoning to Coase himself is purely a kind of direct governmental regulation in order to confine 
certain types of business to certain districts (1988). In those analysis and evaluation of zoning, 
Coasians argue that zoning does not improve land use efficiency and zoning is a zero sum game. 
Empirical studies support that zoning is unnecessary by using Coasian value regression 
models which regresses land value against local amenities within a locality with a land use 
pattern that would produce externalities. Reuter (1973) proposes in his study of Pittsburgh case 
that externality is controlled efficiently by self-selection in the market and thus does not need 
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government intervention. Another research is Maser et al.’s study of Rochester, New York, which 
concludes that zoning is ineffective because the externalities could not be detected in zoned area 
except the case that zoning is associated with racial segregation (1977). Similar conclusion could 
also be found in Mark and Goldberg’s study of Vancouver Canada (1981). Those findings 
suggest that many zoning restrictions could be removed without leaving any significant negative 
impact on land value. In reality, land market forces are too strong for planning officials 
administrating a zoning statute to ignore. Empirical studies show that zoning regulation is 
constantly being adjusted to accommodate these forces (Stull, 1975). It seems that completely 
isolating the influence of the market from zoning is not possible. There are a few seemingly 
contradictory findings by Coasians. For instance, Lafferty and Frech III  (1978) in their Boston 
single family home market case found that certain configurations of land-uses under zoning are 
efficient in maximizing property values, though this may not be a direct endorsement of zoning 
because there are alternative means of influencing land uses and zoning introduces costs. Those 
research demonstrate that zoning does not improve land use efficiency or that zoning is just a zero 
sum game. 
Those studies suggest that the important point is not making a choice between zoning and 
non-zoning, but the institutions of either zoning or non-zoning (for instance, the institution of 
exclusive property rights achieved by zoning can also be obtained by zoning alternatives). It may 
then lead to the critiques of a conventional misperception of an opposing dichotomy of Pigovian 
approach and Coasian approach. The main misconception about Coase theory is that there is no 
need for any policy intervention of government. In fact, Coase’s real intention is to make the 
point that where transaction costs are positive, resource allocation is affected by the ways in 
which rights are assigned and the government play a positive role in influencing resource 
allocation and delineating property rights by assigning rights. So it is true that Coase considers 
government as being less efficient than the market, and takes zoning as such an inefficient 
example. This argument however needs to be taken with his caution that it does not do more than 
suggest that governmental regulation should be curtailed (rather than completely removed). He 
states in his argument about pollution: “if many people are harmed and there are several source of 
pollution, it is more difficult to reach a satisfactory solution through the market….As a practical 
matter, the market may become too costly to operate. In these circumstances, it may be preferable 
to impose special regulations, which confine manufacturing establishments to certain districts by 
zoning” (1959: 29). Government intervention arguments “does not do more than suggest that 
governmental regulation should be curtailed” (Coase, 1988: 119). The relevant problems are 
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when to intervene and how to intervene for government to minimize inefficiencies and social 
inequities and how is the effectiveness of the intervention.   
 
Public Choice Theses 
 
The review of Pigovian and Coasian paradigms does not provide clear answer to the 
reasons for public choice of land use control. The paradigms offer social and economic 
justifications for government intervention for social welfare (e.g. externalities) and transaction 
costs in land markets. Zoning is also a political response to land uses by the motivations behind it. 
But Coase deftly sidesteps the fundamental political and moral issues about the distribution of 
power, welfare, and opportunity (Banerjee, 1993). Regarding the question of why society chooses 
zoning (or non-zoning), Lai (1994) in his review of Coase’s theory of institutional economics 
suggest that it is a question of the nature of public choice in a land use restriction process. Zoning 
may actually respond to and then reflect the market through the efforts of property owners, 
developers and stakeholders who would encourage their favored land use regulations (e.g. zoning 
ordinances) to drive up their property values, as showed in the studies of development controls 
and greenbelt zoning in the UK by Hall (1973) and Evans (1991). This apparently runs in 
contradiction to zoning’s role for social welfare and transaction costs. Public choice thinkers 
Downs (1967), Buchanan (1968), Tiebout (1956), Mueller (1989) all question the relationships 
between markets, governments, and policy makers in the Pigovian social welfare paradigm and 
emphasize the limitations of conventional welfare economics. The implicit comparison of an 
incompetent market allocation with an ideal administrative intervention in land resource 
allocation needs to be challenged. Institutions such as voting and other decision making rules 
matter. While the social welfare paradigm emphasizes the outcomes, the expenses of the whole 
policy and political processes have been downplayed.     
The issue of zoning as a political response to personal interests in land resource allocation 
may be more closely relevant to the theory of public choice and its notion of government failure. 
Any claims for the costs of market failures have to be balanced by an assessment of the costs of 
government failure (Wolf, 1987; Mills, 1987). Government failures through excessive and 
incompetent administration generate transaction cost; all transactions between private consumers 
and public goods incur costs. These may introduce additional inefficiencies. Political concept like 
constituency is territory based and implies boundary delineation. From historical perspective, the 
evolution of zoning from a means to protect the individuals collectively within a state to a means 
to attenuate individuals’ rights is consistent with the property rights concept that an institution, 
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like the planning system, is a result of public choice (Lai, 1997). Public choice theses question the 
social welfare paradigm by examining the motivations of stakeholders involved in planning 
regulations. Buchanan (1984) takes zoning as a service provided by the municipalities. 
Politicians, for the interests more of their political ambitions than of social welfare, then of course 
want to make the zoning service attractive to potential voters through offering those voters 
favorable considerations of their suggestions in zoning ordinance making or rezoning process. 
Regulations promote or preserve the power of bureaucracies. As for the planning profession in 
the bureaucratic system, Duneleavy’s (1991) empirical study shows that for high-ranking 
bureaucrats seeking a leadership role, zoning rules that offer administrative and negotiation 
powers and place planning commissions and departments as a lead player in municipal affairs are 
highly desirable for their personal political interests. In this sense, zoning preserves and promotes 
the power of bureaucracies, which significantly consume public resources. Zoning is vulnerable 
to local politics. Some of the facts about political special interest intervention include bargaining, 
dealing, NIMBYism, administrative discretion and delays (Babcock and Siemon, 1985). Such 
vulnerability may result in lax enforcement of zoning, plans and zoning amendments under 
political pressure. Zoning then may not be able to offer consistency and sense of security as 
alternatives like private covenants, conditions, and restrictions to zoning provide in a form of 
private contract along with expensive litigation for the breaches.  
Property owners are the most important voters for whom property values and economic 
and social benefits of their properties are their direct concerns of their neighborhoods. Land use 
restrictions like zoning regulations offer those neighborhoods the possibilities of operating in the 
forms of neighborhood civic clubs, homeowners associations or community organizations to 
press zoning regulations to protect property values and maintain good neighborhood amenities. 
Zoning would assure those potential future owners in the neighborhoods share the same values 
and appreciate the same neighborhood characters of current property owners who press the 
zoning. Thus, together with politicians, bureaucrats, developers, speculators, homeowners also 
use zoning as a means to meet their special interests. Zoning are the rules agreed on by those 
interest groups to maintain their status quo and maximize their rewards. Public choice theory 
therefore provides an analytical approach to zoning institutions and behaviors.  It breaks the 
economic-political boundary and looks at how different actors in the land development process 
may behave. The theory seeks to address the question of society’s choice of alternative systems of 
land use, ownership, compensation—different groups’ preferences for different approaches for 
development controls. Citizen’s demands for alternative policies, laws and regulations may be 
addressed by public choice theory. 
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The real world described by Coase and by public choice theory is in fact closer to the 
understanding of zoning as an economic and political planning tool than the Pigovian social 
welfare. The Pigovian theses do not provides theory of public and private action motivations. A 
large part of the literature on zoning assumes that optimal regulations are imposed, but does not 
address the question of whether participants (bureaucrats, planners, developers, and residents, 
etc.) have incentive to follow the optimal rules (Pogodzinski and Sass, 1990). Governments, and 
bureaucrats, planners all have their individual and career interests that motivate their behavior in 
zoning. Private and social benefits can coincide and political incentives may emphasis such 
coincidences. Private motives might result in socially beneficial outcomes. Yet, this is not always 
and there are also cases that the two diverge. 
 
Market Supported Planning and Contractual Zoning 
 
Alexander (2001) uses transaction cost theory to categorize different forms and agents of 
governance in land development process and property market (Table 1). Planning and 
development controls take various forms. At the planning domain, there are administrative 
supported third-party governance and market supported bilateral governance. In the third-party 
governance model, government agents conduct statutory public planning, or sometimes delegate 
the tasks to professional consulting firms. In other words, a statutory system of public planning 
does not mean it all has to be done by public agencies, there is outsourcing of public planning. In 
the bilateral governance model, planning involves both or either governmental and private agents 
in a variety of combinations. Planning may involve government agencies, public-private 
partnerships (public/private mixed agents), and/or private agents such as firms, corporations, 
households, etc.). The private agents may conduct developer-initiated planning or informal 
planning. Statutory planning is a form of third-party governance linked to development control as 
mandated market regulation. The public planning under bilateral governance is not control and 
regulation of the market but intervention in the market, with government as landowner-developer 
and its related planning tasks.  
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Table 1: Forms and Agents of Governance in the Land Development Process and Property Market (Source: Alexander, 
2001). 
Public/government Private agents Public/government Mixed agents Priavte agents
agents (delegated) agents (public/private) (firms,
corporations,
households)
PLANNING Statutory Professional Public Public-private Developer-
public consultant developer- partnerships initiated
planning firms planner planning
(government (government/
agencies, public agencies) Informal
bureau) planning
Indicative 
planning:
(public planner
and/or delegated
consultants)
DEVELOPMENT infrastructure,
CONTROL public facilities/
open space,
indicative 
designation of
private land
uses/intensities
Regulatory: Contract zoning: Contractual
(government/ plan as CCGs between
public agency) condition of developer/
zoning, building contract of lease planning agent
regulations, or sale between and 
other public subsequent
(environmental, landowner and property 
hazard, special developer owners
area designation,
Third-party governance
(administrative support)
Bilaterial governance
(market support)
 
 
 
At the development control and zoning level, third-party governance leads to regulatory 
development control in the forms of zoning, growth controls, building regulations, and others like 
environmental regulations, hazard mitigation and special area designation, and so forth. Some 
researchers take the British planning regime as a system that has no zoning elements, except for a 
few enterprise zones, in the sense that all development except a few exempted classes of uses 
within the Council district, other than some special zones, must go through the development 
application procedure (Ball and Bell, 1991). Since the development rights nationalization in 1947, 
the zoning plan had gradually become a local structure development plan system where all 
development proposals are reviewed on their individual merits-a development control system. 
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This type of land use control can be included in the broad concept of zoning regarding boundary 
delineation because each local planning area can be seen as one zone within which all 
development goes through the development control process (Lai, 1997). In the British planning 
system, zones are created without prescribed prior uses. Forward planning elements are implicit, 
with the appearance of the lack of zoning. Besides the special form of British statutory zoning, 
statutory zoning imposed by planners is widely applied to most zoning system in the world 
including the US.  
The market supported bilateral governance takes two forms depending on the parties 
involved. When the state is the landowner, the public landowner writes the plan requirements into 
the land lease contract with the private agents. The Netherlands, Israel and Hong Kong adopt this 
contract zoning. Zoning by contract in Hong Kong has been in practice since 1842 where lands 
with restrictive covenants or lease conditions put on by the local authority are allocated as 
leasehold lots by auction, tender, or grant to individual (urban land reforms in China adopted 
Hong Kong’s leasehold system with some changes, China makes zoning plan or “detailed 
regulatory plan” before any land contracts between the government and individuals are possible.) 
The lease is a civil contract between the government and the property owners. Renegotiation for 
lease modification between the government and the individuals is possible. When the planner-
landowner is a private developer, development control takes the form of contractual covenants 
and deed restrictions. Such contractual obligations put restrictions on land development can be 
made by private individuals and then the contracts are enforceable by the government. Houston is 
a case in point (Siegan, 1972). Houston lands are controlled by private covenants, subdivision 
regulations, and building code.  
Contractual zoning may also exist before the inception of statutory zoning. When zoning 
ordinances were adopted by municipalities for the first time, zoning prescription may or may not 
be the same as the existing land uses, the state-imposed uses and other restrictions followed the 
pre-existing ones. Zoning took into account of the existing boundaries delineated by the property 
owners. Zoning restrictions on land use, development intensity, and development boundary are 
implemented in the land development control process. In this process, the land owners’ freedom 
in their property rights is superseded by government determination, and thus their private 
property rights are attenuated by government specified measures. Their rights to use and derive 
income from land can be attenuated by a series of restrictions on the scale and intensity of land 
uses. Their rights to alienate land can be attenuated by requirement of joint development with the 
property of other owners or simply attenuated by restrictions over land subdivision. 
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Land allocation with restrictive covenants and possible subsequent permission to change 
use is a scenario of initial assignment of property rights by zoning by contract (with government 
or among individuals, like Hong Kong and Houston respectively) and subsequent change of rights 
driven by the market. This may be an ideal scenario proposed by Coase. Similar concepts include 
saleable zoning (Nelson, 1977; Fishel, 1979) and the auction of zoning or development rights 
(Mills, 1989). Saleable zoning allows restrictions on land use, intensity and boundary of 
development to be settled by contract (enforceable by the state) rather than statutory regulations.    
The zoning controls range from contractual approaches to statutory approaches. All the 
variants of zoning achieve different degrees of property rights attenuation. Therefore, it would be 
more meaningful to explore different types of zoning with different degrees of land right 
attenuation than to argue about either zoning or ‘non-zoning’.  
 
Review of Empirical Literature on Zoning and Its Alternatives 
 
The section review of empirical findings includes research on zoning as a legal 
instrument and as an institutional device, alternatives to zoning (including those comparative 
studies for zoned and unzoned cities), land use controls and neighborhood diversity, urban form 
and land use controls, and urban form measurements. The review aims to provide a current 
understanding of zoning (and its alternatives), urban form, neighborhood land use planning and 
their complicated relationships. The dissertation research structure and specific research questions 
will be drawn from the review. 
 
Zoning as a Legal Instrument 
 
Local land use regulations include zoning and other planning requirements such as 
building codes, subdivision ordinances, and development fees. Zoning regulations were adopted 
as the first generation land use controls in contrast to the second generation restrictions on land 
use that focus on state level growth management and planning mandates (Navarro and Carson, 
1991). The historical roots of land use planning can be traced back to the early 20th century when 
planning commissions were created and zoning regulations were established through the 
American City Planning Institute (Catanese, 1979). The establishment of planners as a profession 
made the first generation of land use regulation widely accepted functions and brought zoning as 
a new and important planning tool. The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, published in 1924 
by the Department of Commerce, became a model for the states to legislate their own zoning 
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ordinances. Although not a legal reason, zoning advocates justify zoning as the necessity for 
protecting and even enhancing commercial and residential property values. The traditional 
arguments can be traced back to the nation’s first zoning ordinance in New York and later in 
Chicago. Much of the impetus of New York’s 1916 zoning ordinance came from Fifth Avenue 
retailers’ efforts to stop the encroachment of the garment industry’s buildings in Manhattan. In 
Chicago, the proponents of the first zoning ordinance argued that eliminating objectionable land 
use and other negative externalities would raise property values by one billion dollars over 25 
years (Babcock, 1966). Local zoning regulations originated in cities nationwide during the 1920s 
and 1930s. For many years, zoning was the dominant form of land use control. After the 
existence of zoning for decades, empirical evidence has not been clear enough to support the 
rationale that zoning enhances property values, though zoning works well to steer land use with 
negative externalities to sites where they do least harm (Steele, 1987; Fischel, 1990; McMillen 
and McDonald, 1993).  
Zoning is taken as a comprehensive planning tool aiming at improving a city’s social and 
physical conditions. Advocates state that zoning shall conform to a comprehensive plan with a 
broader scope than the zoning scheme; otherwise zoning ordinance lacks coherence and discipline 
in the pursuit for goals of public welfare (Babcock, 1966; Nelson, 1977). Although planning may 
be desirable, planning may be just as arbitrary and irrational as zoning (Babcock, 1966). In most 
communities, zoning is driven by political interests instead of by professional comprehensive 
planning (Rose, 1985). In the cases of mega urban project development, zoning often plays a 
minor role among the array of planning tools such as cofinancing, grants and tax incentive 
programs, special districts, negotiated development, and linkage exactions (Malloy, 1987; Weiss, 
1992). There is even a suggestion that zoning is not a necessary component of successful urban 
planning (Siegan, 1972). Free market conservatives favoring limited government intervention are 
likely to make this argument as zoning implies more regulation. However, the argument has been 
challenged , because it does not count land use externalities and spillovers (Ellickson, 1973; 
Fischel, 1985), and thus an analysis of zoning based only on market values is deeply flawed 
(Karkkainen, 1994). Zoning protects values that only partially captured in market values rather 
than protecting land market values.   
Zoning tends to treat property owners with different ways. Zoning in some cases has 
beneficial outcomes such as controlling nuisances. But it might result in uncompensated taking of 
private property in violation of constitutional principles and fundamental norms of fairness 
(Epsten, 1985). Zoning reduces some property values while raising others; it may in some forms 
effectively allow current homeowners to skim off developers’ profits, violating principles of 
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horizontal equity. Therefore, political process of zoning is biased in favor of local property 
owners (Ellickson, 1990). More radical economic critiques suggest that zoning provides no 
benefit to homeowners, or that such benefits are isolated, fortuitous, and incidental results of a 
fundamentally misconceived regulatory scheme (McMillen and McDonald, 1993). The benefit to 
homeowners does not justify the harm to would-be developers, even if the benefit to homeowners 
outweighs the harm to would-be developers (Karkkainen, 1994). 
The exclusionary effect of zoning is well documented as zoning ordinance’s intended or 
unintended purposes of excluding racial groups, economics classes and economic activities. The 
exclusionary is a much more serious issue in suburban areas, partly because big cities tend to be 
less exclusionary (Nelson, 1977), and partly because new land use decisions with the largest sizes 
and largest investment often are made in suburban areas where zoning has been seen as an 
important planning tool (Fischel, 1990). Karkkainen (1994) argues that racial and economic class 
exclusion should be addressed by constitutional and statutory equal protection claims instead of 
scrapping zoning because constitutional doctrine gives little protection against classifications 
based on economic status which is strongly correlated with race. 
 
Zoning as an Institutional Device 
 
The institutions and practices of zoning vary from city to city. There are nevertheless 
common characteristics among all zoning ordinances. Posner (1992) explains two types of 
zoning: separation-of-use zoning divides zones and permits only certain land uses in each zone, 
so that there are separate zones for high-rise apartments, single family homes, for commercial, for 
industries, and so on. Exclusionary zoning, the second type of zoning, tries to exclude certain 
uses altogether through devices like bans on multifamily housing, lot size and width, building 
sizes, density and so on. In fact, as Silver (1997) argues about early zoning practice, southern 
cities were implementing racial zoning ordinances even before separation-of-use zoning was 
invented, and when the black population spread outside the South, the exclusionary zoning spread 
with it. Silver (1997:27) writes “the racial zoning…is a central feature of American planning 
history”. The movement of zoning and limitations on immigration occurred at the same historical 
moment (Perin, 1997). The nation’s first modern zoning ordinance in New York in 1916 made it 
clear that the motivation for zoning has been as much about the segregation of land users as the 
segregation of land uses (Toll, 1969). 
After analyzing several hundred new city formations from 1950 to 1990, Burns (1994) 
concludes that the ability to zone in order to meet the exclusion demand has provided the impetus 
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for the incorporation of new cities. City formations were partly encouraged by the white so that 
the new city could provide exclusionary zoning. Although there were also financial motivations 
for the formation of homogeneous cities, “the evidence suggests that the operative concern here 
was race and not simply the low-income population” (Burns, 1994, p. 91). In this case, zoning has 
been used as an institutional device. In response to exclusionary zoning, after a judicial attack on 
zoning in the law case of Mount Laurel v. NAACP by New Jersey Supreme Court, the open 
suburbs movement in New Jersey in the 1970s required each community in the state to rezone to 
accommodate its share of low-income homes. However, the movement’s impact on the practice 
of exclusionary zoning has been negligible (Briffault, 1990). More recently, zoning has been 
under a postmodernist attack: the ideal of a culturally diverse network of urban life is impeded by 
separation-of-use zoning (Young, 1990). 
At the local level the residents can choose from different municipalities which offer 
various bundles of taxes and public goods. According to Tiebout (1956), the citizens reveal their 
preferences in choosing their residential locations. The citizens cannot avoid revealing their 
preferences in a spatial economy. The importance of zoning in the Tiebout model was 
demonstrated by Hamilton (1975). He argues that exclusionary zoning can salvage the efficiency 
properties of the Tiebout model by promoting homogeneity of housing within a neighborhood, 
the property tax is then turned into a benefits tax, which provides the marginal-cost pricing 
mechanism required by the model. In Tiebout model, spatial mobility must be conditioned on the 
local service affordability. Exclusionary zoning has been an institution that restricts residents’ 
spatial mobility. In addition to those politically and economically powerful residents, politically 
well connected developers are often able to win zoning changes as they need through campaign 
contributions to key decision-makers, large fees to politically-connected attorneys, outright 
bribes, and personal relationships with elected officials, politicians and professionals 
(Krasnowiecki, 1980; Fischel, 1985). In this regard, zoning is more political than professional. 
The study of zoning describes land use controls as exclusionary, elitist and status-biased 
(Molotch, 1976; Logan and Molotch, 1987; Bollens, 1990; Donovan and Neiman, 1992). The 
social class hypothesis argues that higher income and higher educational attainment levels are 
more likely to practice strict land use controls and thus form homogeneous communities with 
better amenities and higher life quality (Feiock, 2004). Moreover, political fragmentation favored 
by small local governments undermines the overall land use controls. Through the formation of 
new local governments as residents attempt to gain a greater degree of autonomy, a community 
can regulate land use and control the rate and composition of new development within its 
boundaries (Lewis, 1996). Communities then draw on zoning and other land use controls to 
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enforce their preferences for suburban single family housing. Community-based land use 
regulation may create increased growth and congestion in other areas by locating new 
development outside those communities (Fischel, 1985; Downs, 1999). Therefore, community 
land use physical patterns are reinforced by political institutions at community levels, or political 
fragmentation. There is mismatch between the local land use regulation and larger scale (e.g. 
regional) attempts under a decentralized land use governance (Bollens, 1993). The more 
fragmented the institutional setting of a region, the less the overall consistency of land use 
regulation in a city (Carruthers, 2002). Carruthers uses per capita municipalities and per capita 
special districts to measure political fragmentation. He found that political fragmentation is 
associated with lower urban densities, higher property values, and lesser amounts of urbanized 
land. In contrast, central city and counties with consolidated city-county governments are denser, 
contain greater amounts of urbanized land, and have lower property values. 
Both as a legal instrument and institutional device, zoning should not be understood as a 
tool of purely scientific and professional urban planning because politics, partisan composition 
(e.g. the ideology of the Democratic Party has been more supportive of regulation and 
government intervention in markets) and vision differences among city politicians, planning 
professionals and neighborhood residents might be significant (Talen, 2005). Therefore, ideal 
zoning has to accommodate individual variances, neighborhood diversity, changes over time, and 
periodic comprehensive updates. 
 
Alternatives to Zoning 
 
Laissez-faire states appreciate a political culture that supports the limited public policy 
instruments and considerable private land development decision making. Many communities in 
those states implement land use plans with little or no zoning or subdivision regulations (Kaiser et 
al., 1995). Advocates of land use controls with mandatory government regulations criticize that 
those communities are ineffective in preserving natural resources, containing urban sprawl, and 
mitigating losses from hazardous events (French and Nelson, 1996; Burby et al., 1998; Knaap and 
Nelson, 1992; Nelson and Duncan, 1995). 
Alternatives to zoning include covenants, nuisance rules, and fines as land use controls 
(Ellickson, 1973). Deed restrictions, or restrictive covenants, are used in addition to zoning in 
order to for those homeowners to achieve more restrictive land use controls than those specified 
in zoning ordinances. For cities without zoning, deed restrictions become the most important 
mechanism for land use controls. They are private agreements and are binding upon every owner 
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in a subdivision. All future owners have to agree to the items in deed restrictions when they 
purchase properties in those subdivisions. The main purpose of deed restrictions is to keep 
commercial and industrial land uses away from residential uses. Most deed restrictions are valid 
for a certain period of time (e.g. 25 to 30 years in Houston) with a provision for automatic 
renewal unless otherwise prevented, or renewed by written approval of a certain percent of 
property owners. As a private contract, the conditions of deed restrictions vary from 
neighborhood to neighborhood. Landowners must be convinced to enter into deed restrictions 
voluntarily (Fischel, 1985). In most cases, subdivision residents establish homeowner 
associations and contribute to those associations financially in order to monitor and enforce the 
private covenants. 
Several legal institutions empower the local government to enforce private deed 
restrictions as an alternative to zoning to realize land use control (Henderson, 1987). For instance, 
according to the Restrictive Covenant Enforcement Acts of Texas (1965), communities were 
allowed to sue to enforce deed restrictions when a land use restriction was violated and it 
threatened a neighborhood’s residential characteristics. Municipalities may assist neighborhood 
organizations to enforce deed restrictions. However, many deed restriction violations cannot be 
covered by municipal enforcements (Berry, 2001). Under the Acts, building permits can be 
denied for projects that do not comply with deed restrictions on use, setback requirements, lot 
sizes, type and number of buildings. Through the denial of building permits, cities can deny new 
projects that would violate deed restrictions. Homeowner associations monitor and enforce those 
deed restriction provisions that are not covered by the Acts. 
There are a few studies that compare the cities with zoning ordinances with those that 
without zoning, on housing price, land prices, and residential segregation. Siegan (1972) argues 
that the market-place provides economic incentives for land use separation similar to what is 
found under zoning. However, he did find that the price for multifamily housing is different 
between zoned and unzoned cities when he compared Dallas with Houston. To Siegan, Houston 
established a strong case that zoning is the major factor accountable for the multifamily housing 
price differences. Fischel (1985), however, attributes the reasons to nuisances that zoning would 
have prevented as “we so often concentrate on zoning as excessively raising the price of housing 
that we forget that housing might be priced too low if it is devalued by the threat of 
uncompensated nuisances” (p. 233). Furman’s (1982) study of housing price in Houston finds 
that properties, mostly single family houses, under deed restrictions carry price premiums over 
those properties that are not covered by any deed restrictions. 
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Peiser (1981) studied two pro-development cities Houston and Dallas and found that land 
development in Dallas is more likely to be adjacent to existing subdivisions than in Houston. 
Thus land prices reflected the narrower choice in Dallas, which led to higher land prices in the 
city. Unlike zoning, subdivision restrictions do not protect property owners against undesirable 
land use change adjacent that is not covered by their deed restrictions. Such loss of control 
concerning adjacent land uses that may lower the values of deed restriction-protected properties 
exposes the weakness of the absence of zoning in Houston. For land development, the benefits of 
the absence of zoning may extend beyond the time and cost savings of the zoning process itself. 
Land use is more flexible and can respond more quickly to the market than in zoned cities. The 
regulatory schemes place more incentive for developers in Houston, while the density of 
development and its interconnection with existing utilities is more controlled in Dallas. Another 
more recent study examined the developer’s decision about density of development at the 
disaggregated, subdivision level, and the relative influence of zoning rules versus market forces 
(McConnell et al., 2006). It found that both zoning rules and economic variables are important in 
determining density. The study argued that the subdivisions constrained by the lowest density 
limits would have been nearly 50% denser absent any zoning regulations.  
In a comparative study regarding residential zoning, Berry (2001) concludes that there 
are other methods of land use control that can produce similar results in the absence of zoning, 
that is, deed restrictions in Houston achieve what zoning achieves in Dallas. In other words, 
zoning simply does not matter, at least for residential segregation. If racial homogeneity is valued 
by some homeowners, they would compensate developers for not building undesirable housing 
through higher prices for covenant-restricted properties. If the use of land for multifamily housing 
were more valuable, developers might compensate neighboring homeowners in effect purchasing 
the right. Zoning-like outcomes are produced through private market exchanges of property rights 
(Berry, 2001). However, because zoning is established through legal and political process, 
developers cannot compensate neighboring homeowners for the right of building multifamily 
housing due to the high cost of reallocating zoning entitlements. Berry even proposes a 
hypothesis that residential segregation is attributable more to the use of private covenants than to 
zoning, but there is no empirical evidence to test this hypothesis.  
Abolishing zoning would not necessarily effect a cure to exclusionary zoning outcomes 
(Marks, 1994; Fischel, 1990); private tools like deed restrictions will have similar goal of 
exclusion (Berry, 2001) through purchases of large private tracts of land, or developments on 
large lots enforced by informal social norms (Heilbrum, 1987; O’Sullivan, 1996). However, 
private covenants are likely to be effective only in undeveloped areas where they are imposed as 
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part of the subdivision of a large parcel because the cost of getting all residents to agree to deed 
restrictions is very high (Ellickson, 1990). NIMBY also excludes legal but locally undesirable 
land uses from those politically powerful residents’ communities. The political power is often 
correlated with racial and socio-economic status in such a way that lower income and minority 
communities have to suffer undesirable land uses like waste disposal sites, homeless shelters, 
drug and alcohol treatment centers, and even landfills and incinerators (Been, 1993; Bright, 1992, 
2000). The political dynamic of NIMBY is not necessary co-extensive with zoning: cities without 
zoning like Houston has its share of NIMBY-like land use patterns because market forces play a 
greater role than sitting decisions (Been, 1994).   
 
Land Use Controls and Neighborhood Diversity 
 
Classic works have criticized zoning which is considered as a barrier to diversity. Lewis 
Mumford argued that the mechanisms largely put into place with the help of planners—zoning—
had reduced the city’s capacity to foster its primary function of human exchange—“the maximum 
interplay of capacities and functions (Mumford, 1949: 38). From sociological perspective, zoning 
stifles the diversity of land uses and segregates land use types in neighborhoods; and it distorts 
the natural land use allocation, which is harmful to economic innovation and growth, as well as to 
the flowering of culture and the natural pleasure of urban life (Jacobs, 1961).  
More recently, out of the classic works on the critical importance of biodiversity (Wilson, 
1988), planners have drawn increasingly stronger connections between the diversity of plant and 
animal species and the need to foster a heterogeneous human pattern. It is through diversity that 
pluralist societies, defined as “heterogeneous groups within a space” achieve unity (Steiner, 2002: 
34). A recent American Planning Association publication Codifying New Urbanism: How to 
Reform Municipal Land Development Regulations (2004) makes link between diversity and 
zoning explicitly. Mixed use zones are called for various uses, building types and densities and 
even mixed use within an individual building. However, most theories of land use patterns pertain 
to segregation rather than diversity (Talen, 2005). Economists have argued that social mix is 
actually a theoretical impossibility, and that “even with elimination of all institutional practices 
that hinder spatial integration, market-based factors would still drive some forms of spatial 
segregation in a metropolitan area” (Wassmer, 2001: 2). In addition, sociologists have theorized 
that social homogeneity strengthens social support networks, helps protect against discrimination, 
and helps to preserve cultural heritage (Suttles, 1972). Grant’s (2002) study of “mixed use in 
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theory and practice” concluded that mixed use promises much but delivers little as it operates 
amidst “social and economic forces” that promote land use separation (p.71). 
The physical form of diverse places has been studied by Nyden et al. (1998). They found 
that physical factors contribute stable diverse neighborhoods include attractive physical 
characteristics, access to public transportation and employment, economic activity diversity, 
housing stock variety, proximity to downtown, and the existence of “social seams” in the form of 
schools, parks, or a strip of neighborhood stores. Rather than a result of deliberate policy 
intervention, some neighborhoods are diverse because of underlying social and economic 
processes that allowed a mix but stopped short of complete displacement. It is also important to 
investigate the places that are already diverse and work to sustain them. As Rowley concluded, 
“we must treasure mixed-use diversity wherever we find it” as a way of counter-balancing 
inauthentic, new mixed-use developments that are only “a very pale imitation of the genuine 
article” (Rowley, 1996: 95). There are connections between physical form, zoning and 
neighborhood diversity but that understanding them will require an acknowledgement that the 
connections are worth figuring out. 
 
Urban Form and Land Use Controls 
 
Urban form generally refers to the spatial configuration and patterns of land use. Urban 
form has both morphological and functional characteristics. Morphological arrangement refers to 
physical and spatial patterns of a place, such as building design, style, density and variation. 
Functional arrangement refers to the spatial zoning and land allocation (Van Diepen and Voogd, 
2001). Morphological and functional characteristics of urban form are integral. Urban forms that 
are accompanied by more sustainable practices are labeled as “sustainable urban forms” 
(Breheny, 1992; Anderson and Kanaroglou, 1996; Jenks et al., 1996; Banister et al., 1997). Urban 
form points at the extent of sustainability of land use control effects, either from public sector 
agencies or from private sectors agreements that correspond to the morphology and functionality 
of the built environment. With this perspective, it is necessary to study the relationship between 
land use controls and types of urban form—a hypothetical causal relationship could be 
established between land use controls and urban form. From planning perspective, the relation 
between land use controls and urban form is complicated as it relates to questions about private 
and public costs, social relationships, and economic and political feasibility. Moreover, urban 
form is a dynamic process which evolves over time as the outcome of changing land use polices 
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and agreements. Changes in physical form are sometimes a necessary precondition for urban 
economic, social, and ecological change, while sometimes an outcome of them. 
There is an extended body of literature that mentions the complexity of the mutual 
relationships between urban form and sustainable land use (McLaren, 1992; Owens, 1992, 1995; 
Breheny, 1992; Jenks et al., 1996). There are transportation studies that attempt to measuring 
urban form by density, service levels, public transport (Huigen, 1986; Newman and Kenworthy, 
1989, 1992; Banister, 1992), urban size (Breheny, 1995), local facility provision (Farthing et al., 
1996), open space amount (Banister et al., 1997), diversity (Cervero and Kockelman, 1997), 
mixed land use, and presence of sidewalks (Kitmura et al., 1997).  
Much of urban form research has been focused on a design perspective; response among 
social scientists has been limited and unproductive, both from practical issues and theoretical 
debates. However, any change of urban form implies a sociology and a politics. A superficial 
environmental determinism often fails to respond to the issues of social equity related to the 
structural connections between the organization of urban space and the patterns of class and race 
in society (Lefebvre, 1991; Gottdiener, 1985; Zukin, 1991; Smith, 1996). Healey’s (1992) 
collaborative planning approach implies that in order to make land use planning more sustainable, 
investigation is called for the relationships between land users and their surrounding environment, 
which evolves as an outcome of planning decisions made by residential individuals, 
neighborhood organizations, business groups and public sectors agencies. Recently, urban 
sociology has focused on the relationship between urban form and the patterns of social 
inequality of race, class, and gender. There is work that links place to the social and economic 
structuring of regions (Dreier, Mollenkopf and Swanstrom, 2001). There is also research 
exploring the implications of demographic changes in the suburbs of the last couple of decades 
(Patillo-MaCoy, 1999; Haynes, 2001; Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum, 2000).  
Conventional planning has focused on functions, mitigating the externalities resulting 
from market-driven patterns by separating land uses into zones. Traditional neighborhood design 
focuses on the form in which uses are assembled and ways that proximity and a mix of uses can 
generate positive effects as a result of qualities of form (Brain, 2005). Urban form built by both 
types of design is a value proposition that has to do with social and political relationships. Every 
level of the complicated institutional matrix determines urban form: from federal policy to local 
land use regulation, from the practices of planning and design professions to the routines of 
developers, bankers, transportation engineers, regulators, and builders; from the interests of 
elected officials to the habits of homebuyers and citizens (Logan and Molotch, 1987, Fisher, 
1989; Kirby and Lynch, 1987; Brain, 2005). 
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Empirical Research on Houston’s Contractual Zoning 
 
Houston adopts a laissez faire economic and urban development policy. The government 
only provides basic services like courts, police, fire prevention, infrastructure and sewage funded 
mainly by property tax. Statutory planning legislation controlling land use is virtually absent. 
There is no statutory zoning system. Therefore, the pattern of land uses is determined by profit 
motives and business decisions. Land uses are changeable at will of the land owners, subject to 
restrictive covenants attached to the titles. Basic forms of planning control however exists in the 
forms of a government run infrastructure system, privately imposed restrictive covenants in first 
granted freehold titles enforced by government, and subdivision controls for new development.   
Both Houston’s pro-growth economic environment and minimal government intervention 
political environment have fascinated scholars. In spite of city’s status of “non-zoning”, relatively 
little has been written about land use in Houston. Real estate lawyer Bernard Siegan’s Land Use 
Without Zoning (1972) remains the definitive document on Houston’s “non-zoning”. According 
to Siegan, the market-place provides economic incentives for segregation of uses and produces 
patterns of development similar to what is found under zoning. As he put it, “economic forces 
tend to make for a separation of uses even without zoning” (Siegan, 1972: 75). Siegan also sets 
forth the argument of Houston’s unplanned, unregulated development in a set of articles 
defending the City’s refusal to enact a zoning code. He asserts that land use regulation in Houston 
is extremely modest when compared to what is contained in most zoning ordinances because 
Houston has no ordinance that sets forth specific restrictions on the uses that may be established 
on any property. More recent studies address Houston from different perspectives such as urban 
geography (Kirby and Lynch, 1987; Shelton, 1989; Vojnovic 2003), political science 
(Gainsborough, 2001), public policy (Fisher, 1989) and legal and economics (Berry, 2001), but 
few from land use planning. For instance, the most recent research on Houston is from urban 
governance perspective (Vojnovic, 2003) where the political and social forces that have shaped 
local governance is explored. It employs two theoretical interpretations--the public choice and 
political economy in explaining Houston’s governance and public policy directions, and 
concludes that the new directions in Houston’s policy are a reflection of a different growth 
strategy reflecting changing demographics and diversifying economy. Gainsborough’s (2001) 
research explores the politics of regional cooperation in Houston, focusing in particular on the 
role of the state in facilitating or inhibiting metropolitan-wide approaches to urban problems. 
Gainsborough argues that while generous annexation rules have facilitated regionalism in 
Houston, these rules are themselves only as powerful as the political consensus to use and 
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maintain them. Regionalism in Houston is more often defined in terms of systems maintenance 
functions rather than lifestyle functions. In addition, urban sociologists often portray Houston as 
an archetype free enterprise, capitalist, or laissez-faire city (Feagin, 1998; Lamare, 1998; Lin, 
1995). All those previous studies provide solid background and politico-economic context for this 
research on Houston’s land use planning approaches in the lack of zoning regulation.  
There are a few comparative studies that compare the cities with zoning ordinances with 
Houston, on housing prices, land prices, and residential segregation. Siegan (1972) argues that the 
market-place provides economic incentives for land use separation similar to what is found under 
zoning. However, he did find that the price for multifamily housing is different between zoned 
and unzoned cities when he compared Dallas with Houston. To Siegan, Houston established a 
strong case that zoning is the major factor accountable for the multifamily housing price 
differences. Fischel (1987), however, attributes the reasons to nuisances that zoning would have 
prevented as “we so often concentrate on zoning as excessively raising the price of housing that 
we forget that housing might be priced too low if it is devalued by the threat of uncompensated 
nuisances” (p. 233). Furman’s (1982) study of housing price in Houston finds that properties, 
mostly single family houses, under deed restrictions carry price premiums over those properties 
that are not covered by any deed restrictions. A careful study of single family house prices for 
1978 in Bellaire, West University Place (two small zoned municipalities that are completely 
surrounded by the city of Houston), and Houston by Speyrer (1989) showed that owners paid 7.0 
percent more for houses in areas with zoning compared to areas without zoning or deed 
restrictions. Houses in areas with effective deed restrictions sold for 8.7 percent more than houses 
in areas without zoning or deed restrictions, while difference between the 7.0 percent and the 8.7 
percent premiums was not significant. It shows that deed restrictions effectively protect rich 
neighborhood by maintaining their higher property values.  
Peiser (1981) studied two pro-development cities Houston and Dallas and found that land 
development in Dallas is more likely to be adjacent to existing subdivisions than in Houston. 
Thus land prices reflected the narrower choice in Dallas, which led to higher land prices in the 
city. Unlike zoning, subdivision restrictions do not protect property owners against undesirable 
land use change adjacent that is not covered by their deed restrictions. Such loss of control 
concerning adjacent land uses that may lower the values of deed restriction protected properties 
exposes the weakness of the absence of zoning in Houston. For land development, the benefits of 
the absence of zoning may extend beyond the time and cost savings of the zoning process itself. 
Land use is more flexible and can respond more quickly to the market than in zoned cities. The 
regulatory schemes place more incentive for developers in Houston, while the density of 
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development and its interconnection with existing utilities is more controlled in Dallas. Another 
more recent study examined the developer’s decision about density of development at the 
disaggregated, subdivision level, and the relative influence of zoning rules versus market forces 
(McConnell et al., 2006), it found that both zoning rules and economic variables are important in 
determining density. The study argued that the subdivisions constrained by the lowest density 
limits would have been nearly 50% denser absent any zoning regulations.  
After a comparative study regarding zoning and residential, Berry (2001) concludes that 
there are other methods of land use control that can produce similar results in the absence of 
zoning, that is, deed restrictions in Houston achieve what zoning achieves in Dallas. In other 
words, zoning simply does not matter, at least for residential segregation. If racial homogeneity is 
valued by some homeowners, they would compensate developers for not building undesirable 
housing through higher prices for covenant-restricted properties. If the use of land for multifamily 
housing were more valuable, developers might compensate neighboring homeowners in effect 
purchasing the right. Zoning-like outcomes are produced through private market exchanges of 
property rights (Berry, 2001). However, because zoning is established through legal and political 
process, developers cannot compensate neighboring homeowners for the right of building 
multifamily housing due to the high cost of reallocating zoning entitlements. Berry even proposes 
a hypothesis that residential segregation is attributable more to the use of private covenants than 
to zoning, but there is no empirical evidence to test this hypothesis.  
 
Towards an Institutional Economic Conceptual Framework 
 
The process of land development and the transformation of built environment can be 
understood as a sequence of complicated transactions, mainly include property rights transfers 
and procurements. For research on land development controls, robust analytical methodologies 
are required to examine the outcome and process of alternative tools of development controls, and 
understand how policies impact urban development processes. One of the most important strands 
of theory is to analyze land use regulation using a property rights paradigm. Coasian and public 
choice analysis of zoning is an example of this analytical approach. It focuses on the allocation of 
property rights rather than the allocation of productive resources. Zoning can be conceptualized 
as a form of property rights, an assignment of restrictive rights over private property. A property 
rights paradigm provides a framework for analyzing allocative and process efficiency in land 
resource management. The public choice theses apply the rules of microeconomics to analyze the 
efficiency of alternative property rights, policies and institutions. The section aims to integrate the 
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three theoretical paradigms on land use zoning to propose a conceptual framework for contractual 
zoning under private agreement.  
Each case study only relates to a particular geographical area and the findings only reflect 
the time period of that study, while the market condition and the performance of zoning might 
change over time. The Coasian and public choice theories imply that when geography, time, the 
environment, local politics and life style choices are added to the debate about zoning, it is 
difficult to decide what, when, where, who and how to control land use. There is, therefore, no 
general conclusion to the merit of zoning debate. Instead, the debate on zoning has to be case 
specific, context specific, locality specific as individual cases because local geographical, 
political, social, and economic conditions are significantly variable. In practice, various forms of 
land use regulations and their relevant public regulations are required to facilitate land 
development. From political perspective, zoning has broad meaning which includes all spatial 
arrangements in a polity. Broader understanding of zoning therefore implies a special polity (Lai, 
1994, 1997). To this end, the relevant question might be why the society chooses a specific land 
zoning system and what the political and socioeconomic reasons behind such option are.  
Some ideas of the theoretical paradigms can be integrated, with a plausible continuum of 
zoning ranging from statutory zoning with pre-specified uses, zoning without pre-specified uses, 
to contractual zoning by private agreement instead of the conventional understanding of zoning as 
bipolarity (i.e. zoning or non-zoning). When one reconsiders the Pigovian approach in which 
zoning is used to correct market failure in order to internalize externalities and the Coasian 
approach in which zoning is adopted to reduce transaction costs in land market, a better 
understanding of the two might be the distinction between public planning by government and 
private planning by non-government in the market, instead of a distinction between free market 
and government intervention. The distinction between planning and market in the planning field 
is misleading as Sowell argues “every economic activity under every conceivable form of society 
has been planned. What differs are the decision making units that do the planning….[Government 
planning] is the forcible superseding of other people’s plans by government officials (Sowell, 
1980 as quoted in Kwong 1990: 55). It is possible public planning and private planning coexist, 
and then the critical question to ask is how they coexist and to what extent they get involved in 
land use boundary delineation. To address those questions, an investigation of institutional design 
in different land use control system becomes necessary. There is the complementarity between 
government, civil society, and the market under the overarching concept of governance (Sanyal, 
2002; Healey, 1998). This demands detailed analysis of the relevant interacting agents, 
identifying their critical characteristics and results.  
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There is a need to explore the rules or workings of development controls of private 
contractual zoning, in which government and private sector interface. Contractual zoning can be 
understood as a property rights activity and a direct coordinating activity. This is particularly 
intriguing when planning co-exists with the private sector market place. Under the contractual 
zoning, it is necessary to develop frameworks so that comparative experience related to 
stakeholder interests can be conducted in a society with social and economic diversity. Just as it is 
important to investigate the statutory zoning system, it is also important to study the decision 
making units that do the zoning in the form of private firms. Coasian and public choice theories 
suggest comparative approaches to reveal the differences in institutional arrangements between 
the land markets where decisions made by individuals and private firms, and those where 
decisions made by planners. The judgment of land use planning can be evaluated in terms of the 
differences in the institutional design of different planning systems (e.g. those with zoning system 
and those that do not), or changes in land use rights assignment (about land boundary or uses) 
within a certain planning system. For contractual zoning between private agents, the issue of scale 
of the area within which they are applied (city wide versus specific neighborhoods) is also 
debatable.    
Property rights have their common nature which is to exclude others in land use. The 
exclusive nature in land use is inseparable from boundary delineation as land as a good has 
physical attributes or spatial dimension, as distinct from a legal set of rights attached (Pearce, 
1981). The concept of boundary delineation could be implied in land laws other than statutory 
zoning. While research on private contractual zoning (e.g. the comparative cases for Houston) 
usually focuses on property values and its socioeconomic results (e.g. racial segregation), 
different degrees of land use restrictions may result in cross-sectional spatial form variations 
among geographical areas (e.g. neighborhoods). Chronological changes in land use restrictions 
may also result in spatial dimension variation in a neighborhood under a given land use control 
system. Both cross-sectional spatial form variations and chronological changes can be a 
comparative approach to reveal how lands with or without private contractual zoning evolve. For 
government intervention, even in the case of contractual zoning where such intervention is 
curtailed, the imposition of constraints for market operation does not directly interfere with the 
spatial aspects of production. Instead, those interventions are typically achieved through tax, 
subsidy, or production quota. However, by using a series of rules, policies, and standards for land 
use activities, and government infrastructure system, government funded mega projects, and 
urban regeneration, planners held land use intervention tools from spatial aspects which regulate 
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the location, dimension, density, time of the production. Spatial dimension of land is the result of 
a specific institutional design.  
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CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
The conceptual framework set an overall aim for this study. That was to analyze how 
urban land policy is being implemented by the local government and the nongovernmental sectors 
in Houston in order to identify and evaluate the roles of local government and nongovernmental 
interest groups and stakeholders in urban land development mechanisms without a zoning 
ordinance, and to explore land use diversity and urban form that have evolved and their causal 
relationships with socioeconomic characteristics in three neighborhoods. In support of this 
fundamental aim, the hypotheses of this research were set: 1) Despite the lack of zoning law, 
Houston’s regulatory land use polices (with many zoning elements) have significant influence on 
its urban development and urban form, particularly at the citywide scale; 2) private land use 
controls may result in the diversity of land use patterns and the different degrees of chronological 
changes of urban form at the neighborhood level, and 3) such diversity and chronological changes 
of urban form are closely associated with the neighborhood socioeconomic characteristics, such 
as age of neighborhood, household income level, education attainment, housing ownership, 
property value, etc..  
The dissertation examined the change of urban form and land use in the city and its three 
case study neighborhoods without zoning regulation, and explored the socioeconomic reasons 
behind those changes. From the institutional perspective, it explored how local land use policies 
made by both the local government and non-governmental sectors shape urban form and land use 
diversity in Houston, a city born out of several anti-zoning battles. Despite the city’s lack of 
zoning, local land use regulatory policies and some limited plans made by the municipality have 
significant influence on urban development. On the other hand, civic and private organizations 
such as super neighborhoods and homeowners associations fill the gaps left by the lack of land 
use zoning. The study examined how these two aspects contribute to land use planning and urban 
form at both city and neighborhood levels.  
This chapter is primarily a methodological discussion for the study. It first identifies the 
overall research strategy of this study, and then explains the rationale of choosing Houston and its 
three neighborhoods as the case study. Data collection methods and data analysis and 
interpretation are also explained. The research uses both quantitative methods (i.e. GIS spatial 
statistical analysis) and qualitative methods (i.e. document review, formal and informal data 
gathering, and semi-structured interviews in Houston). The dissertation seeks to provide insight 
into the relationships between urban form, the lack of zoning ordinance, and neighborhood 
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planning. It also sheds light on the implications of urban growth without zoning law by 
comparing the results with some existing findings from zoned cities.   
 
Overall Research Strategy 
 
The overall research strategy was focused upon a case study. The rationale consisted of: 
(1) the research questions posed: the research questions of urban land use without zoning 
ordinance were explanatory and dealt with operational links over time; (2) the control a 
researcher had over behavioral events: the research topic on urban land use in Houston was a set 
of events over which the researcher had no control; and (3) the research topic as contemporary 
events: Houston’s urban land use is a contemporary topic and the selected neighborhoods were 
established in the twentieth century. Yin (2003: 9) argues when ‘a “how” or “why” question is 
being asked about a contemporary set of events, over which the investigator has little or no 
control’, the case study approach has a distinct advantage. 
There were several research strategies suitable for small-scale social research projects: 
survey, case studies, experiments, action research, and ethnography. Denscombe (1998) discusses 
the applications, advantages and disadvantages of each strategy. Survey strategy was not adopted 
as the most suitable one for this study because: (1) the strategy would produce data that lack 
much by way of detail and depth on the research topic; (2) the emphasis of the strategy on wide 
and inclusive coverage would limit the degree to which the researcher could monitor the accuracy 
of response; and (3) this study is also associated with qualitative data, while the survey method is 
more suited to quantitative data collection and analysis (although nothing excludes the use of 
survey with qualitative data). Experiment was not considered suitable as the researcher obviously 
had no control on land use, different actors, or events involved in this study. The most defining 
characteristics of the action research strategy were unlikely to meet in this study because: (1) 
change, as a way of dealing with practical problems and an integral part of research, was 
impossible to realize by the researcher within land use and urban form; (2) for the same reasons, 
the cyclical process for changes and the active participation of crucial people for changes, would 
not happen. Ethnography might be suitable for some evidence but was obviously less suitable for 
this research topic as a comprehensive strategy. 
The study employed both quantitative and qualitative data. Quantitative data was used not 
only to describe the changes of land use in Houston, at the neighborhood scale in particular, but 
also to help explore the reasons behind these changes. Statistical and GIS data were mainly used 
to portray the characteristics, contrasts and patterns of changes presented in the forms of tables, 
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figures, and maps. Qualitative data is the other data sources used in this study. The data were 
mainly derived from published documents from the City and  neighborhood civic clubs and 
homeowners associations, City of Houston administration archives, and direct physical field 
observation. The triangulation of different data minimized the degree of specificity in bodies of 
knowledge, and increased the credibility of research findings (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 
1992). Consistent findings among different data collection methods increased the research 
credibility, while any inconsistency helped in the formation of research arguments and 
observations and raised problems for further enquiry. 
 
Houston as a Case Study 
 
Houston, an understudied city, has enjoyed some of the country’s most rapid economic 
and population growth over past generation because of its diverse and highly entrepreneurial 
economy, friendly business climate, and positive attitude towards growth. Houston is the only 
major city in North America without zoning ordinance. The growth of Houston illustrates a 
traditional free market philosophy in which land use zoning is seen as a violation of private 
property and personal liberty. In such a laissez-faire city, public-sector-initiated urban planning 
policies are limited, especially at the neighborhood level, in comparison with other cities in the 
country. Instead, many urban development policies and plans are made by the private sector and 
by business associations. Except for limited daily urban needs, transportation and infrastructure 
that are the responsibilities of the public sector, planning (especially that which effects economic 
growth) is initiated, developed, and monitored by the private sector (Fisher, 1989).  
Bernard Siegan’s Land Use Without Zoning (1972) remains the definitive document on 
Houston’s “nonzoning”. According to Siegan, the market place provides economic incentives for 
segregation of uses and produces patterns of development similar to what is found under zoning. 
Siegan also sets forth the argument of Houston’s unplanned, unregulated development in a set of 
articles defending the City’s refusal to enact a zoning code. He asserts that land use regulation in 
Houston is extremely modest when compared to what is contained in most zoning ordinances 
because Houston has no ordinance that sets forth specific restrictions on the uses that may be 
established on any property. In the meanwhile, during the past three decades, Houston has 
adopted more planning tools and involved diverse nongovernmental organizations in land use.  
Houston as a case of city without zoning ordinance is not alone. In Pendall et al. (2006) 
study of land use regulations in the 50 largest metropolitan areas in the US, it is estimated that 5 
percent of the metropolitan population lives in jurisdictions without zoning, and as much as 11 
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percent of the land area is unzoned. City without zoning is typical in Texas because the counties 
in Texas are not authorized to regulate land use except for the enforcement of minimal 
subdivision regulation. Zoning does not occur except where cities impose it in their expansive 
extraterritorial jurisdictions. Hence the study of Houston has implications for cities without 
zoning ordinance in both Texas and the country.   
 
Research Questions  
 
Based on the research hypotheses and the literature review, the research questions were 
grouped into four interrelated headings: 
1) Alternatives to zoning, in this research, were taken more as a political than as a 
professional means, driven by political interests. Why did Houston choose the 
alternatives to zoning in history? Who influenced the politics of the option of “non-
zoning”? What are the changes of the politics, if any, with the growing power and 
influence of non-governmental organizations in land use? How does land use politics 
work in promoting the city’s growth? The questions addressed the political reasons for 
Houston’s land use system and its contributions to the city’s urban development in 
history.  
2) Despite of the lack of zoning, Houston has regulatory land use policies with zoning 
elements. How do local land use policies made by public sector impact the overall urban 
development of Houston? What are the different land-use planning tools (e.g. ordinances 
and plans) used by public sector? How do they shape urban form of Houston? How is the 
city different from those zoned cities in the existing research findings in terms of its land 
use and the relevant issues? The questions critically examined Houston’s land-use 
planning and urban form at the citywide scale. 
3) Neighborhood land use patterns are formed by political institutions at community levels. 
Houston’s diverse land use patterns helped to understand the social, political and 
economic reasons underlying the neighborhood diversity of urban form. In the 
meanwhile, the practice of private covenants as a land-use control means provided an 
example of a collaborative planning approach where land users make decisions on their 
surrounding environment. How do those civic and private governments like super 
neighborhoods and homeowners associations influence their neighborhood urban form in 
their land use decision making? How do the non-government organizations get involve in 
land use controls? What are the implications from private agreement making on land use 
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controls, as a kind of collaborative planning approach? What is the fate of those areas that 
are not covered by any deed restrictions in those neighborhoods? And the socioeconomic 
reasons behind them? As Zhang (2001) concludes in his research about Chicago urban 
growth is rooted in the features of neighborhoods rather than a direct consequence of 
spatial-related factor. Urban form is a dynamic process which evolves over time as the 
outcome of changing land use polices and agreements. The questions analyzed land use 
controls at the neighborhood levels using an institutional approach.  
4) Neighborhood local factors include the socio-economic situation of a neighborhood, 
including demographic changes, the community’s economic status, and its education 
quality. The factors also include housing stock and land use policies. This research 
considered local factors such as age of neighborhoods, household income level, education 
attainment, housing ownership, and property value. For the neighborhoods with similar 
local factors, whether, and if yes, how do their deed restriction statuses (i.e. with or 
without deed restriction) determine urban form at the neighborhood level? The questions 
resorted to quantitative analysis. The results were used to explore how the urban forms 
are determined by the deed restrictions and how well findings in neighborhood land use 
controls qualitative research can explain the spatial statistical results.   
 
Data Collection and Data Analysis Methods  
 
Quantitative Methods  
 
In this research for the quantitative part, it used US Census data at neighborhood (block 
group) level to conduct citywide socioeconomic characteristics analysis for household income 
level, education attainment, housing ownership, property value. For three data driven alternatives: 
census tracts, block groups, and subblock groups, neighborhoods defined at the census tract level 
may provide less information about urban form changes than neighborhoods defined at the block 
group level; neighborhoods defined at the subblock group level may reveal little more 
information (Song and Knaap, 2004). Therefore, neighborhoods were defined by block groups. 
This part of the study used cluster analysis to group neighborhoods (block groups) so that the 
neighborhoods with similar local socioeconomic factors could be identified within Houston’s 
urban area. The selection of the neighborhoods for in-depth urban form analysis also depended on 
the availability of their historic and current deed restriction statuses. The information on deed 
restriction were obtained by contacting homeownership associations or neighborhood clubs. The 
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study then selected three neighborhoods, one with strict deed restriction in place, one without any 
deed restriction, and a third with expired deed restriction to measure their urban forms.  
 Quantitative research methods have been widely used to test changing land use patterns 
and forms (see for example, Carruthers, 2002; Nelson and Moore, 1996; Nelson, 1999; Song and 
Knaap, 2004; Zhang, 2001). However, quantitative research at neighborhood levels to examine 
urban form for those without growth management programs is sparse. Conventional quantitative 
research on urban growth compares suburban growth to central city growth in terms of the 
location of population growth (Chinitz, 1965), or focuses on the change of population density 
(Mills, 1980). Similarly, comparative research for urban area and urbanized land areas using 
population density has also been done (see for example, Fulton et al. 2002; Sierra Club, 1998). In 
more recent research Wassmer (2000) investigates the share of metropolitan population, 
employment, retail sales, farmland, poverty rates, and income levels for those that lived in the 
central city, the central county, and the urbanized area. All those studies provide little about urban 
form. 
One of the policy-relevant quantitative approaches for urban form was developed by 
Allen (2001) using part of INDEX, a policy planning support system for forecasts of vehicle 
miles traveled, ambient air emissions, as well as employment and housing balance.  Besides the 
information about density, nuclearity, and centrality studied in previous research, measures of 
transportation, housing and employment options, mixed use, and transit and public facility 
accessibility address more policy issues concerning residents and decision makers. Song and 
Knapp (2004) use approaches similar to Allen’s to measure urban form at the neighborhood level 
(block groups as neighborhoods) for Washington County, the western portion of Portland by five 
dimensions—street design and circulation systems, density (without data for multifamily units), 
land use mix, accessibility and pedestrian access.    
Several measures of urban form are developed from the approaches used by Allen (2001) 
and Song and Knaap (2004). Using GIS, the study conducted spatial statistical analysis for the 
urban form for each of the neighborhoods over two decades period (1985 until 2005. Note: the 
land use categories data is only available since 1985, and the historic shape file data is even 
limited--it is from 2000 to 2006). In addition, the statistical analysis compared the results among 
different neighborhoods. The urban form of the neighborhoods was measured by five dimensions:   
(1)  Street design and circulation systems: measured by 1) Internal Connectivity: number 
of street intersections divided by sum of the number of intersections and the number 
of cul-de-sacs; the higher the ratio, the greater the internal connectivity. 2) Block 
Perimeter: median perimeter of blocks; the smaller the perimeter, the greater the 
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internal connectivity. 3) Blocks: number of blocks divided by number of single 
family housing units; the more the blocks the greater the internal connectivity. 4) 
External Connectivity: median distance between Ingress/Egress (access) points in 
feet; the shorter the distance, the greater the external connectivity.  
(2)  Density: measured by 1) Lot Size: median lot size of single family residence in the 
super neighborhoods; the smaller the lot size, the higher the density. 2) Single Family 
Unit Density: single family units divided by the residential area; the higher the ratio, 
the higher the density. 3) Floor Space: median floor space of single family units in 
the neighborhoods; the smaller the floor space, the higher the density.  
(3)  Land use mix: measured by 1) acres of non-residential land use (commercial, 
industrial, and public land use) divided by the number of housing units, and 2) the 
percentage of each non-residential land use in the area. A further step is to analyze 
land use diversity H.   
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where H = diversity index; pi = proportions of each of the land use types such as 
single-family residential, multifamily residential, industrial, public, and commercial 
uses; and s= the number of land uses. The higher the value, the greater the land use 
diversity (Song, 2005).  
(4)  Accessibility: measured by 1) Commercial Distance: median travel distance from the 
single family residences to the nearest commercial uses; the shorter the distance, the 
greater the accessibility. 2) Bus Stop Distance: median travel distance from the single 
family residences to the nearest transit stop; the shorter the distance, the greater the 
accessibility. 3) Park Distance: median travel distance from the single family 
residences to the nearest public park; the shorter the distance, the greater the 
accessibility.  
(5)  Pedestrian Access: measured by 1) Pedestrian to Commercial: percentage of single 
family unit parcels within ¼ mile (Duany and Plater-Zyberk, 1992) of all existing 
commercial uses; the higher the percentage, the greater the pedestrian access. 2) 
Pedestrian to Transit: percentage of single family unit parcels within ¼ mile of all 
existing bus stops; the higher the percentage, the greater the pedestrian access. 3) 
Pedestrian to Park: percentage of single family unit parcels within ¼ mile of all 
parks; the higher the percentage, the greater the pedestrian access.  
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The spatial data resources were US Census data, Harris County Appraisal District 
(HCAD), Gulf Coast Institute, and the statistical studies at neighborhood levels from Houston’s 
Department of Planning and Development. Most data were available in City of Houston 
Geographic Information System (COHGIS) release 6 (1998), releases 9-11, and COHGIS release 
12 (2006). These DVD data dictionaries are developed by Information Technology Division of 
Houston Planning and Development Department. The data themes that were used are super 
neighborhoods (SNBR in GIS database), parks (PARKR), buildings (BUILDING), parcel 
information (PARCEL), apartment information (APT.DBF in GIS database), commercial 
building information (BUILDINGS.DBF), historical land use information (1985-2005, 
LUSE.DBF), 2000 census block group (GRP 2000), and major roads (MJROAD).   
The spatial statistical results were used to 1) investigate the extent of urban form change 
of each of the neighborhoods without zoning ordinance over the two decades; 2) compare the 
extent of urban form’s statistical difference among those neighborhoods; 3) help qualitative 
research approach to explore socio-economic and institutional reasons for those variations among 
the neighborhoods; 4) assist qualitative methods to reveal historical, socio-economic, and 
institutional rationales that resulted in the changes of each neighborhood over time; and 5) if 
possible, compare the generalized quantitative observations of those neighborhoods with the 
existing studies on impacts of urban land use controls on urban form (for instance, Song and 
Knaap, 2004; Song, 2005 among others). For instance, their study of two neighborhoods in 
Portland, a ‘typical’ neighborhood Forest Glen and a ‘new urbanist’ neighborhood Orenco Station 
produces the urban form measurement results as Table 2). 
 
 
Table 2: Urban Form Measurement for Forest Glen and Orenco Station in Portland (Source: Song and Knaap, 2004). 
Urban form measure Forest Glen Orenco Station 
Median block size (median perimeter 
in feet) 
3,365 830 
Number of blocks per SFDU 0.026 0.15 
Actual non-residential area per SFDU 
(sq.ft.) 
0 2,068 
Median distance to nearest 
commercial use (feet) 
3,184 834 
Median distance to nearest park (feet) 1,267 873 
Percentage of SFDUs within ¼ mile 
of any commercial uses 
0.04 0.78 
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Qualitative Methods 
 
In contrast to much of the stereotype of Houston as an “unplanned” city that comes from 
its early history before World War II, the City has since actually adopted most of the planning 
tools and processes that other cities use. Houston does not have zoning, but there are many 
planning tools such as subdivision plats, downtown development plans, super neighborhoods, and 
deed restrictions. Those are put in place by public and private sectors. The qualitative research 
focused on land use planning tools that have influence at neighborhood level in particular, such as 
subdivision plats, deed restrictions, super neighborhoods and their responsible organizations.  
  The expected result of this empirical research was to analyze the impact of neighborhood 
planning approaches on urban form in an unzoned city, and to reveal the implications in land use 
planning and (non)zoning. Based on the anticipated research results, the specific methods 
employed were: 
(1) Documentation: The documents included agendas and minutes of meetings; 
administrative documents, such as regulations, proposals and plans; and local 
magazines and newspapers. Some of the examples included:  
Houston Land Regulation and Development Brochure (Houston Planning and 
Development Department); Tomorrow: A Publication of the Gulf Coast Institute 
(2006); Houston Downtown Development Framework: A Vision for 2025 (Central 
Houston, Inc., 2004); Goals for Tomorrow: A Comprehensive Planning Framework 
for the Houston-Galveston Area Council (Houston-Galveston Area council, 1998); 
Montrose Pedestrian and Bicyclist Plan (Lockwood, Andrews & Newnam, Inc., 
2005); deed restriction documents from neighborhood associations; newspapers and 
magazines such as Architectural Record, Houston Chronicles, Cite: a publication of 
the Rice Design Alliance often have reports about Houston planning.   
(2) Archival Records: The archival records included maps and charts of the physical 
layouts of the sites and the changing process; and statistical data, in particular those 
of land use and planning, about the sites. Some of the examples included: 
Houston Land Use and Demographic Profile 2000 (Houston Planning and 
Development Department); How We Compare Study 2005 (Houston Planning and 
Development Department); Houston Housing and Households Study 2004 (Houston 
Planning and Development Department); Super Neighborhood Demographics 
(Houston Planning and Development Department); The Houston Metropolitan Study: 
an entrepreneurial community looks ahead (University Houston Center for Public 
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Policy, 1998); Simply the Best (2005 Report of Port of Houston Authority); reports 
from community associations and civic clubs.  
Data analysis in qualitative field research was considered an ongoing process relevant to 
data collection where observers formulated important themes and refined or revised them during 
the research process (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1992). The overall strategy for data 
analysis followed the theoretical propositions of the case study. The theoretical propositions 
regarding causal relationships not only guided the case study analysis, but also helped to organize 
the study and to define alternative explanations to be examined. The main data analytic method in 
this study was Yin’s (2003) Explanation Building technique, which is similar to grounded theory 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967), but with different ultimate goals. The goal of this method was to 
analyze the data by building an explanation about the case. Yin sees the eventual explanation is 
likely to be a result of a series of iterations and statement/proposition revisions, that is, the case 
study evidence is examined, theoretical positions are revised, and the evidence is examined once 
again from a new perspective, in an iterative mode. The compiling of chronological events was 
used in this case study. The procedure had an important analytic purpose that was to investigate 
causal events in urban land policy and its implementation. The procedures of analysis involved 
coding and categorizing data (and writing memos and drawing diagrams), identifying 
relationships and themes, developing and refining generalization, and finally using 
generalizations to improve any relevant existing theories. 
The data analysis in this study went through the process of data reduction, data display, 
and finally conclusion drawing, which was listed by Robson (2002) as a primary component of 
data analysis. For any quantitative data collected, data reduction was realized by descriptive and 
summary statistics; data display by graphs and tables of correlations; and conclusion drawn by 
inferential statistics and so on. For the qualitative data, data reduction process went though 
session summery sheet, document sheet, development of coding categories, memos, and interim 
summary. Coding categories first attached labels to groups of words obtained though primary and 
secondary data, and then grouped the initial codes into a smaller number of themes or patterns. 
The interim summary attempted to summarize the findings and figure out what still needed to be 
collected. The interim summary helped direct and focus the later phases of data collection.  
 
Research Limitations 
 
By using case study, the study involved an in-depth record of an individual city Houston 
and a group of three neighborhoods in the city by collecting and examining various observations 
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and records of Houston's experiences without zoning ordinance. Case study was helpful to get a 
detailed contextual view of Houston’s particular land use control approach, where experimental 
studies were not possible. It helped understand the factors that are part of the development of 
certain type of land development control in an individual city.  
However, this study of Houston involved only a single individual city for the land 
development control category where it is primarily achieved by “private contractual zoning”. In 
addition, the urban form spatial analysis of the neighborhoods only represented a few different 
types of neighborhoods in the city, and therefore, may not be representative of the whole general 
group.  
For the qualitative methods part of this study, this research sometimes relied on 
descriptive information provided by different resources. This left room for important details to be 
left out. Also, much of the information collected (e.g. archives and documentations) was 
retrospective data, recollections of past events, and was therefore subject to the problems inherent 
to memory. Therefore, the conclusions that were drawn might suffer from a lack of reliability. It 
was difficult to generalize findings to different settings as context and environment are 
dependent.  
 
Triangulation 
 
Triangulation technique in case study helped to confirm the validity of the research. This 
study used three types of triangulation: theory triangulation, method triangulation, and data 
source triangulation.  
This research used theory triangulation by using both institutional economics and public 
choice theories. It also combined quantitative and qualitative approaches. Two resources of data 
collection of this research were used: documentation and archival records. Apparently, each of 
these data collection methods has certain advantages and some inherent limitations. By using two 
types of data collection, the study tried to minimize the degree of specificity of certain methods to 
particular bodies of knowledge. For the quantitative data, the research applied five different 
measurements to examine the urban form. If the findings yielded by the different methods are 
consistent, the validity of those findings is increased. It helped to partially overcome the 
deficiencies that flow from using only one method. Multiple methods also addressed different but 
complementary questions within a study.  
While the Houston Planning Department has descriptive statements on the deed 
restriction status for some of the neighborhoods, it was difficult to figure out the exact deed 
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restriction status for each of the lots in a certain neighborhood. Houston Planning Department is 
soliciting deed restriction status from the neighborhoods citywide recently and plans to integrate 
the information into existing spatial information. The research would be enhanced when the deed 
restriction status survey is completed by the Houston Planning Department.  
 
Generalizability 
 
Case study results can be generalized to theoretical propositions (analytical 
generalization) but not to populations (statistical generalization). A case study of Houston might 
be concerned with explaining the land use control in a particular “private contractual zoning” 
city. Houston as a city without a zoning ordinance is not alone. In Pendall et al. (2006) study of 
land use regulations in the 50 largest metropolitan areas in the US, it is estimated that 5 percent of 
the metropolitan population lives in jurisdictions without zoning, and as much as 11 percent of 
the land area is unzoned. Cities without zoning are typical in Texas because the counties are not 
authorized to regulate land use except for the enforcement of minimal subdivision regulation. 
Zoning does not occur except where cities impose it in their expansive ETJ. Thus Houston 
provides some kind of generalizability beyond its specific settings studied. Houston might be a 
representative sample of settings for jurisdictions without zoning ordinance. But that may not 
imply that Houston is a “typical” example of this group of jurisdictions because Houston is the 
largest one among them.  
Tying theories to literature and empirical findings in this study enhanced the validity and 
generalization of case study research. In terms of theoretical generalization, Houston case as a 
particular study provided theoretical insights in the debate of institutional economics and public 
choice theses, as well as the discussions on similarities and differences among three land use 
development controls categories in planning practice.   
 
Summary 
 
 This chapter discusses the use of a case study as the overall research strategy for this 
study because the research hypotheses and questions raised, the control the research had over the 
urban land use events, and the contemporary nature of the research topic gave the case study 
methodology a distinct advantage over other research strategies. Houston was selected as the case 
for investigation given many unique features of the city. Houston’s rapid economic growth and 
urban development combined with its special status as the only major city without zoning not 
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only justified it as a case with implications for other cities in the country without zoning 
ordinance, but also contributed to the theoretical debate on strong public intervention versus 
market-oriented mechanism in land development controls, and even broader, in urban planning. 
In addition, the city’s dependence on private land use control tools, which only cover part of the 
city and mainly apply to residential land use, may results in such land use diversity and urban 
form that the cities with zoning law might not have. For the last two decades, the city has 
continuous urban growth and population increase which many other sunbelt cities have not 
experienced, despite of the critiques on the problem of its land use without zoning. The position 
of Houston in its land use policy making has resulted from the city’s political culture and pro-
growth development philosophy which can be traced back to decades ago but still has significant 
influence on the city’s current urban development as the city seems to benefit from it in many 
aspects. All these make Houston an ideal place for the proposed case study. 
 Data collection methods for this study were mainly informed by the research hypotheses, 
research questions, and overall research strategy. For the qualitative analysis, the data collection 
methods used in this study were documentation and archival records. For the quantitative 
analysis, the urban form measurement employed GIS data that were collected from Houston 
Planning and Development Department. Three selected neighborhoods for urban form 
measurement represented three typical land use patterns in Houston, with diversities in their 
locations, neighborhood development, and socioeconomic characteristics. All planned 
communities at their very beginning in history, three neighborhoods showed significant 
differences in many aspects. A specific list of contents for investigation for each data collection 
method clarified the functions of that method and the type of data to be collected. Those methods 
were supplementary to each other to enhance the data validity since the triangulation of different 
data minimized the degree of specificity in bodies of knowledge, and increased the credibility of 
research findings. 
 The main data analytical method in this study was the explanation building technique, 
with the goal of analyzing the data by building an explanation about the case in an iterative mode. 
The analysis processes for quantitative and qualitative data were discussed respectively. Certain 
techniques for qualitative data process were proposed to display evidence and draw conclusions. 
 Given the overall strategy for this study, the processes and techniques proposed in this 
research design were only taken as an initial set of methods at the early stage of the research. 
Robson (2002) argues that it is not feasible to pre-specify many of the design details at the 
beginning stage, and the design itself, as well as the theoretical and conceptual framework, should 
be viewed as emerging during the research. 
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CHAPTER IV 
URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND LAND USE CONTROL IN HOUSTON 
 
Houston is ranked as one of the Gamma World Cities in GaWC inventory of world cities 
by Beaverstock et al. (1999), in which cities are ordered in terms of “world-cityness”. 
Friedmann’s (1986) hierarchy identified Houston as one of the core secondary world cities. 
Houston is also defined as a specialist city because of its status as the world’s energy capital. The 
city ranked 10th in terms of global network connectivities of U. S. Cities (Taylor and Lang, 
2005). Besides its world city status, Houston is the only major city in North America without a 
government land use zoning ordinance. The growth of Houston illustrates a traditional free 
market philosophy in which land use zoning ordinance is seen as a violation to private property 
and personal liberty. In such a laissez-faire city, public-sector-initiated urban planning policies 
are discouraged, in comparison with other cities in the country. Many urban development policies 
and plans are made by investors, developers, builders, realtors, homeowners, architects, and 
planners in the private sector and by business associations organized by city enterprise elites. 
Except for the limited daily urban needs that are the responsibilities of the public sector, planning 
is initiated, developed, and monitored by leading voices in the private sector. Then how does 
local land use policy and urban planning practice work in this unique political economic setting, a 
dynamic city with growing economic and demographic diversity?  
This chapter explores how local land use policy made by both the local government and 
non-governmental sectors impacts urban development in Houston, which was born out of several 
anti-zoning battles. Despite the city’s lack of zoning, local land use regulatory policies made by 
the municipality such as extraterritorial jurisdiction, annexation, minimum lot sizes, minimum 
parking requirements and setbacks, street width and large freeway mileage have had significant 
influence on urban physical development. On the other hand, private and civic organizations such 
as super neighborhoods and homeowner associations fill the gaps left by the lack of land use 
zoning. This chapter examines how these two aspects contribute to the city’s planning, and 
whether this kind of planning matter in a ‘unzoned’ city like Houston.  
 
The City of Houston 
 
The city of Houston began on August 30, 1836, when New York real estate investors 
Augustus Chapman Allen and John Kirby Allen named their town after Sam Houston and later 
persuaded the Texas Congress to designate the site as the temporary capital of the new Republic 
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of Texas. Situated on the headwaters of Buffalo Bayou, the town of one-fifth square mile in size 
attracted 1,500 settlers in its first year (Melosi, 1994). In 1853 and 1857, sizable appropriation 
was used to clear Buffalo Bayou and dredge a ship channel to Galveston Bay. By 1861 Houston 
was the rail center of Southeast Texas, and when the Houston and Texas Central reached Dension 
in 1873, Houston joined the national rail network. In 1870 Congress declared Houston a port of 
entry. A few years later, a group of business leaders secured fund to upgrade the ship channel and 
port facilities. By 1875, as David McComb has noted, Houston had grown from “a frontier 
society” into “a well-established commercial town with a network of railroads and a useful 
bayou” (cited from Melosi, 1994). In 1900 Houston was a city of about 50,000 people lived in the 
urban area of around 70-80 square miles along the banks of Buffalo Bayou. 
After the Spindletop oil discovery ninety miles east of the city in 1901, the city became 
the leading oil refining centre in the country. Within ten years, the oil discovery led to the 
founding of the Texas Company (now Chevron) and Humble Oil and Refining Company (now 
Exxon Mobil). Besides oil, Houston has many natural advantages. The city sits on an enormous 
fresh water aquifer. The city is located near fertile soil good for cotton. It also has natural 
resources such as timber. As a result, Houston emerged as a city of regional significance, with 
commercial economy built upon cotton, lumber, and petroleum. Land developers inspired the 
spread of the city when they built suburbs such as Pasadena (1892), Houston Heights (1892), 
Deer Park (1892), Bellaire (1911), and West University Place (1919). As part of the social code, 
separate residential areas were developed for African Americans, Mexican Americans, and whites 
around the end of the 19th century. Despite occasional outbursts, nothing changed the legacy of 
slavery until the civil-rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s. However, Houston remained a 
small city until its rapid growth in the post-World War II era (Shelton et al. 1989).  
During the Second World War, the city became the world’s largest petrochemical 
manufacturing site. Houston ranked sixth in federal wartime plant investments (Mollenkopf, 
1983). At that time, some $700 million was invested in Houston’s local chemical facilities by the 
Defense Plant Corporation (DPC). The DPC also built two great pipelines, the Big Inch and the 
Little Inch to transport petroleum to the Northeast. These investments were also a stimulus for 
private investment in advanced technology, defence, oil and natural gas, tourism, and property 
during and after the War. Along with the investment increase and industry expansion, Houston 
started to experience rapid population growth. In 1948-49, to avoid encirclement by incorporated 
suburbs, the Houston City Council used its annexation power to envelop the older suburbs 
(McComb, 2003). As a result the city doubled in size. Starting from the early 1950s, Houston 
experienced the great majority of its growth in the age of private automobiles. The city’s first 
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expressway, the Gulf Freeway, connected Houston and Galveston in 1952 and later became a part 
of the interstate highway system. In 1956 the council voted more annexation, and in 1960 while 
fighting with neighboring towns, the council threatened to annex all unclaimed land in Harris 
County. Compromises finally brought the annexation war under control. The expansion of 
scientific, technical and managerial jobs drew well-educated people from throughout the country 
and made the population more diverse. The city gradually changed to a multi-racial metropolis. 
The driving force behind the 1970s post-industrial economy was the managerial and 
technical employees in the oil and gas industries in the city. The local economy in other fields 
also benefited—the Texas Medical Centre became a world-renowned research and treatment 
centre with more than 42 non-profit institutions. The energy industry was still the primary 
economic contributor as it accounted for over 85 percent of local employment in the early 1980s 
(City of Houston, 2000a). The oil industry did not develop with a free market in that public 
regulation involved numerous benefits to oil entrepreneurs, including tax breaks, price fixing and 
subsidies directed to petroleum infrastructure. However, in the early and mid 1980s the oil 
industry slumped with the sharp oil price drop: the region lost a net of 200,000 jobs between 1982 
and 1987 (University of Houston Center for Public Policy, 1998). Houston gradually recovered in 
the early 1990s. Besides the energy sectors, there was significant growth in other sectors such as 
high technology industries, professional services, medical research and oil related technology 
industries. While in 1990 energy accounted for 60% of Houston’s economic base, it accounted for 
only 49% in 1999 (Smith, 2000). Nearly half of all jobs today are in nonenergy fields such as 
business, services, technology, medicine, etc. Houston-based Compaq Computers became one of 
the largest PC manufacturers in the world. Continental Airlines also chose Houston as their 
headquarters in the 1980s. The city enjoyed an improving economic climate in the late 1990s as 
new commercial and residential buildings and a sharp increase in property and sales taxes 
generated more public revenue. At the beginning of the century, for three consecutive years, 
Houston ranked first in the nation in new business growth, according to American Business 
Information. A survey shows that more than 31,000 new local business were started in Houston, 
much larger than the second, Los Angeles’ 16,780 (City of Houston, 2000b).   
Between 1990 and 2000, Houston had the third largest population growth in the country, 
remaining the fourth largest city in terms of population (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000). At 618 
square miles, the city of Houston could contain the cities of New York, Washington, Boston, San 
Francisco, Seattle, Minneapolis, and Miami. However, Houston is far less densely populated than 
most other cities of a similar size, with only 3372 people per square mile (1297 per sq.km.), less 
than half the density of any of the three cities larger than Houston. Los Angeles has 7877 
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residents per square mile (3030 per sq.km), while Chicago and New York have over 10,000 
residents per square mile (3850 per sq.km) (Lewyn, 2005). With vacant land accounting for 24% 
of the City’s total land uses, it presents opportunities for the City to guide future growth and 
leverage infrastructure investments through better growth management and planning. Clearly 
these areas with high vacancy rates and land available for infill development can help 
accommodate future population growth. Between 1990 and 2000, Houston experienced 
approximately a 20% increase in population. 
Along with the changing employment opportunities and immigration of population from 
the region and across the nation, the residential patterns before the 1960s has changed from 
heavily concentrated to much less concentrated and disperse (desegregation) particularly after the 
mid-1980s. The region’s population are among the most diverse in the country, with the third 
lowest percentage of non-Hispanic whites among the top 20 metropolitan. By 1990, only 38 
percent of the black population lived in heavily black tracts and 47 percent of the black 
population lived in tracts where they were not a majority (University of Houston Center for 
Public Policy, 1998). The non-Hispanic whites kept growing in the 1960s and 1970s, due partly 
to annexation of suburban areas, but dropped sharply in the 1980s, with a net out-migration from 
the city. However, in the 1990s, non-Hispanic whites started to move back inside the 610 Loop or 
to adjacent areas like the Galleria. In the meanwhile there is continuing non-Hispanic white out-
migration to exurban areas from inner city neighborhoods. Along with the demographic diversity, 
there is apparent economic diversity within the city: the richest and the poorest areas in Harris 
County both fall within the City of Houston.  
In close relation to the continuing population growth, what is attractive to many is the 
fact that high income comes with low living expenses in Houston, partially due to its non-zoning. 
In 2005, the per capita personal income for Houston is $39,052, higher than Dallas’ $37,075 and 
many other metropolitan cities such as Boston and San Francisco (US Department of Commerce, 
2005). According to National Association of Realtor’s (2006) statistics for median sales price of 
existing single-family homes, Houston’s average price is $149,100 (Dallas’ is $149,500) lower 
than the national average of $220,000. NAHB/Wells Fargo Housing Opportunity Index assesses 
the affordability of existing homes based on a region’s median household income. Houston (55.7 
percent, and Dallas has 61.7 percent, San Francisco 7.5 percent, New York 5.1 percent) has more 
than half the homes sold would be affordable for those earning the median household income 
(Kotkin, 2007). However, the low housing price in Houston has not resulted in higher 
homeownership rate (Houston’s 61 percent homeownership rate in comparison with the national 
average between 65 and 70 percent), because the low price rental housing stock offers strong 
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competition to homeownership, and as prices and rents have escalated slowly, homeownership 
does not provide potential homeowners as a protection against the uncertainty of growing housing 
expenses (Pendall, 2007).  
With the continuous development of new museums, performing arts centers, and 
fashionable shopping districts, Houston is gradually moving from the role of economic 
challengers to that of rival in the arts, culture, and architecture to many other metropolitan cities. 
During the past decade, Houston not only had large annual immigration rate, but also attracted 
educated and talented domestic population from other cities. For instance, during 2004 and 2005, 
Houston’s net domestic migration of “creative” professional occupations (such as management, 
business, financial, legal, healthcare and high-end sales) migrants per 1,000 is 1.69, very close to 
Dallas’ 1.74. The city’s net domestic migration of “super creative” professional occupations (such 
as computers, mathematics, architecture, engineering, life, physical and social sciences, 
education, art, design, entertainment, sports, and media) migrants per 1,000 is 0.90, higher than 
Dallas’ 0.64. (US Census Bureau, 2005). The demographic and economic diversity benefited the 
city. During the 1990s, Houston’s population in hard-core poverty areas fell by 107,272 (about 48 
percent), which was one of the largest declines in the nation (Jargowsky, 2003).  
One of the explanations for the migration is that Houston's land use planning model is in 
stark contrast to cities such as Boston and San Francisco, which have strict zoning, exacting 
building codes and laws governing historical preservation. Some economists say excessive 
regulation in such cities has slowed construction to the point where demand has outstripped 
supply, fueling a run-up in home prices (Glaeser, 2006). Such places have priced out today's 
highly skilled 'knowledge workers,' forcing them to live in a more affordable locale like Houston.  
 
Political Culture 
 
Houston has an individualistic history. The 1875 Texas constitution written by the 
Democrats reflects a strong anti-government bias. Its 1912 home-rule amendment allowed cities 
like Houston to do anything not prohibited by the state or federal governments. Houston’s 
dominant political culture for the governance of planning and development is to assist private 
economic needs. Growth and development have long been goals among Houston’s elites, and the 
city supports programs that enhance private economic expansion with only minimal supportive 
programs for public services in areas like public transit, health care and welfare. Pro-growth 
business leaders had great influence on the city. There were also disagreement among them. For 
instance, Jesse Jones and Hugh Roy Cullen fought over zoning for thirty years. However, there 
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was consensus among those business leaders on most issues. The political elite defined by the 
economic marketplace, and successful business leaders, are expected to exercise great influence 
in local decision making. One example in this regard is Houston’s NASA Space Centre 
developed since the 1960s. U.S. Rep. Albert Thomas, chairman of the House committee that 
approved appropriations for NASA, worked constantly on behalf of his home community-Harris 
County. He hammered in Washington on the fact that Houston had all facilities necessary for 
successful operation of the project-climate, a fine site, deep-sea shipping, labor, and the scientific 
facilities offered by universities and foundations. More recently, the business organization 
Greater Houston Partnership, which is governed by 134 chief executives of Houston’s leading 
companies and organizations, provided support for the Metropolitan Transit Authority’s plans to 
build a 7.5 mile light rail system linking two of the city’s major employment centres with its 
major league sports facilities, art centres, educational institutions and local neighborhoods. 
Houston, like many other American cities, has a pro-growth coalition. However, in Houston, 
public planning tends to work with private economic interests. In contrast to other cities, 
Houston’s pro-growth coalition encounters weak competing coalitions such as environmental 
interest organizations and organized labour unions.   
The implications for ‘privatized politics’ in urban policy making in Houston are clear: 
with planning removed from public debate and discussion, most people in the city, especially the 
marginalized, have little access to planning and policy decisions affecting them (Fisher, 1989). 
The laissez-faire capitalism and elite political culture results in poor social services. A number of 
costs are typically passed on to certain groups of residents, or external forms of government. For 
instance, Kirby and Lynch (1987) blamed the city’s lack of zoning restrictions for the 300-plus 
toxic waste sites identified by the Environmental Protection Agency. Melosi (1994) documents 
that of eight incinerators operated by the city between the 1920s and 1975, six were located in 
Black neighborhoods, one in a Hispanic neighborhood, and only one in an area that was 
predominantly White. In fact, the five city-owned landfills, which ultimately complemented the 
incinerators, were all located in Black neighborhoods. The implicit assumption about the 
probusiness climate is that services can be ignored when they fail to meet the ends of economic 
growth or can be promoted when they prove a tangible value. The negative consequences of such 
a policy are poor service, inequity of distribution, and environmental degradation. However, there 
are some changes recently. Blacks were largely excluded from the political process until the 
1960s. Winning with a multi-ethnic coalition, Lee Brown became the first African American 
mayor in December 1997. This was a significant change given the Mayor’s dominant role in 
Houston’s city governance. The Mayor not only sits and votes on city council, but appoints the 
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city judiciary and all department heads. For instance, the light rail project was possible partly 
because the Mayor appoints five of the nine seats of the Metro board. The light rail project got 
strong support from the Mayor. Mayoral actions make Houston change. Among typical mayoral 
initiatives are Kathy Whitmire’s “Imagine Houston”, Elyse Lanier’s “Houston Image’, Robert 
Lanier’s Neighborhood to Standards, and Lee Brown’s Super Neighborhood Program.  
Houston’s rhetoric is for limited government intervention, low taxes and low expenditure 
on public welfare, and a disinterest in social service and income redistribution programmes. Such 
an urban policy philosophy is supported by a strong belief in self-reliance and individualism (Lin, 
1995). About 80 percent of Houstonians consistently agree with the proposition that “if you work 
hard in this city, eventually you will succeed”. Just 74 percent of Los Angeles’ residents and only 
66 percent of New Yorkers agreed with the same statement (Rice University, 2007). The 
government has adopted the entrepreneurial spirit of the private sector in the public realm in 
which certain issues are highly regarded such as government performance at low cost, increased 
flexibility in agencies and personnel, decentralization, and privatization (Osborne and Gaebler, 
1992). The belief in governing Houston is that the lack of interest in social service programmes 
would be compensated for by the support of pro-growth urban policies. As Ross et al. 
commented, the penetration of government by local business elites has been so considerable that 
the borderline between business and government is no longer clearly discernable (1991:56).  
Until the 1970s, city politics was non-partisan. Labor unions, ethnic and community 
organizations were weak, and participation in elections was low. During the last three decades, 
the business community has become less unified. Changes in the politics (e.g. term limits, 
initiative process, etc.) have made leadership more difficult at all levels of government. The 
process of public vote on major policy changes (such as zoning) may take city officials’ decision 
to uncertainties (University of Houston Center for Public Policy, 1998). In addition, the links 
between political economy and cultural change demonstrates that the political economy of 
Houston is increasingly decentralized (Lin, 1995).  Houston’s current leadership is fragmented, or 
at best, segmented, compartmentalized—the city, the county precincts, the Metropolitan Transit 
Authority, the Sports and Port authorities, and the Greater Houston Partnership. Super agencies 
such as the Texas Department of Transportation and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers take 
advantage of this political fragmentation, and proceed with projects that may not be in the long 
term public interest (Brown, 2002).  
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Zoning Battle 
 
Houston has had several passes at zoning. The first time was in 1927, when both a master 
plan and a zoning ordinance were proposed, but were strongly opposed by developers and 
property owners. Another master plan and zoning ordinance were defeated in 1938, although, two 
years later, the city did adopt its first subdivision regulations. In 1948, and again in 1962, voters 
overwhelmingly rejected proposals for comprehensive zoning (a two-to-one margin in 1948 and a 
53-to-47 percent margin in 1962).  
The impetus for zoning Houston in 1991 came from a grassroots movement of 
homeowners and neighborhood associations trying to protect their properties through a less 
tenuous legal framework than that afforded by deed restrictions. Zoning proposal for Houston is 
used primarily to protect single-family residential neighborhoods from the encroachment of urban 
forces, and more importantly, to protect their property values. A house in zoned West University 
Place or Bellaire might cost 10 to 15 percent more than a virtually identical residence across the 
street in unzoned Houston proper (Curtis, 1991). Neighborhoods struggling desperately with 
declining property values from the lingering depression of the 1980s were seeking for help from 
the city against all manner of businesses, some of them opened by out-of-work homeowners. 
Homeowners circulated a letter petition supporting planning and zoning; they also lobbied the 
city council, particularly minority members who had overwhelmingly opposed zoning in the past.  
In Houston’s history, it meant risking political suicide to mention the P word, much less 
the one beginning with a Z. The politics of the city changed profoundly over the decade before 
1991. The zoning proponents argue that the city needs zoning, because all previous plans since 
the 1920s had proved unenforceable without the sanctions that zoning provided. In addition, the 
zoning proponents argue that it is both naïve and unwise to think that Houston merely needs deed 
restrictions for residential use alone because the city will become further divided between 
planned areas and neglected areas. In 1990, the city assigned only one lawyer to advise 
homeowners about the deed restrictions and how to enforce them. Neighborhoods that cannot 
afford expensive lawyer services and deed restrictions have seen their property values drop as 
incompatible land use has moved into their residential area (Dillon, 1991). Zoning has numerous 
tools to enforce those plans, including dedicated land use, performance standards, density control 
tools via FARs, building height restrictions, special use districts, and the protection of historic 
buildings. The proponents also hoped that zoning could deal with some urban blight. From the 
mid-1970s to the late 1980s, Houston had a 50% percent population increase. But along with the 
59 
 
 
growth came unprecedented urban blight. For instance, Lamar Terrace, a residential subdivision 
near the Galleria shopping center, became an overnight slum because of reckless land 
speculation. The Midtown area ended up with 50% of the state’s halfway houses for parolees, 
while inner-city Neartown lost 10 percent of its housing in a few years (Dillon, 1991). The 
biggest challenge was creating an ordinance that combines maximum protection for 
neighborhoods with a maximum amount of flexibility for economic development.  
As a result, city council proposed an enabling ordinance mandating that within one year 
the Planning and Zoning Commission present for preliminary approval zoning regulations to 
achieve the goals of an approved comprehensive plan. Although it was council’s intention for 
zoning to follow the comprehensive plan, they realized that given the timetable this was not 
possible. So the original ordinance states that initiation of the comprehensive plan should be 
concurrent with the development of zoning regulations (Kelsey, et al., 1992). But work on the 
comprehensive plan began only in January 1993. This means that the zoning proposal were based 
on existing conditions rather than on a vision of what Houston wanted to be in the future, that is, 
the city would be mapped according to existing land uses-in effect freezing in time existing use 
patterns. All raw land over two acres in size would be zoned Open (O zone), and all single-family 
deed-restricted subdivisions would be zoned R1, the most restrictive residential category. 
However, recognizing and categorizing other categories were more difficult. The O zone, which 
was to preserve large areas in which Houston’s entrepreneurial spirit could continue to flourish, 
might turn out to be an interim designation, eventually to be replaced by other zoning categories. 
The ordinance required, for instance, that any single family homes developed in the O zone be 
rezoned R1. A new district classification, the major activity center (MAC), was added shortly 
before the completion of the draft. Intended for areas of intense development such as downtown, 
uptown, and the Texas Medical Center, it included perimeter setback requirements less stringent 
than those in the O zone. Houston had over years passed numerous land use ordinances aimed at 
specific issues-parking, setbacks, sexually oriented businesses, signs. However, none of these had 
been incorporated into the draft zoning ordinance.  
The proposed zoning ordinance divided the city into several districts. Residential districts 
aimed to protect neighborhoods from incompatible uses. They had stringent land use restrictions 
and development standards for land use compatibility. Residential districts included (1) R1 
residential single-family detached; (2) R4 residential single-family (up to 4 units on a lot); (3) R8 
residential only (up to 8 units on a lot); (4) RO residential only (no limit on number of units). 
Open and Major Activity Center districts aimed to provide maximum flexibility for development. 
They had few land use restrictions, and had performance standards to minimize land use conflicts 
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at the edges of the district and around nuisance uses. Urban neighborhood district applied to 
existing mixed use areas with a residential character and scale. It had fewer land use restrictions 
than residential districts, and had scale and property edge standards for nonresidential uses and 
large apartments. Industrial district had land use limitations to carry out purposes of districts; it 
had buffers required at edge of district. Other districts to meet special needs included planned unit 
development (PUD), special district for areas with unique characteristics (SD), landmark and 
historical overlay district (L and H), green space (GS).  
The proposed zoning ordinance received many statements against it. Living in one of the 
best large cities in the country for small businesses, some Houstonians believed that zoning hurts 
small businesses, the engine of local economy whereas small businesses created a significant 
percentage of job opportunities in the country. In the meanwhile, zoning activates were believed 
to work for government or for large corporations who do not care about the fate of small 
businesses. For those against zoning, trying to zone older neighborhoods which were 
commercial/residential mixed-use areas that were in constant transition is a mistake. Strong land 
use controls may result in empty, abandoned buildings and tax revenue loss. Furthermore, 
protecting residential neighborhoods from commercial encroachment can be done through stricter 
building codes and nuisance ordinances in residential neighborhoods.  
When the November 1993 election approached, the mayor, most city council members 
and influential business leaders all endorsed the notion that Houston's zoning time had finally 
come. Opinion surveys conducted by reputable pollsters predicted zoning would win going away. 
However, 52 percent of Houston citizens voted to reject zoning. According to a tabulation in the 
Houston Chronicle (Nov. 3, 1993), zoning was decisively opposed in low-income Black and 
Anglo precincts and favored in middle-income Black and Anglo areas. Hispanic voters also voted 
against zoning. A detailed statistics was as follows (Table 3). 
 
 
Table 3: 1993 Houston Zoning Referendum Statistics (Source: Houston Chronicle, 1993). 
Area Turnout For Zoning 
Low-income Black 11.1% 27.9% 
Low-income Anglo 17.6% 31.8% 
Middle-income Black 23.1% 62.6% 
Middle-income Anglo 28.1% 55.6% 
Predominantly Hispanic 13.1% 42.0% 
Upper-income Anglo 34.5% 43.8% 
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The statistics shows that if the turnout from the low-income areas had been higher, the 
zoning ordinance proposal might have been defeated more decisively. It also shows that the 
demand for zoning comes significantly from middle-income class. The voting result was similar 
to that in 1962, except that zoning was approved by 65 percent of the voters in upper-income 
Anglo areas on that occasion (Murray and Thomas, 1991). In short, it was the low-income areas, 
where land-use controls might have had the most effect in protecting residential neighborhoods 
from offensive land uses, that voted against zoning. Moorhead (1993) attributed the result to a 
last-minute fear/smear campaign by the well-financed opposition consisted of a wide mix of 
interests. Houston lacks the small suburban municipalities that are dominated by middle-income 
homeowners and where it is normal to expect that zoning will exist (McDonald, 1995). In 
addition, it is difficult to set up deed restrictions in developed areas where they either have never 
had deed restrictions or earlier restrictions have expired, due to the prohibitively high cost of 
setting up deed restriction system in those developed areas. Largely for this reason, the middle-
income homeowners turned to the creation of a zoning ordinance in their voting.  
In the past few years, public officials and community leaders have sought ways to control 
the impact of growth on the environment and quality of life. In 2003, city officials drafted an 'area 
plan' ordinance that would have empowered management districts or similar entities to write 
development standards unique to those areas. The idea drew strong opposition from developers 
and was never presented to the City Council. Current Houston Mayor Bill White still does not see 
zoning as the answer to Houston’s land use issues. He states that there will be both new 
development and more rules to protect common interests, the city will respect consumer choice 
and not have some bureaucrat in City Hall become the taste patrol for the city (Hudson, 2007). 
One of most recently proposed rules is a new city traffic ordinance which would allow Houston to 
reject proposed developments that create too much traffic on neighborhood roads.   
 
Annexation, Major Infrastructure and Activity Centers 
 
Annexation 
 
The 1912 amendment to Texas constitution gave Houston near total annexation powers. 
As a result, around-the-city annexations in the 1940s and 1950s allowed the city to double and 
redouble its size and population. By the Municipal Annexation Act of 1963, Houston was granted 
extraterritorial jurisdiction (ETJ) over adjacent land out to five miles in unincorporated areas for 
future suburban growth. The extent of the expansion depended on Houston’s current population 
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and allowed the city to place all lands within five miles of its limits under ETJ. Only Houston was 
allowed to annex in this area, and no settlements could incorporate themselves without 
permission from the city or a change in the state law. In any given year, Houston could annex up 
to 10 percent of its total area or opt for postponed annexation of an area as long as it did not 
exceed 30 percent of the city’s total area. (Adams, 1976, p.113). Between 1960 and 1996, this 
aggressive policy resulted in 119 annexations. By 1999 this generous annexation policy had 
allowed Houston to reserve approximately 1289 square miles (excluding the areas of cities within 
it) for future annexation. This has often been accomplished by manipulating the letter of the law: 
incorporating ten-foot wide strips in right-of-way along highways, thereby allowing the city to 
incorporate areas such as Lake Houston, Intercontinental Airport, and Clear Lake City, which lay 
beyond reserved but still unincorporated areas (Kaplan, 1984). 
In recent years, resistance to annexation by outlying areas has increased in intensity. 
Clear Lake City has yet to reverse its 1977 annexation by the city of Houston. In the affluent 
northwest portion of Harris County, subdivisions quietly discussed future prospects for 
developing a separate city. Concern over Houston’s annexation plans became more acute in the 
1980s because of the economic hard times brought on by the collapse in oil prices. The city has 
always used annexation as a means to keep city taxes low while increasing the tax base. Political 
sensitivities within the city have also been raised by interest in expansion for fear that the 
annexation of predominantly white suburban neighborhoods would dilute minority voting 
strength. A particular severe battle of words broke out in 1995 when the city of Houston annexed 
the affluent subdivision of Kingwood north of downtown. As a consequence of the Kingwood 
case, the old model for annexation of the municipal utility districts is no longer feasible. In the 
past, Houston encouraged the creation of municipal utility districts by developers outside the city 
and waited until the municipal utility districts were built out to annex them into the city. The city 
is now having “strategic partnership deals” with municipal utility districts, in which the city 
agrees not to annex an area in 30 years while the municipal utility districts levy a one-cent sales 
tax equal to the city’s rate, and share half of the proceeds with Houston. This is a net gain for 
Houston as the city does not provide service to those municipal utility districts (Nissimov, 2004). 
Houston’s strategic partnership agreements with the municipal utility districts increased from 
three in 2000 to forty three in 2004.  
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Major Infrastructure 
 
Houston has established its own way of planning and implementing major projects by 
using substantial public subsidies to advance the city development. The city has well-deserved 
reputation for infrastructure planning. Public infrastructure investments with funding from both 
the private and the public have played a key role in the economic growth. As Metrostudy 
President Mike Inselmann has said “the city grows where developers buy land and they buy land 
where new transportation corridors get developed” (Gulf Coast Institute, 2006). Houston 
Chamber of Commerce’s 15-year Regional Mobility Plan made in 1982 invested $1 billion a year 
in mobility improvements. By 1992, the investments had included adding some 2,675 lane-miles 
of road, widening many major highways and freeways, and constructing the 21-mile Hardy 
Tollraod and the 28-mile Sam Houston Tollroad. In 1987, Harris County residents voted to 
finance road, flood control, and Port of Houston improvements with $626.5 million in bonds. A 
$95 million new terminal (Micky Leland) at the Houston International Airport was opened in 
1991. $2.6 billion in total was invested to upgrade the City’s three airports in 2000. With 
continuous expansions and upgrades, Houston now has the fourth largest airport system in the US 
and the sixth largest in the world.  
After a long time debate, the first 7.5 miles of the $340 million light-rail line along Main 
Street from downtown to Reliant Stadium were completed in 2003. Metro is seeking approval 
from voters for a local transit tax to finance a 22-mile addition at a cost of $640 million. Again, 
the attempt encounters resistance. The antirail and prohighway forces have been running 
commercials contending it would be cheaper to buy every commuter a Ferrari. Supporters like the 
Gulf Coast Institute (2006) contends that in comparison with New York City, Manhattan and the 
City of Houston both have two million residents, but Manhattan will fit inside Loop 610 four 
times. Houston has 7.5 miles of rail transit while Manhattan has 75 miles. Eighty-two percent of 
Manhattanites walk, bike, or take transit to work, but only seven percent of Houstonians do that.   
The Houston Ship Channel opened in 1914 and has been since widened and deepened. 
Recently, the most significant environmental measures taken by the port authority in 2005 are 
associated with its long-awaited completion of the Houston Ship Channel’s deepening and 
widening project in concert with the US Army Corps of Engineers. This $639 million, 50 year 
project deepened the Houston and Galveston ship channels to 45 feet from 40 feet and widened 
the waterway to 530 feet from 400 feet. The Port of Houston stands at the heart of Houston’s 
international infrastructure. Port of Houston is the nation’s sixth largest port. More than 28 
million tons of cargo moved through PHA facilities in 2005. More than two million tons of liquid 
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petroleum products moved through the Houston Ship Channel in 2005. It ranks first in the U.S. in 
foreign tonnage moved in 2005.  
However, some infrastructure development encountered difficulties because of their 
locations. The extension of Chimney Rock was needed since the 1940s, but since it passes 
through Tanglewood, the second richest suburb in Houston, none of the mayors wanted to get 
behind it. The 610 Loop was created which was supposed to relieve the traffic congestion in the 
area, but it had the opposite effect as it became the most congested freeway in Texas, because 
there was no Chimney Rock or Voss to get people north and south of that area. It took from the 
1940s to the 1980s to get this street extension project agreed to and completed. Former Houston 
Planning Commission Chairman Burdette Keeland commented in an interview: “ It should show 
what kind of job we are talking about. If it takes 40 years to get one road, a badly needed road, 
extended, imagine what it will take to create a workable planning and zoning system.” For 
infrastructure development, the problem with a lack of zoning is that there is always confusion. 
Nobody knows what to do with property. That is also a problem for architects, who like uses to be 
defined before they start designing (Barna, 1985). 
The plan and development of some major infrastructure may be at the costs of the 
minority neighborhoods and so receive strong resistance. In 2003, an environmental group 
fighting a plan that would sharply increase train traffic in Houston’s East End says the consortium 
(San Jacinto Rail Line) seeking the new rail line deliberately distorted 2000 census data to claim 
it would go through largely white neighborhoods. When the data used to map the route is 
corrected to reflect residents who identified themselves as Hispanics, which was not a main 
census category, the figures show that communities affected by the new trains are 
overwhelmingly Latino. The original map hided the fact that more than 50 percent of the affected 
residents are minorities. The East End, although gentrifying, still consists largely of modest, 
Hispanic neighborhoods. The original map identified census tracts as being either more than 50 
percent white or less than 50 percent white. But when shaded the map to include everyone who 
called themselves Hispanics, large areas went from white to minority. 71 percent of the residents 
within a quarter-mile of the proposed operating route are Hispanic and 32 percent are children. 
27,825 Hispanics, or 90 percent of the people who live within a quarter-mile of the route, were 
counted as white in the racial data the consortium provided (Rodriguez, 2003). 
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Activity Centers 
 
Houston is poised to be a premier example of a polycentric region. Employment 
migration has resulted in concentrations of office employment in nodes scattered across the 
region—the activity centers. The region’s twenty activity centers vary in size and purpose. Those 
centers are CBD, Uptown/Galleria, Greenway Plaza, Texas Medical Center, Westchase, West 
Houston I, US 290/NW, Sharpstown, Greenspoint, Northwest Mall, NASA I, Universities, West 
Houston II, Energy Corridor I, Brookhollow, Southwest I, Bush International Airport, FM 1960 I, 
FM 1960 II, and Hobby Airport. In recent years, the desire of these workers for locations offering 
short home-to-work trips, security, and pleasant environments accelerate the migration of jobs to 
suburban activity centers. By the year 2000, it was estimated that 80 percent of Houston’s office 
space is located outside of downtown in activity centers like the Galleria.      
Most of Houston’s major constructions are located in those activity centers. In 1987, the 
$108 million George R. Brown Convention Center, the fourth largest in the country, was built in 
downtown. The privately funded $72 million Gus Worthham Theater, home to the Houston Ballet 
and the Houston Grand Opera, opened in 1987. During the 1980s, the Texas Medical Center spent 
$2.55 billion updating its facilities. With most historic structures restored, Downtown focuses on 
new construction. It works toward a residential population of 20,000, and offers a wide range of 
residential properties, from the most affordable to luxury developments. Most recently, light rail 
service began along Main Street from Downtown to the Texas Medical Center and Reliant Park. 
Metro has plans to connect other activity centers by light rails. However, the high cost of light rail 
construction means that Houston can build 10 miles of light rail a year with current funding. At 
the end of 2007, the Metro board approved a route on Richmond and Wheeler for the 
controversial University line, which will provide a 10-mile east-west complement to the existing 
7.5-mile Main Street line. 
Development of those activity centers have strong support from many non-government 
organizations. For instance, downtown development organizations include: Buffalo Bayou 
Partnership (BBP), which is a primary non-government partner for improvements to Buffalo 
Bayou planned for the next twenty years; Central Houston, Inc., with focus for Downtown-based 
economic development, major civic projects, access/mobility, long-range planning initiatives and 
advocacy for Downtown; Downtown District (HDMD), who provides specialized services not 
offered by traditional government, research, planning and general improvements of prime 
importance to Downtown’s future; and Main Street Market Square Redevelopment Authority 
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(MSRA) which offers public improvements to retail, residential, bayou and theater environments 
on Main Street and within its tax increment zone boundaries.  
Since the beginning of this century, Houston has experienced a sports renaissance. No 
other American city has ever invested as much as on sports stadiums in as little time, opening 
three pro-facilities in 40 months for $1 billion. They are the centerpiece of Houston’s 
unsuccessful bid for the 2012 Olympics. The bid failed for Houston’s image as having pollution 
problems, no zoning, hot weather and economic instability. Nevertheless those pro-facilities lend 
a positive identity to the city. All have been supported by popular vote.  Under a 1997 state law, 
those votes allowed the sports authority to levy a 2 percent tax on hotels and a 5 percent tax on 
car rentals to build sports venues. This raised Houston’s hotel tax to 17 percent, the highest in the 
nation. Minute Maid was completed in 2000 for baseball. This $286 million project includes $18 
million from Astros, $48 million cash on hand from hotel and rental car tax, and $220 million in 
bonds. Reliant was completed in 2002 for football. This $500 million project includes $50 million 
from Texans fans purchasing personal seat licenses, $18 million from Texans, $7.5 million from 
Aramark, $4 million from Harris County Sports and Convention Corp, 4.6 million from Rodeo 
Houston, 1.4 million loan from Rodeo Houston, $367 million in bonds, $25 million loan from 
Texans, and $22.5 million in loans from Harris County. The most recent Toyota Center was 
completed in 2003 for basketball. The center costs $252 million, which includes $20 million from 
City of Houston, $212 million in bonds and bank loans, and $20 million loan from Rockets.  
 
Governmental Intervention in Land Use Control 
  
The City established both a Planning Department and a Planning Commission in 1927. 
The Planning Department produced a master plan for the city in 1929 that included a proposed 
zoning ordinance. However, the Planning Commission was disbanded after the zoning ordinance 
failed under opposition from the Houston Property Owners League. In 1937, the Planning 
Commission was reconstituted to once again investigate the possibility of creating a zoning 
ordinance. However, the general public did not embrace zoning at this time and subsequent 
attempts failed in 1948, 1962 and 1993. Today the Planning Commission reviews and approves 
subdivision plats and development plat variances. Houston planning commission includes 26 
members, who are from the Department of Public Works and Engineering, the Metropolitan 
Transit Authority, the Commissioners’ Courts of Harris County, Fort Bend County, and 
Montgomery County, and residents and voters of the city and its extraterritorial jurisdiction. The 
Department of Planning and Development provides tools and resources to strengthen and increase 
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the long-term viability of neighborhoods; regulates land development in Houston and the extra 
territorial jurisdiction; and reviews, investigates and promotes land regulation policies for the 
changing demands to Houston’s growth and quality of life. In Houston’s history, comprehensive 
plans have been made from time to time, but have been ignored due to the objections from private 
sectors.  
Despite the laissez-faire rhetoric, government intervention in Houston’s growth has had a 
significant impact on urban development. The City of Houston draws up park and library master 
plans, neighborhood plans, major thoroughfare plans, and various infrastructure plans. For 
instance, Houston’s park master plan takes care of more than 43,700 acres of green and growing 
city parks. The City produces the Major Thoroughfare and Freeway Plan (MTFP) annually. In the 
plan, the city identifies sections of roadways that are in need of expansion. The plan serves as 
notice to the public for developing land adjacent to the identified roads. The Houston 2000 
Strategic Transportation Plan, a regional plan commissioned by the Mayor, recommended policy 
and strategic actions to address Houston’s future transportation issues including growth trends, 
the roles and responsibilities of organizations associated with transportation planning, and 
policies to trigger future action. More recently the City proposes that residential developments of 
100 units or more need to include park space, and developers can either provide land (2.6 acres 
for park space) or pay fees ($80,000) for park acquisition and improvements. Houston Galveston 
Association Council (HGAC) makes regional transportation plans. The 2025 Regional 
Transportation Plan is a federally required plan that ties together all roads, transit, 
bike/pedestrian, and port/airport projects for the Houston-Galveston area over the next two 
decades. The HGAC develops the long-term plan with the cooperation of local cities, counties, 
and transportation agencies. By 2025, the region will have 11,000 land miles of new roads (cost 
77 billion) in total. Harris County Flood Control District drew up the Brays Bayou Improvement 
Plan. The first project of Buffalo Bayou’s 30-year master plan is recently completed with a new 
lighting system, hike and bike trails. In June 2006, the City of Houston embarked on a major 
initiative, Urban Corridor Planning. This initiative will change how the City regulates 
development and designs its streets and other infrastructure in order to create a high quality urban 
environment in areas along METRO’s light rail and guided rapid transit corridors: Main Street, 
Uptown, East End, North, Southeast and University. Houston’s municipal government exercises 
some regulation of land use in a variety of ways, including: minimum lot sizes, minimum parking 
requirements and setbacks, street widths and block sizes. Moreover, building lines regulation 
helps preserve the residential character of an existing block in inner city neighborhoods by 
requiring new development to comply with the most frequently constructed building line along 
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the block. Similarly, prevailing lot size regulation requires new development to comply with the 
most frequently occurring lot size.  
There are some new government interventions in land use in recent years. For instance, as 
a result of collaboration among the Old Sixth Ward Neighborhood Association, the City, and 
Historic Houston, the City Council created Houston’s first protected historic district in 2007, 
shielding more than 200 buildings from demolition in the Old Sixth Ward. Since 1998, 10 historic 
buildings in the district have been demolished, 51 inappropriately altered, 4 relocated, and 12 
replaced with structures that are incompatible with the neighborhood’s characters. The new 
historic district ordinance protects the 33-acre district where some of the structures were built in 
the late 19th century. The ordinance does not directly regulate land use, but it dictates building 
materials so construction and rehabilitation will have to follow design regulations (e.g. 
overhanging roof eaves are encouraged while flat roofs are forbidden for residential buildings). 
The regulations are important not only to the current historic buildings but also to 23 vacant lots 
in the district.  
Houston regulates land use by its Department of Planning and Development. Houston 
City Code Chapter 42 is the city’s development ordinance. It was made in 1983. The ordinance 
sets standards for minimum building setbacks and maximum block lengths. The city also has 
strong ordinances for billboards and mobile homes, and regulations establishing a minimum 
distance (1,000 feet) between sex-oriented business. Chapter 42 was amended in 1999 to divide 
the city for the first time into an urban zone inside Loop 610 and a suburban zone outside the 
loop. Loop 610, which originally was designed and constructed as a bypass, has essentially 
become the city’s main street-a thoroughfare lined with commercial and retail uses. The 
ordinance allows for higher density residential development and for narrower streets in the urban 
zone. The role played by local developers in the Chapter 42 amendment debate, and its outcome, 
demonstrate that in one important respect, the local political landscape has not changed. In too 
many cases, small houses and bungalows in established neighborhoods are being torn down to 
make way for two or three townhomes on the same lot, threatening the neighborhood character.  
 
Minimum Lot Sizes 
 
According to amended Chapter 42, for single-family residential in suburban area, the 
minimum lot size requirement is 5,000 square feet. For single-family residential in urban area, the 
minimum lot size requirement is 3,500 square feet. Lot sizes less than the otherwise applicable 
minimum prescribed above are permitted in subdivisions where compensating open space is 
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provided within the boundaries of the subdivision plat. However, in no event the lot sizes can be 
less than 1,400 for both suburban and urban areas. In addition, the minimum width of any lot 
shall be 20 feet.  
Until 1998, Houston’s municipal land use code set the minimum lot size for detached 
single family residences at 5,000 square feet (465 square metres). In addition, the municipality 
made it impossible for developers to build large numbers of attached single family homes such as 
townhouses because it required townhouses to sit on at least 2,250 square feet (209 square 
metres) of land (Siegan, 1972). The city’s townhouse regulations were significantly more 
restrictive than those of other American cities (Allbee, 1998; Skrzycki, 1983). The townhouse 
regulations and minimum lot size requirements meant that almost all single family development 
was low density (i.e. 8.7 houses per acre (21.5 per hectare)), and it was not uncommon to find 
only two residences per acre (Williams, 2003). These requirements may have unsustainable 
impacts on urban development. For instance, such low density: makes improved public transit 
impractical (Nichols, 1992; Hanson, 1999); increases the cost of providing infrastructure and 
public utilities such as water and sewer services (Speir and Stephenson, 2002), and: to certain 
extent encourages population growth to shift away from the city centre.  
In 1998, the municipality amended the minimum lot size requirement regulations such 
that the 5,000 square foot minimum now applies to areas outside Interstate Highway 610 (I-610), 
which is about five miles from downtown Houston. Within the I-610 ring, the minimum lot size 
has been decreased to 3,500 square feet (325 square meters), and the minimum lot size for 
townhouses has been changed to 1,400 square feet (130 square metres). However, given that only 
1.4% of city dwellings were built in 1998 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2004) and that about 25% of 
Houston residents live inside the I-610 highway (Roth, 1991), the impact of the amended 
regulation on urban development has been limited from the beginning.  
The reform of Houston’s land use policies was a response to the real estate industry in the 
city. In the late 1990s, homebuilders urged the city to allow more compact development through 
reducing lot sizes when the city was rewriting its subdivision ordinance (Schwartz, 1998). 
Developers and homebuilders did make it happen. Those changes have recently resulted in some 
positive development, particularly in the downtown area: townhouses are showing up throughout 
Houston’s inside I-610 area, inner city population is starting to grow, and urban land value is 
rising significantly. The change featured a mini-boom of loft conversions and townhouses that 
has transformed some of the derelict central city areas into one of Texas’s fastest growing 
residential neighborhoods. The affluent and middle classes have begun to return to inner city 
neighborhoods.  
70 
 
 
Minimum Parking Requirements and Setbacks 
 
Chapter 42 articulates that each development plat containing a multifamily residential 
development needs to provide off-street parking spaces. For efficiency, the parking spaces 
required per unit is 1.25; for one bedroom, the requirement is 1.333 per unit; for two bedrooms, 
the requirement is 1.666; and for three or more bedrooms, the requirement is 2. Each multifamily 
residential development is also required to provide open space. For efficiency, the square feet of 
open space required per dwelling unit is 200; for one bedroom, the requirement is 240; for two 
bedrooms, the requirement is 320; for three bedrooms, the requirement is 440; and for four 
bedrooms, the requirement is 500. Each area provided as open space is at least 20 feet wide by 60 
feet long.  
Apartment buildings must provide 1.333 parking spaces for each 1 bedroom apartment, 
meaning that property owners must supply more than one parking space for every apartment even 
though 17% of Houston renters do not even own one car (US Census 2000). Houston bars must 
accommodate drivers by providing 10 parking spaces for each 1000 square feet gross floor area. 
Furthermore, the city also requires that structures abutting major thoroughfares be at least 25 feet 
from the street, according to its minimum building line requirement. The combination of 
mandatory setbacks and minimum parking requirement limits the population density in the case 
of residence uses, and the employment density in the case of business and commercial uses. 
Landlords pass at least some of the cost of parking spaces on to society through higher prices for 
goods and services. The costs of parking lots are paid for not only by drivers, but also by 
residents, taxpayers, and customers. Large parking lots increase building costs and get passed 
through to the consumer, sometimes through higher housing unit rents or higher costs at the 
grocery stores. In contrast, some cities such as Pasadena, Seattle, Portland, and Boston are 
making progress by revamping parking regulations, charging more for on-street parking, and 
adjusting the parking lot requirement in new developments. In Portland, maximum parking limits 
vary with the distance from light-rail stations, meaning there is less parking required near the 
stations, more required several blocks away. Iowa city sets aside land for parking to be built only 
if it is really needed has meant minimum parking requirements are waived or relaxed (Table 4).  
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Table 4: Houston’s Minimum Building Line Requirements (Source: City of Houston, 2007. p. 2900). 
 Urban Area Suburban Area 
Central Business District 0 feet NA 
Abutting Major Thoroughfare 25 feet 25 feet 
Single-family Lot Backing on Major 
Thoroughfare  
10 feet 10 feet 
Abutting Major Thoroughfare with 
Planned ROW of 80’ or less 
  
• General 15 feet NA 
• Retail Commercial Center 5 feet or 0 feet according to another 
relevant standards 
NA 
Collector and Local Streets   
Not Single-family Residential 10 feet 10 feet 
• Nonresidential Across from 
Single-family Lots with 
Platted Building Line 
greater than 10’ 
Lesser of 25 feet or greatest building 
line on single-family lots 
Lesser of 25 feet or greatest building 
line on single-family lots  
Collector Street-single-family 
Residential  
10 feet, Principal Structure 
17 feet, Garage of Carport Facing 
Street 5 feet 
25 feet Front 
10 feet Side and Back 
Local Streets- Single-family 10 feet, Principal Structure 
17 feet, Garage or Carport Facing 
Street 
20 feet Front 
10 feet Side and Back 
Residential 5 feet 10 feet 
10 feet both sides of corner lot 
  0 feet, if vehicular access is from 
public alley 
Private Streets 5 feet for habitable structure 5 feet for habitable structure 
 
 
Minimum Right-of-way Widths and Miles of Freeways 
 
Houston’s land use code Chapter 42 requires that major thoroughfares must have a 100 
feet unobstructed right-of-way for traffic, and all other streets must generally have a 50 to 60 feet 
right-of-way (Table 5). With the addition of the usual 4 feet wide sidewalk on both sides of 
streets, Houston’s wide streets contrast with most American streets which are around 35 feet wide 
or even narrower (Colby, 2000; Coden, 2003; Swift, 2003). The SmartCode (a walkability-
oriented model zoning code) even proposes streets with as few as 10 feet of pavement in 
residential areas and as few as 16 feet in mixed-use areas. Wide streets reduce the amount of land 
available for housing and commerce, and reduce residential and employment density.  
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Table 5: Houston’s Minimum Right-of-Way Requirements (Source: City of Houston, 2007. p. 2894). 
Major thoroughfares 1) The lesser of 100 feet or the right-of-way specified by 
the street hierarchy classification established by the major 
thoroughfare and freeway plan; or 
 2) 100 feet for streets designated on the major 
thoroughfare and freeway plan for which a street 
hierarchy classification is not established 
Collector streets designated on the major thoroughfare 
and freeway plan 
The right-of-way width established by the major 
thoroughfare and freeway plan 
Other collector streets (1) 60 feet; or  
 (2) 50 feet if all properties on both sides of the collector 
street consist of single-family residential lots that do not 
have driveway access to the collector street. 
Local streets (1) 50 feet if adjacent to exclusively single-family 
residential lots; or 
 (2) 60 feet if adjacent to any other development 
Public alleys 20 feet 
  
  
  
(Note: There are some street width exception areas. For instance, for the central business district additional widening is 
not required unless the existing right-of-way is less than 50 feet. Also an area that has block lengths of 600 feet or less 
and paved public streets with right-of-way of not less than 50 feet wide with equivalent levels of vehicular traffic, is 
eligible for designation as a street width exception area.) 
 
 
Houston has more overall freeway mileage than other American regions of comparable 
size. With only about 10% more population than the Boston urbanized area, Houston has almost 
twice as many lane-miles of freeway (Houston’s 2,460; Boston’s 1,310), and about the same lane-
miles as Chicago with less than half its population (Chicago’s 2,655) (Texas Transportation 
Institute, 2003). The large mileage of freeway nevertheless does not help transportation situation 
as Houston’s roads are more congested than those in either Boston or Chicago. Houston is known 
as one of the most congested cities in the country. The low density development, little by way of 
compact urban form, the shift of development from city centre to urban fringe and suburbs, and 
the lack of mass transit have resulted in private vehicle-dependent lifestyles. The 2004 average 
household in Houston spends $9,566 per year on transportation, which is over $3,000 per year 
more than residents of Boston metropolitan area (Surface Transportation Policy Project, 2004).    
 
Non-governmental Sector Efforts on Land Use Control 
 
Homeowners Associations and Deed Restrictions 
 
Homeowners associations are private organizations, who create rules and regulations 
(e.g. deed restrictions) that are enacted to protect the property values, amenities, and 
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homeowners’ quality of living in a neighborhood. Texas is known as one of the states (along with 
California, Arizona, Florida) with a longer history of homeowners association activity (Pena, 
2002). The state has developed more detailed laws regarding homeowners association governance 
and the regulation of individual behaviour. A homeowners association is most commonly created 
by a developer or house builder even before a community is built (Berry, 2001; Jacobs, 2005). 
They play an important role in curbing the effects of the lack of zoning (Berry, 2001; Martin, 
2004). Deed restrictions, landscape ordinances, and regulations formed by these organizations 
shift the burden form the public to the private sector. For the city government of Houston, 
homeowners associations reduce costs and take on some of local government’s responsibilities.  
For homeowners associations, the declaration of covenants, conditions and restrictions are the 
governing documents. Homeowners association regulations like deed restrictions can go beyond 
land use controls. They may address such matters as parking, sing posting, exterior colours, 
landscaping, architectural standards, play equipment, and décor (Blakely and Snyder, 1997; 
Hyatt, 2000; McKenzie, 1994). City land use regulations such as zoning ordinance have similar 
function in regulating land uses but without the level of details that govern individual property 
choice in homeowners associations’ regulations such as deed restrictions (Nelson, 1999).  
While zoning is enforced by city law, deed restrictions are usually enforced by civil 
lawsuits. The authority to enforce deed restrictions rest with the Deed Restriction Compliance 
Committee, with the assistance of the City of Houston Legal Department, Justice of the Peace 
Courts, and the Harris County Attorney. The Restrictions may be amended at any time by an 
instrument executed by the owners, of a majority (50% + 1) of lots in the Subdivision having 
agreed to do so. The purpose of the homeowners/neighborhood association is to maintain the 
residential character of the community, and to promote the civic and social welfare in the area. In 
the early 1990s, it was reported that about 50 to 60 percent of Houston’s neighborhoods had 
viable deed restrictions in place in a study conducted by Rice University (Kelsey, 1992). From a 
different, but more recent source, only 30 percent of Houston’s neighborhoods have viable deed 
restrictions, the other 70 percent are mostly low- to moderate- income neighborhoods where 
developments might move in (Hudson, 2007). Deed restrictions are usually valid for 24 to 30 
years after which they have to be renewed or the deed restrictions will be invalid. If a deed 
restriction gets expired, development may come in. Even the development on the site without 
deed restriction may draw protests from the nearby property owners where there is a deed 
restriction. In 2006, a developer bought a 1.7-acre parcel for a $100 million 187 condos project at 
the intersection of Bissonnet and Ashby streets occupied by 67 outdated apartments (not 
governed by any deed restriction) near the pricey homes of the Southampton and Boulevard Oaks 
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neighborhoods which have deed restrictions. The project has appalled the owners of the pricey 
homes and put local politicians in a hard time. The affluent residents hire a lawyer and complain 
that the condo tower will flood Bissonnet and Ashby with traffic, block sunlight from their homes 
and lower their property values. The City suggests the developer to scale back or cancel the 
development, on which the developer strongly disagrees. However, without zoning laws to 
regulate land use, and in this case without deed restriction on the development site, the city can 
do little to thwart the project other than apply traffic restrictions.   
 
Super Neighborhoods 
 
As defined by the City of Houston’s Planning and Development Department, ‘a Super 
Neighborhood is a geographically designated area where residents, civic organizations, 
institutions, and businesses work together to identify, plan, and set priorities to address the needs 
and concerns of their community’ (City of Houston, 1999). By getting residents of individual 
communities to focus their attention on areas that do not affect only their immediate 
neighborhood or subdivision, they are encouraged to broaden their communities by identifying, 
prioritizing, and addressing the needs and concerns of the wider neighborhood (City of Houston, 
1999). Currently there are 88 super neighborhoods covering the whole city of Houston, some of 
which has been encouraged by the city to form Super Neighborhood Councils. These councils 
serve as a forum where a representative group of residents and stakeholders can discuss issues 
impacting on their communities, reach a consensus on projects, and develop a Super 
Neighborhood Action Plan for community improvements. 
Super Neighborhoods are part of a city of Houston initiative giving community members 
more input into city government policy making, budgeting, planning and capital improvement 
projects in their part of town. With the help from the representatives from the city of Houston for 
setting up super neighborhoods, the Super Neighborhood format creates strength in numbers. 
Many civic groups works as individual entities with limited results and visions. When they band 
together around shared issues they have a great deal more power. It also helps them to think of 
solutions that not only address their immediate area but work to solve the larger problems. 
Besides easier communication with city officials and organizational resources from the city, 
official recognition of a super neighborhood would make the city more likely to include that 
group’s requests for projects on the city’s capital improvement plan. The boundaries of the super 
neighborhoods used a variety of elements including natural boundaries, freeways and major 
thoroughfares that divided areas, subdivision lines in some cases, and other built elements. 
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However, there is not a simple definition of “neighborhood”. Some neighborhoods have distinct 
boundaries while others don’t. The boundaries were drawn and then distributed to district city 
council members for comments. There is a great deal of flexibility built into the system as each 
neighborhood has a slightly different story, need and resources. The city suggests that 
stakeholders come from as many sectors as possible (businesses, faith-based groups, schools, etc.) 
because the success of the Super Neighborhood will be determined in part by how broad their 
support is in the community.  
The super neighborhood deals with neighborhood concerns as environmental amenity, 
neighborhood characteristics, educational and recreational facilities, senior citizen housing and 
affordable housing. However, not every super neighborhood protest succeeds. In 2005, the Alief 
super neighborhood protest against a subdivision proposed on a former landfill did little to 
dissuade the Houston Planning Commission from approving several requests by the developer, 
when developer SHRD Partners wants to build a 730-unit subdivision on a 138-acre dump site in 
Alief on the north side of Bissonnet Street between Cook Road and Kirkwood Drive. The bulk of 
the property consists of the former Doty Landfill (with the documented presence of methane), 
which was officially registered as a closed solid waste facility with the state in January 2001. 
Only after the commission’s approval, can the developer go seek from a series of permitting 
decisions before any construction can begin.  
Super neighborhoods also have influences on built forms and density. Overbuilding can 
cause a reduction in property values, and some super neighborhoods intend to find ways to 
change deed restrictions to avoid the problem to keep property values intact. In 2004, 
neighborhood members in Spring Branch Super Neighborhood try to make the changes so that 
developers don’t replace small houses with enormous ones that reach the property line. In other 
words, deed restrictions need to be changed in order to better control the sort of building that goes 
on in a neighborhood. Another case in the Fourth Ward, developers demolished homes to build 
upscale residential developments and the Houston Independent School District acquired a block 
of residential land for future schools. In 2005 its neighbor MacGregor Super Neighborhood took 
the case as a potential threat to their community and tried to preserve their community’s 
characters by distributing fliers and getting together with leaders of civic associations and 
homeowners associations of their area and the nearby ones (Martin, 2005). Similarly, Spring 
Branch West Super Neighborhood requested the developers of two residential projects to make 
design changes of their plans. The neighborhood’s main concern is about the density of a 
proposed subdivision and a 398-unit apartment complex Riverway being constructed in the area 
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off Bunker Hill by Trammel Crow. They asked if Riverway would consider doubling the size of 
the lots, decreasing the number of homes and increasing the starting price (Brown, A. D, 2006). 
Super neighborhood is a neighborhood oriented government which makes government 
participatory and more importantly driven by the neighborhoods. The idea is to make government 
more accessible and responsive to the public. But achieving that goal on a scale the size of 
Houston city is in fact far more complex. Articulating the concept and putting it into action has 
proved more difficult than Mayor Brown, the creator of Super Neighborhood initiative, could 
have foreseen. In the meantime, the city as a whole already has nine district council members 
operating at least one fully staffed district office handling neighborhood oriented issues. So some 
see super neighborhoods as one more layer of bureaucracy and prefer to work thorough 
traditional relationships with district city council members (Mason, 1998). After hundreds of 
meetings and dozens of plans, super neighborhood program is having yet to yield a single large 
project to which residents can point and say, “we did this.”. Critics argue the Brown 
administration has undercut its own initiative by not committing the resources that have made 
similar programs succeed in such cities as Seattle and Tacoma Washington. The only place where 
super neighborhoods will benefit the city of Houston is probably going to be the districts where 
there are very few homeowners associations. There super neighborhoods, in one of their many 
roles, can voice the concerns that would have otherwise been raised by homeowners associations. 
According to planning department figures, the city received nearly 3,200 Super Neighborhood 
Action Plan (SNAP) requests in 2002, about half related to routine maintenance, such as new 
street signs. Many critics suggest that the councils should focus more on transportation and 
affordable housing issues. From a political perspective, Super Neighborhood might be such an 
initiative that poses low political risk to Mayor Lee Brown, and produces more substantial 
additional political capital rather than substantial improvement at neighborhood level.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Initially defined by its natural advantages for oil and gas in history, Houston’s land use 
was, and is, determined by transportation infrastructure, mega projects, private land use controls, 
and a few land use regulatory policies. Large federal funded infrastructure such as Port of 
Houston, Houston Ship Channel, Big Inch and Little Inch oil pipeline, interstate highways, 
airports, and NASA Space Center, partially defined the city’s historic landscape. More recently, 
various large projects still dominate urban form, with significant government intervention and 
public funding resources.  
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The civil society organizations in Houston play important roles in land use due to 
relatively low level of leadership by and participation of the public sector. They work to fill the 
public sector vacuum. Deed restrictions have been principal reasons why Houston’s physical 
appearance and land use patterns are not greatly different, at least in a general sense, from those 
in other major cities. For the last decade, super neighborhood program also addresses land use 
issues such as environmental amenity, neighborhood characteristics, built forms and density. 
Despite the fact that super neighborhood program currently has many limitations, the 
improvement of the program will have significant contribution to the neighborhoods, especially 
where homeowners associations are not in place. 
There are some potential land use compatibility problems with deed restrictions. As 
subdivisions have grown older and as deed restrictions expire, other uses have encroached upon 
them resulting in a change in land use character. For instance, heavy commercial and industrial 
uses exist alongside single family residences; small bungalows are adjacent to commercial, 
industrial and vacant land. In many cases the residential uses are directly adjacent to heavy 
industries, toxic sites, and landfills. Such land development strategies might satisfy the pro-
growth ideology, but it fails to alleviate the living circumstances of the poor, and transfers the 
costs generated from growth to them (Vojnovic, 2003).  
While Houston is becoming a polycentric city with growing economic and demographic 
diversity, a key problem with the deed restrictions is their variation from area to area in content 
and enforcement. In particular, deed restrictions in minority and/or lower income communities 
might simply be ignored by landowners and developers. This is a critical problem given that over 
500,000 citizens (24% of 2.1 million Houston residents as of 2006) are living at or below the 
poverty line, which ranks Houston worst among major Texas cities (Brown, P., 2006).  
 If conventional planning means significant governmental intervention in the public 
interest for land use and related socio-economic problems of development and growth, then 
Houston is indeed ‘unplanned’. Planning in Houston has been privatized largely due to the pro-
growth coalitions among local businesses and political elites and the dictates of the investment 
market and economic growth. Houston’s lack of government zoning ordinance and generally 
weak planning laws have been used as a defence of the viability of planning with limited public 
intervention. The co-existence of private planning and public intervention was supported by the 
belief that economic growth would result in the correction of dysfunctional conditions on an ad 
hoc basis (Fox, 2003). Such planning is clearly not without social and environmental costs.   
The Houston case demonstrates the importance of examining local variations and 
indigenous political cultures that affect urban form. Houston’s planning and development 
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indicates that local politics is a primary factor in its development. Local political history and 
culture determine distinct urban development patterns. Local elites devise strategic plans and 
make political choices that shape the city’s development.  
The privatization of land use planning, with weak and partial regulations and controls, 
and no formal government zoning ordinance has lead to a unique form of development in 
Houston. It is also one that is changing. It favours the wealthier residents who have the power, 
education and resources to maintain a high quality for their own environment through enforcing 
private covenants and controlling land use in their neighborhoods. However, where covenants 
expire, or the communities are too disadvantaged or too poor to wield sufficient influence, 
powerful private interests can either ignore private covenants or overcome them. The result is 
interesting. In the richer areas, private covenants result in environments that are effectively 
strictly zoned, and effectively become single use mono-cultures. In the poorer areas, where 
covenants are less likely to be enforced, mixed use areas begin to emerge, with many of the much 
claimed urban design benefits of viability and vitality, but with social and economic disbenefits 
of inappropriate mixtures of uses that may over-ride community amenity.  
Up till now, Houston is still a free enterprise city. Houston exemplifies a unique major 
city without land use zoning. Transportation plans and large projects define the main framework 
of its urban form. Deed restrictions fill the gap of non-zoning, but not without problems. Private 
land use controls are weak in addressing social and environmental concerns in lower income 
communities. Downtown redevelopment brings people back to inner city but creates 
gentrification. Hence as Houston develops further toward a quintessential world city, if public 
sector planning and maybe zoning is still impossible for the city to achieve, a new type of 
planning in a free market context needs to be developed to address current problems. 
Impediments to zoning reform are predominantly political, social and economic. Nevertheless, if 
the end result of land use control reform is the imposition of a decision-making and regulatory 
bureaucracy on top of something that currently works well, it could create imbalances and 
inefficiencies that would try to force the wrong things in the wrong places at the wrong time. 
Houston needs flexibility and adaptability to allow dynamic growth and urban evolution.  
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CHAPTER V 
LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL AND URBAN FORM IN HOUSTON’S 
THREE SUPER NEIGHBORHOODS 
 
 This chapter uses a combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches to examine the 
urban form and land use patterns of three super neighborhoods in Houston. Using statistical 
cluster analysis, it first clusters Houston’s block groups into three categories based on the 
socioeconomic characteristics of those block groups. Those socioeconomic factors include 
race/ethnics, educational attainment, household income, homeownership, housing density, 
housing value, and rent. It then uses super neighborhood boundaries to group three sets of block 
groups as case study super neighborhoods—River Oaks, Independence Heights and Montrose. 
The cases represent both urban and suburban super neighborhoods. More importantly, they 
represent three types of land use patterns with different levels of property rights attenuation 
developed from their history, population, and socioeconomic characters in their own. Applying 
Geographic Information Systems (GIS), the study develops quantitative measures of urban form 
and land use patterns-street design and circulation systems, density, land use mix, accessibility, 
and pedestrian access- to conduct both comparative and chronological analysis for three case 
study super neighborhoods. Such quantitative approach is followed by a qualitative investigation 
of the super neighborhoods attempting to address why and how such quantitative results are 
formed over the decades. The chapter concludes with discussions over the limitations of the 
study, policy implications from the findings on urban form and land uses, and some contributions 
to the debate over urban form and government intervention in better land use patterns. 
 
Case Study Neighborhoods 
 
The interaction between socioeconomic status of a place and its spatial variation has been 
acknowledged by research work. For instance, Galster and Killen (1995) theorize the interaction 
of three structures-social, economic, and spatial, and argue that such interaction produces 
structural socioeconomic diversity of individuals in different places. Furthermore, the uneven 
resource distribution creates a socio-spatial structure where economic forces and land use 
practices reinforce each other to produce landscapes of inequality (Squires and Kubrin, 2005). 
More explicitly, socioeconomic status indicators such as educational attainment, race and 
ethnicity, household income distribution, housing options, homeownership rates, housing density, 
land-use mix and property status are some of the key reasons that result in neighborhood spatial 
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variation. In this study, census block groups were used as the smallest spatial analysis unit of data 
collection. While it would be preferable to use census block as measurement unit, census block 
group is a relatively homogeneous area that can capture the characteristics of a neighborhood 
(Song and Knaap, 2004; Bates, 2006).    
This analysis used US Census data 2000 for race/ethnic population1, education attainment 
for population over 25 years old2, median household income, owner or renter occupied housing 
units, housing unit density3
                                                 
1 There are five categories for race/ethnicity. They are (1) Not Hispanic or Latino- White alone; (2) Not Hispanic or 
Latino- Black or African American alone; (3) Not Hispanic or Latino- Asian alone; (4) Not Hispanic or Latino- others, 
which include Not Hispanic or Latino- American Indian and Alaska Native alone, Not Hispanic or Latino- Native 
Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander alone, Not Hispanic or Latino- Some other race alone, and Not Hispanic or Latino- 
tow or more races; and (5) Hispanic or Latino. 
2 There are four categories for educational attainment. They are (1) No High School Education, which includes all that 
do not even have high school education; (2) High School Only Education, which includes high school graduate and 
some college education; (3) Bachelor’s or Associate degrees; and (4) Graduate degrees, which include Master’s, 
Professional and Doctorate degrees.  
3 There are five categories for housing unit density. They are (1) detached units (single family); (2) multifamily low 
housing unit density, which includes attached units, 2 units, and 3 or 4 units in structure; (3) multifamily medium 
housing unit density, which includes 5 to 9 units, and 10 to 19 units; (4) multifamily high housing unit density, which 
includes 20 to 49 units, and 50 or more units in structure; and (5) mobile home.  
, median contract rent, and median value of owner-occupied housing 
units to define the socioeconomic status of a neighborhood. A note of caution is that the city limit 
boundary of Houston is not always consistent with the boundaries of the block groups. Because 
land use control policies from the City of Houston only apply to the areas within the city limit, 
the analysis only includes the block groups that are completely contained by the city limit. As a 
consequence, there are 1018 block groups in total. Most of them are within Beltway 8 (Fig. 1).    
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Fig. 1: Block Groups that are completely within the City Limit. 
 
In order to have a detailed analysis of natural grouping, K-means cluster analysis was 
used to group three clusters of block groups. Three clusters were chosen based on a conceptual 
assumption that there might be three types of land use controls in the city--strictly controlled, 
least controlled, and one with land use controls in between. Those three types of land use controls 
resulted in three different land use patterns. Cluster analysis identified homogeneous subgroups 
within a population, minimizing within-group variation and maximizing between-group variation. 
The analysis merged similar analysis units into groups. The final cluster centers table shows the 
socioeconomic conditions of three groups4
 
 (Table 6 and Table 7). Among those cluster groups, 
Group 3 has the highest non-Hispanic White population percentage (78.3%), extremely high  
 
                                                 
4 In order to capture the average educational levels and average housing unit densities in the neighborhoods, four types 
of educational attainment are recoded as 1 to 4, where 1 represents No High School Education, and 4 represents 
Graduate Degrees. Similarly, four types of housing unit densities are recoded as 1 to 4, where 1 represents detached 
units in structure, and 4 represents high housing unit density in structure. As a special housing structure, mobile is not 
recoded. As a consequence, the resulting variables will be continuous variables, where a larger number reflects a higher 
average level of education, or a higher average level of housing unit density.  
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median household income ($135,255, which is almost twice of that of Group 1, and four times of 
that of Group 2), the highest owner occupied housing unit percentage (68.5%), the highest 
median contract rent ($1032), and extremely high median housing value ($641,747, which is 
more than three times of that of Group 1, and ten times of that of Group 2. Houston’s median 
housing value is $79,000), and the highest education level (1.49). The statistics demonstrates that 
Group 3 is a cluster of upper-end income neighborhoods that are the richest in the city. However, 
such neighborhoods are very few in Houston, with only 17 block groups. Group 1 has high non-
Hispanic White population percentage (72.2%), high median household income ($ 70,483), high 
owner occupied housing unit percentage (59.9%), high median contract rent ($841), and high 
median housing value ($214,218), and high education level (1.43). The statistics demonstrates 
that Group 1 is a cluster of high- to moderate- income neighborhoods. Group 1 has 173 block 
groups. The largest cluster is Group 2 which has 828 block groups. Group 2 possibly represents 
the majority of Houston’s neighborhoods which has a high percentage of minorities (especially 
non-Hispanic Black and Hispanic), moderate household income ($32,962), high rent occupied 
housing unit rate (50.2%), low median contract rent ($469), low housing median value ($62,896), 
and relatively low education attainment (0.91). 
  
 
 
Table 6: Final Cluster Centers. 
72.2 22.0 78.3 
6.2 31.2 5.1 
5.4 3.9 1.8 
2.0 1.4 2.2 
14.2 41.4 12.6 
70483 32962 135255 
59.9 49.8 68.5 
40.1 50.2 31.5 
.1 1.2 .2 
841 469 1032 
214218 62896 641747 
1.43 .91 1.49 
1.93 1.86 1.87 
Not Hispanic White % 
Not Hispanic Black % 
Not Hispanic Asian % 
Not Hispanic Others % 
Hispanic % 
Median Household 
Income 
Owner Occupied % 
Renter Occupied % 
Mobile % 
Median Rent 
Median Value 
Average Education 
Average Density 
1 2 3 
Cluster 
83 
 
 
 
 
 
Mapping the cluster analysis results based on the block groups revealed a spatial pattern 
consistent with spatial socioeconomic distribution of Houston (Fig. 2). The majority of the Group 
3 block groups clusters in Greater Uptown and River Oaks, which are the well known upper-end 
income neighborhoods within the city limit of Houston. The map shows that the richest 
neighborhoods are near the Houston city center, along the west portion of I-610. The majority of 
the block groups of Group 1 clusters on the west of Highway 59 and Highway 286 and extends 
along the south of Interstate 10. In addition, the block groups in Kingwood neighborhood 
(incorporated by the City of Houston in 1996) and Clear Lake (incorporated by the City in 1977) 
are among Group 1. Those were master-planned neighborhoods before their incorporation into 
Houston. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2: Spatial Distribution of Three Clusters of Super Neighborhood Block Groups. 
173.000 
828.000 
17.000 
1018.000 
.000 
1 
2 
3 
Cluster 
Valid 
Missing 
Table 7: Number of Cases in Each Cluster. 
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The examination of spatial distribution of those cluster groups helped to further identify 
potential neighborhoods for case studies. It was apparent in most cases those block groups with 
similar socioeconomic status cluster together due to their socioeconomic homogeneity. However, 
the block groups sometimes were too small to capture the characteristics of land use of a 
neighborhood, especially when this research attempted to analyze land use diversity of the whole 
city. Representative neighborhoods that cover a reasonable size of neighborhood area were 
desirable. Super neighborhood used by the City of Houston’s Planning and Development 
Department was helpful to define study areas while it could still maintain socioeconomic status 
homogeneity of the block groups. However, super neighborhood boundary defined by the City 
does not perfectly match block group boundary in some cases. As a consequence, super 
neighborhood was used as a reference boundary to select block groups. The analysis used super 
neighborhood boundaries to exclude those super neighborhoods that do not have complete block 
groups and those that have two or more socioeconomic statuses within super neighborhood. As 
discussed, both Greater Uptown and River Oaks were potential cases for Group 3 neighborhoods. 
Greater Uptown block groups within Greater Uptown super neighborhood contain all three 
different types of block groups. Therefore, River Oaks super neighborhood is better as a case 
study super neighborhood, even though it is necessary to acknowledge that River Oaks super 
neighborhood includes about 40 percent of its total area that belongs to Group 1. For Group 1, 
there were two super neighborhoods potentially ideal for case study—Montrose and Texas 
Medical Center. Texas Medical Center was excluded because its special institutional use may not 
make it a representative case. Rivers Oaks and Montrose were established in 1910s and 1920s, 
respectively. For Group 2, super neighborhood age was taken into consideration. Independence 
Heights was selected as a representative case for that group as the neighborhood was established 
in 1910s. It may also represent a case outside I-610 but within Beltway 8 (Fig. 3).  
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Fig. 3: Three Selected Super Neighborhoods: River Oaks (left in the middle along 610), Montrose (next to River Oaks), 
and Independence Heights (top along 610). 
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Table 8: Socioeconomic Status of Three Selected Super Neighborhoods (Source: US Census 2000). 
 
Neighborhood Name River Oaks Independence Heights Montrose
Totoal Population 14,313 14,206 28,015
White 85.7% 6.5% 67.6%
Black 1.7% 59.9% 3.6%
Hispanic 8.1% 32.5% 23.2%
Asian 2.9% 0.5% 3.8%
Other 1.5% 0.7% 1.7%
Educational Attainment
Persons 25 years and over 11,320 8,734 21,976
No High School Diploma 3.5% 43.7% 13.1%
High School Diploma & higher 96.5% 56.3% 86.9%
Household Income
Total Households 7,454 4,775 16,300
Below $25,000 11.3% 53.8% 28.0%
Above $25,000 88.7% 46.2% 72.0%
Labor Force
Persons 16 years and over 8,657 5,873 20,321
Employed 97.6% 83.9% 96.4%
Unemployed 2.4% 16.1% 3.6%
Housing
Total Occupied Units 7,401 4,772 16,239
Owner Occupied 51.7% 49.4% 29.7%
Renter Occupied 48.3% 50.6% 70.3%  
 
 
A. River Oaks Super Neighborhood. 
Fig. 4: Current Super Neighborhood Land Use Maps.  
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B. Independence Heights Super Neighborhood. 
Fig.4 continued. 
 
 
C. Montrose Super Neighborhood. 
Fig.4 continued. 
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When comparing the three neighborhoods ranging from controlled use (River Oaks), 
mixed use together with controlled use (Independence Heights), to mixed use (Montrose) (all will 
be further discussed later), a few socioeconomic differences were observed (Table 8). One of the 
most important factors that seem to relate to the level of deed restriction implementation is 
household income. Table 8 shows that 88.7% of Rive Oaks’ residents have a household income 
of $25,000 or more, higher than the other two neighborhoods.  Deed restriction implementation is 
also associated with homeownership. River Oaks has the highest owner occupied housing 
(51.7%), much higher than the amount of Montrose (29.7%).  
This direct observation suggests a relationship between the socio-economic and perhaps 
even the educational level of inhabitants and their ability, or willingness to enforce private 
restrictive covenants in their own interests (Fig. 4). In areas with fewer covenants, or where 
covenants expire, especially in less socio-economically advantaged areas, residents may not have 
the power, resources or education to enforce them themselves. Without covenant protection, 
residential land use may transform to high density residential use, commercial use or even 
industrial use. That might explain the highly mixed used and somewhat ‘kaleidoscope’ style land 
use pattern in Montrose. Overall, the comparison of three neighborhood plans shows that the 
socio-economic characteristics of different neighborhoods can make significant differences in the 
operation of deed restrictions and thus greatly influence the land use controls and land use 
patterns. Qualitative evidences from the three super neighborhoods in later sections further 
support the arguments. The comparison among three super neighborhoods raises the issue of the 
importance or influence of wealth. Wealth directly relates many socioeconomic factors such as 
race/ethnics, educational attainment, household income, homeownership, housing density, 
housing value, and rent. All those factors drive the differences in land use patterns. The 
institutional processes and procedures that have been erected at local levels to manage land 
development are fueled by this wealth. They are well developed and deeply ingrained. There is a 
strong and direct connection between this wealth and the quality of social services (schools, park 
and recreational facilities, libraries, police/fire protection, sewer and water treatment, 
transportation systems, etc.) provided in those neighborhoods. As discussed in previous chapters, 
ecological and environmental values will remain costs to be distributed and externalized to others 
in exchange for more immediate, monetizable benefits. Furthermore, there is also strong 
connection between wealth and property right tenure security. The argument of wealth and land 
use patterns also calls for new insights into how citizen-generated covenants can be used to 
protect the status quo or other important issues. All those factors drive the differences in land use 
patterns.    
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Spatial Measures of Urban Form  
 
Quantitative research methods have been widely used to test changing land use patterns 
and forms (see for example, Carruthers, 2002; Nelson and Moore, 1996; Nelson, 1999; Song and 
Knaap, 2004; Zhang, 2001). However, quantitative research at neighborhood levels to examine 
urban form for those without growth management programs is sparse. Conventional quantitative 
research on urban growth compares suburban growth to central city growth in terms of the 
location of population growth (Chinitz, 1965), or focuses on the change of population density 
(Mills, 1980). Similarly, comparative research for urban area and urbanized land areas using 
population density has also been done (see for example, Fulton et al. 2002; Sierra Club, 1998). In 
more recent research Wassmer (2000) investigates the share of metropolitan population, 
employment, retail sales, farmland, poverty rates, and income levels for those that lived in the 
central city, the central county, and the urbanized area. All those studies provide little about urban 
form. 
One of the policy-relevant quantitative approaches for urban form was developed by 
Allen (2001) using part of INDEX, a policy planning support system for forecasts of vehicle 
miles traveled, ambient air emissions, as well as employment and housing balance.  Besides the 
information about density, nuclearity, and centrality studied in previous research, measures of 
transportation, housing and employment options, mixed use, and transit and public facility 
accessibility address more policy issues concerning residents and decision makers. Song and 
Knapp (2004) use approaches similar to Allen’s to measure urban form at the neighborhood level 
(block groups as neighborhoods) for Washington County, the western portion of Portland.    
Several measures of urban form are developed from the approaches used by Allen (2001) 
and Song and Knaap (2004). Using GIS, the study conducted spatial statistical analysis for the 
urban form for each of the three super neighborhoods over a two decade period (from 1985 until 
2005). In addition, the statistical analysis compared the results among different neighborhoods. 
The urban form of the neighborhoods were measured by five dimensions:  (1) Street design and 
circulation systems; (2) Density; (3) Land use mix; (4) Accessibility; (5) Pedestrian access. 
The spatial data resources were US Census data, Harris County Appraisal District 
(HCAD), Gulf Coast Institute, and the statistical studies at neighborhood levels from Houston’s 
Department of Planning and Development. Most data were available in City of Houston 
Geographic Information System (COHGIS) release 6 (1998), releases 9-11, and release 12 
(2006). These DVD data dictionaries were developed by Information Technology Division of 
Houston Planning and Development Department. The data themes that were used are super 
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neighborhoods (SNBR in GIS database), parks (PARKR), buildings (BUILDING), parcel 
information (PARCEL), apartment information (APT.DBF in GIS database), commercial 
building information (BUILDINGS.DBF), historical land use information (1985-2005, 
LUSE.DBF), 2000 census block group (GRP 2000), and major roads (MJROAD). In addition, the 
bus stop data was from Houston Metro.   
 
Street Design and Circulation Systems  
 
They are measured by 1) Internal Connectivity: number of street intersections divided by 
sum of the number of intersections and the number of cul-de-sacs; the higher the ratio, the greater 
the internal connectivity. 2) Block Perimeter: median perimeter of blocks; the smaller the 
perimeter, the greater the internal connectivity. 3) Blocks: number of blocks divided by number 
of single family housing units; the more the blocks the greater the internal connectivity. 4) 
External Connectivity: median distance between Ingress/Egress (access) points in feet; the shorter 
the distance, the greater the external connectivity. This portion of the analysis uses the data as of 
December 2005 (Table 9).  
 
 
Table 9: Street Design and Circulation Systems. 
 River Oaks Independence Heights Montrose 
Internal Connectivity 0.903 0.837 0.959 
Block Perimeter (feet) 1585.79 1172.63 819.36 
Blocks 0.120 0.146 0.169 
External Connectivity(feet) 297.60 178.16 230.60 
 
 
The results show that Montrose has better internal connectivity (0.959) and smaller block 
perimeter (819.36 feet) than the other two super neighborhoods do. When one uses blocks to 
measure internal connectivity, the results also indicate that Montrose (0.169) has the best internal 
connectivity. Both Independence Heights (178.16 feet) and Montrose (230.60 feet) have better 
external connectivity than Rive Oaks does (297.60 feet).  
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Density  
 
Density is measured by 1) Lot Size: median lot size of single family residence in the 
super neighborhoods; the smaller the lot size, the higher the density. 2) Single Family Unit 
Density: single family units divided by the residential area; the higher the ratio, the higher the 
density. 3) Floor Space: median floor space of single family units in the neighborhoods; the 
smaller the floor space, the higher the density. This portion of the analysis uses the data as of 
December 2005 (Table 10).  
 
 
Table 10: Density. 
 River Oaks Independence Heights Montrose 
Lot Size (s.f.) 9314.35 6324.11 4976.60 
SFUD 2.784 4.758 7.066 
Floor Space (s.f.) 3907 1246 2444 
 
 
The results demonstrate that River Oaks has the largest median lot size (9314.35 s.f.). 
The size is almost twice of that of Montrose (4976.60 s.f.). Not surprisingly, Montrose has the 
highest single family unit density (7.066) among three super neighborhoods. With its large single 
family lot size, River Oaks also has large median floor space of single family units. In other 
words, River Oaks has large lots and big houses with large floor space. Despite that Independence 
Heights has larger median lot size than Montrose, the super neighborhood however has smaller 
median floor space of single family units. The differences in median lot size, single family unit 
density, and median floor space among three super neighborhoods are sharp. The results here 
clearly echo the significant socioeconomic statuses of three super neighborhoods. The median 
floor space for Independence Heights (1246 s.f.) is only half of that for Montrose (2444 s.f.) and 
one third of that for River Oaks (3907 s.f.), although Independence Heights has large lot size 
which could be attributed to its suburban location.  
 
 
Table 11: Housing Units in Structure (Source: Census 2000). 
Super Neighborhood Name 1 Unit Detached 1 unit attached 2 units 3 or 4 units 5 to 9 units 10 to 19 units 20 or more Mobile Home Boat/RV Van
INDEPENDENCEHEIGHTS 3,603 163 111 71 128 275 919 148 4
MONTROSE 3,954 2,076 1,951 2,018 1,679 2,045 4,758 0 0
RIVER OAKS AREA 3,318 499 97 175 302 428 3,415 0 0
CITY OF HOUSTON 364,905 42,105 16,323 32,534 46,999 64,550 206,896 7,703 363  
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The housing units in structure statistics (Table 11) indicates that the majority of 
residential land use in Independence Heights is for single family detached unit. There are some 
high-rise apartments in that super neighborhood. The number of mobile home in Independence 
Heights implies the existence of lower-income households in Independence Heights, while there 
is no mobile home in either River Oaks or Montrose. This observation is consistent with their 
better socioeconomic status than Independence Heights. Montrose has a wide variety of housing 
options, ranging from single family detached units, townhouses, to high-rise apartments. River 
Oaks mainly has two types of housing units--single family detached units and upper-end high-rise 
apartments.  
 
 
Table 12: Housing Units - Year Structure Built (Source: Census 2000). 
Super Neighborhood Name 99-00 95-98 90-94 80-89 70-79 60-69 40-59 39 or earlier
INDEPENDENCEHEIGHTS 0 52 15 221 932 1,261 2,467 474
MONTROSE 739 1,468 371 1,066 2,392 3,805 4,246 4,393
RIVER OAKS AREA 255 534 525 732 1,364 1,733 2,231 859
CITY OF HOUSTON 19,401 35,937 31,310 138,990 217,658 145,791 152,681 40,610   
 
 
All three super neighborhoods were developed as early as the 1920s. Montrose has many 
more housing units built before the 1960s. There has been a good amount of new housing 
development since then. With other evidences from the analysis in later sections, the land use 
pattern changes and housing stock changes indicate that the parcels in Montrose has experienced 
residential to non-residential use conversion. At the same time, there might also be non-
residential to residential land use conversion in addition to new housing unit development. In 
contrast, most Independence Heights’ housing stock was built during the 1940s and the 1970s. 
Since then, the housing unit development has dropped significantly. There is no single housing 
unit developed in Independence Heights during the 1990s. This observation suggests that 
Independence Heights has experienced net population emigration during the last decade. Most 
River Oaks housing stock was built during the 1940s until the 1970s. Similar to the situation in 
Montrose, there has been a good amount of new housing development since then. Both River 
Oaks and Montrose seem to be popular as a good choice for housing. Independence Heights 
however seems to be a declining super neighborhood with respect to housing stock (Table 12).  
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Land Use Mix  
 
Land use mix is measured by analyzing land use diversity 1) H1 and 2) H2 for the same 
equation (Song, 2005).   
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Where H1 = diversity index including single family residential units; pi = proportions of each of 
the land use types such as single family residential, multifamily residential, industrial, public, and 
commercial uses, etc; and s= the number of land use types. The higher the value, the greater the 
land use diversity. Here s = 9, which include (1) single family residential; (2) multifamily 
residential; (3) commercial; (4) office; (5) industrial; (6) public and institutional; (7) 
transportation and utility; (8) park and open spaces; and (9) undeveloped.  
 Where H2 = diversity index excluding single family residential units; pi = proportions of 
each of the land use types such as multifamily residential, industrial, public, and commercial uses, 
etc; and s= the number of land use types without single family residential land use. The higher the 
value, the greater the land use diversity. Here s = 8, which include (1) multifamily residential; (2) 
commercial; (3) office; (4) industrial; (5) public and institutional; (6) transportation and utility; 
(7) park and open spaces; and (8) undeveloped. This portion of the analysis uses the data from 
1985, 1990, 1993, 1996, 1998, and 1999 until 2005. Those are the only years that have historic 
land use data available for analysis (Table 13). 
 
 
Table 13: Land Use Diversity Index. 
Year 1985 1990 1993 1996 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
M H1 0.65712 0.70965 0.71893 0.72259 0.71650 0.74205 0.73828 0.73563 0.74224 0.74021 0.73955 0.76404
IH H1 0.65594 0.67224 0.67740 0.68732 0.68940 0.74415 0.74443 0.74478 0.75124 0.75350 0.75601 0.75214
RO H1 0.53508 0.58431 0.57871 0.60168 0.61031 0.61777 0.60839 0.60532 0.60718 0.60727 0.60510 0.60729
M H2 0.53329 0.57942 0.58749 0.59114 0.58536 0.61264 0.60925 0.60700 0.61369 0.61177 0.61115 0.63516
IH H2 0.52564 0.53831 0.54230 0.55196 0.55399 0.61166 0.61179 0.61174 0.61844 0.62072 0.62302 0.61894
RO H2 0.43622 0.47760 0.47326 0.49646 0.50427 0.51141 0.50354 0.50100 0.50265 0.50287 0.50099 0.50268  
(Note: M = Montrose, IH = Independence Heights, and RO= River Oaks). 
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Fig. 5: Land Use Diversity Index H1. 
 
 
The analysis of land use diversity change between 1985 and 2005 demonstrates that all 
three super neighborhoods have experienced land use changes toward more diverse uses (Fig. 5). 
The H1 results for River Oaks show the lowest values among the three super neighborhoods. It 
means that Rive Oaks land use is always the most strictly controlled and then the least diverse. 
During the twenty years, River Oaks experienced two significant land use diversity increases. 
One is the increase from 1985 to 1990. The other is the increase from 1993 to 1999. The 
observation of the land use maps of those two periods indicates that the changes were mainly 
because of the office and commercial development in the northwest part of River Oaks super 
neighborhood, especially the portion along I -610. For other time period, land use diversity index 
for River Oaks did not experience any significant change, which means that land use was strictly 
controlled in River Oaks during that time. River Oaks’ land use diversity index increased only 
0.07 during the twenty years. Montrose had the highest land use diversity until 1999, when 
Independence Heights’ land use diversity reached a similar point. Since 1999, the overall land use 
diversity pattern for Independence Heights gets flat, which means few land use diversity changes. 
Montrose however shows a pattern that the land use diversity index is likely to continue its 
increase. The land use diversity index for Independence Heights increased 0.10 during the twenty 
years. The land use diversity index for Montrose increased 0.11 during the twenty years. Land 
uses in both Independence Heights and Montrose are much less controlled than is River Oaks.     
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Fig. 6: Land Use Diversity Index H2. 
 
 
The analysis results for land use diversity index H2 show an overall trend similar to H1 
analysis results (Fig. 6). For non-single-family land uses, River Oaks still has less diverse land 
uses. Its land use diversity index H2 increased 0.07 over the twenty years. Land use diversity 
index H2 for Independence Heights increased 0.09 between 1985 and 2005. Montrose had an 
increase of 0.10 between 1985 and 2005. The H1 and H2 analyses indicate that land use analysis 
including single family residential use and land use analysis excluding single family residential 
uses produced consistent results. In River Oaks, land use has been strictly controlled except for its 
northwest part, while in Montrose and Independence Heights land use has been much less 
controlled and possibly more market driven due to the lack of private land use control or the loose 
private covenant restriction implementation. Furthermore, if one examines River Oaks without its 
northwest portion (which experienced significant commercial and office development over the 
years), the land use diversity index should be even lower and experience even less change. The 
following three land use parcel maps show the parcels that experienced changes between 1985 
and 2005 (Fig. 7). Apparently, River Oaks has those changed parcels concentrated in the 
northwest part of the super neighborhood. For Montrose, those changed parcels are everywhere 
and do not show any clear geographic concentration. The changes for Independence Heights is 
somewhere in between.   
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A. Land parcels in River Oaks that have difference uses for 1985 and 2005. 
Fig. 7: Land Use Change Pattern between 1985 and 2005 in Three Super Neighborhoods.  
 
 
B. Land parcels in Independence Heights that have difference uses for 1985 and 2005. 
Fig. 7 continued.  
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C. Land parcels in Montrose that have difference uses for 1985 and 2005. 
Fig. 7 continued. 
 
Accessibility  
 
Accessibility is measured by 1) Commercial Distance: median travel distance from the 
single family residences to the nearest commercial uses; the shorter the distance, the greater the 
accessibility. 2) Bus Stop Distance: median travel distance from the single family residences to 
the nearest transit stop; the shorter the distance, the greater the accessibility. 3) Park Distance: 
median travel distance from the single family residences to the nearest public park; the shorter the 
distance, the greater the accessibility. This portion of the analysis uses the data as of December 
2005 (Table 14). 
 
 
Table 14: Accessibility. 
 River Oaks Independence Heights Montrose 
Commercial Distance (feet) 926.64 426.05 309.74 
Bus Stop Distance (feet) 631.69 783.10 461.80 
Park Distance (feet) 1338.13 1772.83 1372.34 
 
 
The results for commercial distance indicate that Montrose has commercial land uses that 
are very close to single family residential (309.74 feet). River Oaks’ commercial land uses have 
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been kept away at a median distance of 926.64 feet from single family residential land use. 
Montrose also shows its advantage in access to public transit with a median distance of 461.80 
feet from single family residential unit to bus stop. Despite of its high income and high housing 
value for which conventional assumption might suggest a lack of public transit service, River 
Oaks in fact has very good access to public transit. The bus stop distance for Independence 
Heights shows its disadvantage in access to public transit, while good access to public transit may 
be expected by the residents who have the poorest socioeconomic status among the three. Not 
surprisingly, Independence Heights also has poor access to amenities like public parks. It has 
longer median distance (1772.83 feet) from single family residential units to parks than Montrose 
(1372.34 feet) and River Oaks (1338.13 feet). River Oaks has excellent access to parks-easy 
access to good amenities that are one of advantages for affluent neighborhoods. 
 
 
Table 15: Commuting to Work - Workers 16 Years and Over (Source: Census 2000). 
 
 
 
While Independence Heights has poorer access to public transit, residents there actually 
are more public transportation dependent than those in Montrose and River Oaks are (Table 15). 
This is demonstrated by Independence Heights’ higher carpooled and public transportation rates. 
The recent bike and pedestrian oriented plan initiatives in Montrose has encouraged more 
residents to bike or walk to work than the other two super neighborhoods.  
    
Pedestrian Access 
 
Pedestrian access is measured by 1) Pedestrian to Commercial: percentage of single 
family unit parcels within ¼ mile (Duany and Plater-Zyberk, 1992) of all existing commercial 
uses; the higher the percentage, the greater the pedestrian access. 2) Pedestrian to Transit: 
percentage of single family unit parcels within ¼ mile of all existing bus stops; the higher the 
percentage, the greater the pedestrian access. 3) Pedestrian to Park: percentage of single family 
Super Neighborhood Name Drive Alone Carpooled Public Transportation Motor Cycle Bike Walked Other Means 
Work At  
Home 
RIVER OAKS AREA 83.3% 5.9% 2.1% 0.2% 0.0% 2.0% 0.4% 6.1% 
MONTROSE 73.4% 7.0% 7.9% 0.2% 1.9% 4.5% 0.5% 4.5% 
INDEPENDENCEHEIGHTS 59.8% 22.0% 11.5% 0.7% 0.3% 2.2% 2.1% 1.5% 
CITY OF HOUSTON 71.8% 15.9% 5.9% 0.1% 0.5% 2.3% 1.2% 2.3% 
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unit parcels within ¼ mile of all parks; the higher the percentage, the greater the pedestrian 
access. This portion of the analysis uses the data as of December 2005 (Table 16). 
Table 16: Pedestrian Access. 
 River Oaks Independence Heights Montrose 
Pedestrian Commercial 0.707 0.996 1 
Pedestrian Transit 0.936 0.807 1 
Pedestrian Park 0.597 0.420 0.580 
 
 
The results show that Montrose has excellent pedestrian access to commercial, public 
transit and parks. Although Independence Heights has good access to commercial, its access to 
public transit and parks indicates its disadvantageous socioeconomic status again.  
 
 
Table 17: Urban Form Measurement Comparison between Portland and Houston. 
Forest Glen Orenco Station River Oaks Independence Heights Montrose
0.67 0.81 0.90 0.84 0.96
569 1016 298 178 230
3365 830 1586 1173 819
0.026 0.15 0.12 0.15 0.17
3184 834 927 426 310
1267 873 1338 1773 1372
1474 247 632 783 462
0.04 0.78 0.71 1.00 1.00
0.34 1.00 0.94 0.81 1.00
Internal connectivity
External connectivity
Median block size (feet)
Number of blocks per SFDU
Median distance to nearest commercial (feet)
Median distance to nearest park (feet)
Median distance to nearest bus stop (feet)
HoustonUrban Form Measurement Portland
Percentage of SFDUs within 1/4 mile of all commercials
Percentage of SFDUs within 1/4 mile of all bus stops  
 
 
 To this end, the quantitative analysis is only able to examine a model of ‘free market with 
limited government intervention’ approach, leaving the two extremes of Coasian and Pigovian 
alternatives not compared. However, it would be interesting to compare the results for Houston 
with the results for a city with much more government intervention in land use planning. Portland 
is the other extreme in terms of Coasian and Pigovian alternatives. Using a same set of urban 
form measurements, Song and Knaap (2004) present the results for their study of two different 
neighborhoods in Washington County Portland. Forest Glen is a ‘typical’ neighborhood, while 
Orenco Station is a neighborhood design with new urbanism concept and ‘mixed use’. They 
conclude that Orence Station has better internal street connectivity, more mixed land uses, better 
pedestrian access to commercial uses, parks and bus stops, but lower external connectivity than 
Forest Glen. When one compares the neighborhoods in Houston with those in Portland, Houston 
neighborhoods have better internal connectivity, but greater external connectivity. For median 
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block size, Houston’s Montrose has the smallest median block perimeter among all five 
neighborhoods, which means Montrose has the greatest internal connectivity. River Oaks’ median 
block perimeter (1586 feet) is the largest among Houston’s neighborhoods, but it is still much 
smaller than the ‘typical’ Portland neighborhood Forest Glen. The numbers of blocks per SFDU 
further support the argument that Houston neighborhoods have better internal connectivity. 
Houston neighborhoods have better pedestrian access to commercial uses and public transit. 
However, the residents in Houston neighborhoods have to walk longer to get to public parks 
(Table 17). A caution for the scale of this comparison: while Song and Knaap chose two 
residential neighborhoods, this study chose three super neighborhoods with their areas much 
larger than the areas of two neighborhoods in Portland. But still, from the comparison, it shows 
that Houston neighborhood urban form has achieved many of the characters of the neighborhoods 
planned with ‘mixed use’ concept like Orenco Station. Such urban form in Houston has been 
developed without zoning regulation. However, this does not imply any conclusion that Houston 
is a better place to live than Portland. 
 
A Tale of Three Super Neighborhoods 
 
River Oaks 
 
River Oaks was Houston’s first mater planned neighborhood. The development of River 
Oaks started in 1924 when three prominent Houston businessmen Hugh Potter and Hogg Brothers 
purchased 1000 acre land for a suburban and automobile oriented development. Its original goal 
was to not only provide homes for the wealthy, but also accommodate some with more modest 
income. Thus, its initial intention was to build an inclusive neighborhood in terms of the 
residents’ socioeconomic status. However, due to its well planned, restricted and maintained 
development, it soon became the most expensive neighborhood in Houston and has remained so. 
Especially after the 2nd World War when Houston experienced its greatest urban growth, many 
middle classes in River Oaks were priced out for affordable housing elsewhere. Interestingly, 
during the early stage of River Oaks development, Hugh Porter and Hogg Brothers felt that 
zoning would stabilize land use patterns in residential subdivisions by stating that public land use 
intervention in private property would “prevent grocery stores, filling stations and chilli joints 
from crowding at random among private residences” (River Oaks Property Owners Association, 
2008). However, zoning was never approved. So the developers established a homeowners 
association to employ rigid deed restrictions to achieve their goals in land use.  
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Designed by famous architects in their eras, many of the original single family residential 
units in River Oaks were built in the 1920s and 1930s. Right at the beginning of River Oaks 
development, there were shuttle buses that operated between the River Oaks Country Club and 
downtown. Good access to public transit seems to start at the incipient stage of River Oaks 
development. Over the years, some of the homes have undergone renovations, but others have 
been demolished and rebuilt. Because the River Oaks Property Owners Association has overseen 
renovations and new home development, the integrity of most part of River Oaks neighborhood 
has been maintained. The intervention of River Oaks Property Owners Association ensures the 
uniformity of design and landscape that were envisioned by the original developers of the 
neighborhood.  
Deed restrictions in River Oaks ensure that the neighborhood is almost exclusively single 
family houses except for its northwest area along I-610 loop. Those deed restrictions not only 
prohibit multifamily residential units and commercial development, but also maintain the 
traditional neighborhood architectural and landscape styles. Nevertheless, the intervention of 
River Oaks Property Owners Association in the design and landscape of the neighborhood 
through deed restrictions does not exclude a diversity of architectural and building styles. A 
variety of styles all together contributes to a harmonious sense of the neighborhood. Besides 
overseeing deed restriction implementation, the River Oaks Property Owners Association took 
over maintenance of the neighborhoods parks and public greenways in 1998. Furthermore, the 
River Oaks Property Owners Association has established a Foundation to raise money to fund 
park and public land improvements. Undoubtedly, River Oaks was and remains the most 
restricted residential neighborhood in Houston. The River Oaks Property Owners Association was 
maintained and has served the community through the continued deed restriction enforcement.   
River Oaks super neighborhood currently includes two of Houston’s most prestigious 
upper-end income areas-River Oaks and Afton Oaks. According to a recent study conducted by 
Houston’s Planning and Development Department, the northwest part of River Oaks has seen 
significant development activity for high income rental units and mixed-use development. On its 
west part, many original houses have been renovated into much larger homes. The 
neighborhood’s garden apartments have also been replaced with luxury single family units and 
townhouses because of the continued property value increase. In the meantime, major public and 
institutional investment in the nearby neighborhood will continue to attract development in the 
area in the future. 
 
 
102 
 
 
 
 
Montrose 
 
The development of Montrose can be dated back to the early 20th century before the 
development of River Oaks. Montrose was one of the first suburbs of Houston, developed as 
early as the beginning of the 1900s. It was conceived in 1910 when J.W. Link’s Houston Land 
Corporation envisioned a “great residential addition” on land. The neighborhood has a strong 
identity with its distinctive character of cultural eccentricity and diversity built up over its long 
history.  
Most of the original buildings in Montrose date from 1900 to 1940. Montrose witnessed 
and benefited from the beginning of a mobility revolution in which the new streetcars extended 
travel distance without increasing travel time. For instance, the Houston and Fairview Street 
Railway added a line to Montrose at the beginning of the century. That was possibly the earliest 
evidence of Montrose’s good access to public transit. Starting from the 1960s, when the area’s 
original deed restrictions got expired, the pre-War single family houses began to give way to 
apartment and commercial uses. According to 2000 US Census, less than 25 percent of the 
housing units are single detached houses. Multi-family development is common, especially small- 
to medium-size properties under 50 units each.  
Houston’s real estate boom in the 1990s significantly drove up the property values in 
Montrose. This transformed the Montrose from a place with many abandoned buildings and low 
rents to a neighborhood with new condominium and high income rental development and a prime 
market for redevelopment. During the same period, large amount of townhouses and high-rise 
apartments replaced bungalows. Re-modeled and new housing development, high rents, upmarket 
commercials and office buildings quickly showed up in many areas of the neighborhood. 
Gentrification in Montrose started in the 1990s with its changing housing market and 
redevelopment. For instance, the demographics of the renting population has changed since the 
1990s, musicians and artists have been replaced by attorneys, medical practitioners, and other 
professionals who can afford the higher rents. Musicians, artists, gays and lesbians have left 
Montrose and moved to the nearby neighborhoods such as Meyerland, Westbury, and Second 
Ward, etc. According to 2000 US Census, roughly 83 percent of the Montrose population is 
between 18 and 64 years old, whereas in the city, this group makes up only about 60 percent of 
the total. Montrose therefore has fewer seniors and youths than the city average. 
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The overall land use pattern in Montrose shows a highly mixture of single family and 
multifamily residential land uses and a highly mixture of residential and commercial land uses. 
The predominant land use in Montrose is residential, with single- and multi-family uses mixed 
together. The major commercial corridors are Montrose Boulevard, Westheimer, West Gray, 
Shepherd, and Smith/Louisiana. The intersection of Montrose and Westheimer has a high 
concentration of commercial activity. The Richmond and West Alabama corridors have a mixture 
of commercial and residential uses, including numerous multifamily units. Multifamily uses are 
also concentrated along Commonwealth and Hazard. Multifamily homes are mixed with single 
family houses in the neighborhood. There are also some public and institutional uses throughout 
Montrose such as the Saint Thomas University and some near the intersection of Montrose and 
Bissonnet in the Museum District.    
The dense street grid, numerous connections to adjacent neighborhoods, convenient local 
buses, METRO’s light rail nearby, high concentrations of entertainment, commercials, all types 
of residential units (including a good share of apartments and condominiums) in Montrose 
altogether contribute to high existing and potential pedestrian activity. The 2000 U.S. Census 
shows that Montrose has young, well-educated, and fairly affluent residents who have propensity 
to walk or ride public transit. A study by Lockwood, Andrews and Newman Inc. in 2005 shows 
that sixteen percent of Montrose workers, or one out of six, took the bus, bicycled, walked, or 
otherwise went to work without driving a car. Almost 5 percent walked and 2 percent rode 
bicycles. This was double the rate of the city as a whole. A survey conducted in the same study 
shows that 35.4 percent of the respondents chose ‘walk’ as a desired means of travel within 
Montrose, 43.4 percent of the respondents chose ‘ride a bike’ as a desired means of travel within 
Montrose (Lockwood, Andrews and Newman Inc., 2005).   
The Montrose Super Neighborhood Council, a civic organization, has supported some 
20-plus small civic clubs and neighborhood associations within its super neighborhood boundary. 
The Super Neighborhood Council rallies these neighborhood associations and civic clubs when 
large community concerns develop. There is an interdependent relationship among them. In 2002, 
for instance, Mandell Place and Winlow Place, two tiny neighborhoods bounded by Montrose and 
South Shepherd on the east and west and Westheimer and West Alabama on the north and south, 
fought diligently to protest the modern, mammoth, multifamily units and trophy homes that 
threaten the 1930s-era charm of the neighborhoods they invaded. The two civic associations 
representing these neighborhoods had been the only ones in the area to succeed in a battle with 
City Council to keep these structures at bay. It was a costly battle and neighborhood resources 
were limited to resident contributions. A three-story dwelling was being constructed in deed-
104 
 
 
restricted Winlow Place. It occupied much of the tiny lot and towers over its neighbors, 
exceeding height limits in deed restrictions. The city’s Legal Department declared the precise 
deed restrictions regarding third-story dwellings as “vague”. Once this development is in place, 
other developers can use this as a precedent for more overbuilding (Ramon, 2002). 
Montrose Super Neighborhood has also been active in competing for major city project 
which will benefit the larger neighborhood. One example is its attempt to attract Metro’s 
Richmond Avenue route. In 2005, Metro was looking at two potential routes for the proposed 
light rail line the University Corridor (part of its $1 billion partnership with the federal 
government to provide five new transit corridors in the city during the next decade). The two 
possible routes were Westpark and Richmond Avenue. Montrose Super Neighborhood Council 
believed that a Richmond Avenue alignment would provide the most benefit to its neighborhood 
for accessibility and ridership. Those neighborhood associations and civic clubs formed a 
coalition to ensure that their voices are heard by the Metro. The Super Neighborhood held 
numerous meetings with the Metro, asking for comprehensive planning and strict execution 
during the construction phase. The Super Neighborhood also urged the Metro to conduct careful 
comprehensive plan so that the neighborhood won’t lose its businesses and residents as a result of 
planning and construction. They maintained that the concerns of the businesses and residents 
should be taken care of by the Metro. Other concerns discussed with the Metro included parking, 
streetscape standards, and tree transplantation or relocation. Many of these standards are far 
stricter than the current Houston City Ordinances (Manning, 2005).  
 
Independence Heights 
 
The history of Independence Heights goes back to 1910 when the Wright Land Company 
secured the land and developed a new community for African-Americans. With their own 
financing, they provided an opportunity for people with lower- and modest- incomes to become 
homeowners in Independence Heights. Independence Heights was the first town incorporated in 
Texas by African-Americans. It was consolidated with Houston in 1929 and is still a 
predominantly African-American neighborhood.  
In history, African-Americans from eastern Texas and south Louisiana moved into 
sparsely populated neighborhoods like Independence Heights which resembled their rural and 
small-town communities in their hometowns. The word “heights” could be connected with higher 
places that got cooler breezes during Houston’s long and hot summers. During the early twentieth 
century, African-American migrants to Houston at first settled down in well-established African-
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American neighborhoods like Third, Fourth, and Fifth Wards. Then a few families built houses in 
newly created African-American neighborhoods like Independence Heights, which are outside 
Houston inner city. In Independence Heights, independent and vibrant expressions of Black 
culture and atmosphere of community consciousness cultivated positive relations between 
established residents and newcomers. They further developed coalitions to advance 
socioeconomic equality in Independence Heights, one of the sparsely populated and sprawling 
African-American neighborhoods in Houston. Because of Houston’s large size, those African-
American neighborhoods were usually formed independently and separately of one another. The 
development of Independence Heights witnessed Houston’s African-American community 
increase. For example, between 1910 and 1920, Houston’s African-American population rose by 
42 percent. In the 1920 to 1930 period, it rose further by 87 percent (Pruitt, 2005).  
As an historic neighborhood, Independence Heights has many historic buildings and 
areas worth effective conservation. For instance, in 1989 a Texas Historical Commission marker 
was placed on the grounds of Greater New Hope Missionary Baptist Church to mark the city site 
as a Texas Historical Site. In 1997, the National Historical Commission identified a historic 
residential district and specific historic buildings within Independence Heights, including the 
famous lobster vendor first introduced in the year 1918. The city of Houston has a Historic 
Preservation code. In the code, the responsibility for determining whether an old building should 
be listed for preservation falls to the Houston Archaeological and Historical Commission 
(HAHC). The board of the commission consists of voluntary professional experts such as 
archaeologist, historian, architect, planner, and real estate appraiser. Since the adherence to the 
Houston building conservation code is voluntary and the role of the Board (with its unpaid status) 
requires persuasion rather than coercion in historic building conservation in old neighborhoods 
like Independence Heights. If a property owner wants to change a building that has been listed for 
conservation, s/he can apply for a certificate of applicability. The HAHC then may suggest 
changes that would be acceptable while would not violate the integrity of the historic building in 
the old area. However, since there is an emphasis in the Houston code for historic building 
conservation that the board “be sensitive to the property owner’s financial condition” (Houston 
Code 33-238), those suggestions from the Board need not be followed by the property owner. 
Thus, there is a continuous pressure in Independence Heights to raze small houses located on 
large lots and replace them with more profitable buildings. If the smaller house is architecturally 
and historically significant, a plea of economic need would change the fate of the building. Such 
tendency can be seen in places adjacent to areas that have experienced a rise in property values. 
The increase in property values in the Houston Heights (which has also experienced gentrification 
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in recent years) has put pressure on adjoining Independence Heights. The only defense against 
such intrusion is neighborhood cooperation and enforcement of private covenants. However, 
given the socioeconomic status and current validity of deed restrictions in only a few areas in 
Independence Heights, the defense against the intrusion to historic buildings is weak.  
Independence Heights is declining in population. The young generations do not return to 
settle in the neighborhood, while the older residents are getting up in age. Over 35 percent of the 
children there live below the poverty level and per capita median income is $10,447 or about a 
third of the U. S. per capita income. Almost 60 percent (59.88%) of the population is African 
American. The next largest population group is Hispanic at 32 percent (32.47%). One hundred 
percent of the proposed targeted subsection of Independence Heights is in the 100 year flood 
plain. There are approximately 370 properties in the proposed targeted subsection that are 
undeveloped have tax liens. Almost 200 of those have long term tax liens. Independence Heights 
features great access and but has a lot of churches and older homes. Its current land use map 
shows a large amount of industrial land uses, especially at its southwest part. Those industrial 
land uses are mixed with other land uses, such as residential uses and commercial uses. There is 
also a certain amount of undeveloped land in Independence Heights, located in many areas of the 
super neighborhood. Given the fact that Independence Heights has been losing its population 
during the past decade, the undeveloped land will remain its current situation. For some 
properties, the owners are behind on their taxes and the city is fixing to foreclose. The 
Independence Heights super neighborhood council is trying to generate funds to buy those 
properties in order to keep out the upscale developers who want to build expensive houses in the 
neighborhood.  
In early 2003 several Houston business leaders became concerned about the future of the 
city after touring some of Houston’s poorest neighborhoods. The poverty they witnessed, in stark 
contrast to surrounding affluence, led them to a vision of establishing a collaborative initiative 
called Houston HOPE to work towards substantially reducing poverty. After the inauguration of 
Mayor Bill White, the City of Houston began to look at subsections of Houston’s most blighted 
neighborhoods with high numbers of long term tax liens. The city identified Independence 
Heights as one of its six super neighborhoods that could benefit from concentrated infrastructure 
investments in targeted subsections of the neighborhoods. Independence Heights has high 
concentrations of tax delinquent and undeveloped property. It is believed that land acquisition and 
infrastructure improvements by the City of Houston in Independence Heights will be a catalyst 
for other neighborhood improvements such as the development of affordable housing. Currently, 
107 
 
 
the Land Assemblage Redevelopment Authority (LARA) has purchased 77 properties in the 
Independence Heights area.  
 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, socioeconomic cluster analysis is used to select case study super 
neighborhoods for urban form and land use pattern analysis. Several urban form measures are 
computed for super neighborhoods River Oaks, Independence Heights, and Montrose. A 
comparative study for those three super neighborhoods is carried out to examine similarity and 
diversity of their urban development and land use patterns in the measurements of street design 
and circulation systems, density, land use mix, accessibility, and pedestrian access. The results 
show that those measures capture differences in socioeconomic status and meaningful urban form 
and land use diversity and changes in super neighborhood characters.  
However, the research results need to be interpreted with some cautions. First, 
multifamily units are not included in the urban form and land use measures mainly because of the 
lack of data on the number of units of each multifamily unit. The bias is fairly limited as 
multifamily residences are the minority (i.e. low percentage in terms of lot numbers) in all three 
super neighborhoods, especially River Oaks and Independence Heights. Second, this analysis 
only conducts chronological analysis for land use diversity changes (using land use diversity 
index), leaving other chronological analysis such as street design and circulation systems, density, 
accessibility, and pedestrian access unaddressed. Those four sets of analysis are only conducted 
in a cross-sectional approach. The main reason for this limitation is the lack of shape files (which 
are stored in an outdated computer system that is not convertible for GIS spatial analysis) for 
chronological analysis for the four dimensions. In addition, Houston Planning Department does 
not update its GIS shape files very often due to the prohibitively high costs of regular updating. 
For instance, their GIS unit only has the building shape files acquired in 1994. And it has not 
been updated since then. Third, even for the chronological land use diversity index, the shape 
files are from the 2005 data, with attribute data for the years from 1985 until 2005. This approach 
therefore may not accurately reflect historical land use pattern. For instance, a single land parcel 
lot in 1985 could be subdivided into several lots during any time between 1985 and 2005, but the 
analysis only uses its situation in 2005. Fourth, spatial coverage data of deed restrictions for super 
neighborhoods is not available at this point. Houston Planning Department is currently soliciting 
the information citywide. It will take a while to make the data organized and ready for analysis in 
the future.  
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The research offers several findings on urban form and land use. The chronological 
analysis of land use diversity in the super neighborhoods finds that in general neighborhoods are 
becoming more diverse in land use in all three super neighborhoods. However, for the super 
neighborhood with continuous private restrictive covenants in place, land use diversity increases 
much less than the other two super neighborhoods where deed restrictions get expired and/or the 
socioeconomic status in neighborhoods make the effective implementation of deed restriction 
impossible. Deed restriction enforcement usually falls into one of four categories: residential-use-
only restrictions; single-family-use-only restrictions; set-back requirements; and parking/storage 
restrictions. Numerous older neighborhoods in Montrose and Independence Heights have 
restrictions that may not be in effect because certain portions of the restrictions may have expired 
and not been renewed, and thus are not effective in preventing commercial and/or industrial 
property uses in the neighborhoods.  
A second finding of this research is from its cross-sectional analysis on street design and 
circulations systems, density, accessibility, and pedestrian access. Despite that all three super 
neighborhoods were established during the early twentieth century, historical reasons for their 
original development, land development over decades, influences from nearby neighborhoods, 
neighborhood plan initiatives, and their socioeconomic composition in the neighborhoods all 
significantly contribute to the differences in the four urban form dimensions. Because of the 
complex nature of land use pattern formation, it is impossible to isolate the impacts of any one 
factor or to answer the question of which specific factor is connected to the identified urban form 
and land use pattern changes. A dismal picture in this regard is that affluent super neighborhood 
like Rive Oaks enjoys excellent public transit access even though a majority of its residents are 
private vehicle dependent, while disadvantaged Independence Heights has poor public transit 
access even though a large percentage of its residents cannot afford to drive to work and are 
public transit dependent. Given the findings from numerous researches that public transit access 
is an important factor in employment opportunity provision in disadvantaged neighborhood; this 
result offers policy implications on public transit improvement in Independence Heights. 
Similarly, the pedestrian access and accessibility to public amenities like parks are not good in 
Independence Heights. If the City were to revitalize Independence Heights and work against its 
recent population decline in the neighborhood to attract more people to live there, attentions 
should go to public amenity betterment. Independence Heights’ large percentage of undeveloped 
land is potentially suitable for park development.  
Another finding is that urban form measures are more relevant to the characters of super 
neighborhoods than to the urban/suburban locations. For street design and circulation systems, 
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both Montrose (‘urban’ area as defined by Houston Planning Department) and Independence 
Heights (‘suburban’ area as defined by Houston Planning Department) have better internal and 
external connectivity than River Oaks (‘urban’). In a similar vein, lot size, single family unit 
density and floor space are also less relevant to urban/suburban locations. River Oaks and 
Montrose are both urban, but have very different results in those measurements. Independence 
Heights is considered as suburban neighborhood, but has the smallest floor space area. Housing 
options for River Oaks and Montrose also indicate that housing types are less associated with 
urban/suburban locations. Same argument applies to distance from single family residences to 
commercial facilities. In all three super neighborhoods, there is no evidence shows that 
neighborhoods remain isolated from transit, even for River Oaks where conventional thinking 
might relate this affluent neighborhood to less public transit or transit exclusion from the 
neighborhood. However, River Oaks does show its relative homogeneity in land uses where 
commercial uses remain separated and concentrated on its northwest part. Montrose and 
Independence Heights do not show such land use pattern.  
The fact that this quantitative analysis used block groups as basic analysis unit and then 
used super neighborhood to define the sets of those block groups raises the issue of a particular 
scale of analysis. The urban form spatial analysis of three super neighborhoods only represented a 
few different types of neighborhoods in the city, and therefore, may not be representative of the 
whole general group. Such approach provides an opportunity to combine quantitative and 
qualitative analysis for in-depth study of those super neighborhoods. However, a thorough 
quantitative study for urban form may call for a comprehensive analysis which covers all super 
neighorhoods in the city. In addition, current scale of super neighborhood also brings up the issue 
of boundary. The super neighborhood boundary helped to define the set of block groups, but in 
the same time, it also brought in some block groups that do not have the same cluster nature as 
others in the same super neighborhood. Both River Oaks and Montrose had this problem. Super 
neighborhood is an arbitrarily defined administrative boundary that is not ideal as many 
boundaries scientifically defined in quantitative analysis.  
American cities take on high degrees of spatial differentiation and stratification. The 
socioeconomic factors in this study include race/ethnics, educational attainment, household 
income, homeownership, housing density, housing value, and rent. This study is unable to fully 
address the implied causal relationship between land use regulation and urban form because there 
may be alternative explanations having to do with socioeconomic composition. Besides 
aforementioned socioeconomic factors, other effects such as age of development, specific 
development history, and local politics all can be confounders on spatial differentiation and 
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stratification. This study only selected a few. Thus the variables used in the analysis only yielded 
a grouping of neighborhoods with different socio-spatial profiles that reflect the selected 
variables.  
The accurate spatial data that can reflect different types of land use controls is not 
available. While the Houston Planning Department has descriptive statements on the deed 
restriction status for some of the neighborhoods, it was difficult to figure out the exact deed 
restriction status for each of the lots in a certain neighborhood. Houston Planning Department is 
soliciting deed restriction status from the neighborhoods citywide recently and plans to integrate 
the information into existing spatial information. The research would be enhanced when the deed 
restriction status survey is completed by the Houston Planning Department. 
Zoning is only one tool of implementing land use planning, often not effective even in the 
U.S.. Zoning has led to undesirable outcomes such as vast tracts of homogeneous land use, that is 
a function of the way in which zoning has been implemented, not necessarily a characteristic of 
zoning itself. There are plenty of cities around the world without zoning, and they continue to be 
viable urban centers. Hence, zoning may not be necessary, let alone sufficient, condition for 
effective planning. Houston distinguishes itself from other American cities in the existence of 
zoning. In the meantime, the public and private sectors interactions in the planning process have 
many similarities with those in other American cities.  
While proponents for more government intervention in Houston’s land use may raise 
many concerns about Houston’s less property attenuation from the government regulations 
citywide than other American cities, this analysis raises some positive issues that achieved by 
Houston’s lack of governmental zoning in land use. When planners have focused their attention 
on neighborhood street network design to realize better connectivity for compact growth and to 
discourage sprawling development, many Houston neighborhoods have good internal 
connectivity in place driven by market, neighborhood plan initiatives, and/or local socioeconomic 
status. In addition, better land use mixing and better accessibility to commercial uses have been 
achieved in many neighborhoods. The positive side of mixed use is supported by a research 
which concludes that residents are willing to pay premiums for homes in neighborhoods with 
more connective street networks, more streets, shorter cul-de-sacs, more and smaller blocks, 
better pedestrian accessibility to commercial uses, more evenly distributed mixed land uses, and 
proximity to operating light rail stations (Song and Knaap, 2003). Montrose is an excellent 
example in this regard, but those in Montrose are achieved without zoning.          
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This final chapter consists of three sections. The first section discusses the policy 
implications of Houston’s land plans, regulations, and governance under a land market 
mechanism with limited government intervention based on the evidence of land use governance 
practice and resultant urban form. In analyzing the problems revealed in the land development 
practice in Houston, the study attempts to find out the problems that underlie the current land use 
governance mechanism and draw out policy implications and recommendations. The second 
section revisits the debates on plan versus market, making the arguments from the lessons learnt 
from the Houston case. The third section focuses on the theoretical debate of the two strands of 
institutional economics theories, the Coasian theorem and public choice theory, which provide the 
conceptual framework for this study. The discussion analyzes the applicability and difficulties of 
these two theories in addressing land development and urban form in Houston, and explores how 
to use institutional economics thoughts in theory for the empirical case. The recommendations for 
future research are provided at the end of this chapter. 
 
Discussions on Policy Implications 
 
Plans and Regulations 
 
 Like every other American city, Houston has laws to address land use, such as building 
codes, parking regulations, setback rules, fire prevention. Lack of zoning does not mean free for 
all. Contrary to conventional perception of Houston’s lack of plan, there has been a significant 
amount of planning in Houston. What Houston’s land use planning system has in common with 
statutory public planning is that different general-purpose governments and various government 
agencies have land use related plans. And those plans provide a coordinating place for 
infrastructure planning, industrial project development, and regional and economic development 
policy. Blueprint Houston (2003), a non-government organization, reviewed about 35 plans with 
the oldest plan dates from 1990 and the most recent dates from 2002. With various formats and 
contents, those plans are work of a wide range of public agencies, civic groups, and community 
associations. They include citywide (i.e. City of Houston) or region-wide plans (i.e. Harris 
County or Greater Houston area) and smaller scale plans concerned with neighborhoods, activity 
centers, major infrastructures, and urban corridors. For instance, neighborhood plans alone cover 
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10.5 percent of the city’s area containing 14.8 percent of the city’s 2000 population. Many of the 
neighborhood plans focus on neighborhood revitalization. 
Some of the government interventions in land use are “parallel” to private land use 
interventions in term of limited geographic coverage. Houston’s “patchwork” regulations result in 
patchwork land use patterns. Many new ordinances are driven by individual projects, and thus 
only apply to a specific neighborhood. This leaves other parts of the city not regulated by the 
same ordinances. For instance, the Old Sixth Ward historic conservation ordinance applies only 
to that neighborhood. Driven by the protest against planned 23-story high-rise at 1717 Bissonnet, 
city officials currently work on ordinance that would require traffic impact studies for certain 
high-density projects. Again, the ordinance will be kept narrowly focused. The city needs to have 
regulations that are comprehensive and future-oriented.   
The analysis of super neighborhoods and their involvements in land use reflects a 
planning process that does not incorporate sufficient and effective coordination among different 
agencies. In addition, the action plans of super neighborhoods do not directly address the 
diversity of citizen visions in those super neighborhoods. The neighborhood plans tend to 
concentrate on short-term revitalization efforts, but do not emphasize longer-term visionary plan 
focus. Many super neighborhood action plans are isolated from other super neighborhood plans. 
In other words, they focus on their own super neighborhoods while do not address the relation 
with nearby super neighborhoods or even the whole city.  
Public land use control requires new development that changes the status quo be subject 
to hearings and ultimately the approval from the government. The system locks in mediocrity and 
suppresses innovation. The Houston cases of three super neighborhoods show that there is no 
evidence that private developers will not meet the need for pedestrian-friendly, accessible, and 
dense mixed-use developments if freed from the regulations that prohibit them from doing those. 
On the other hand, however, for those who argue that zoning laws discourage mixed race and 
mixed income neighborhoods, the evidence from Houston is that for a city without zoning law, it 
is still difficult to achieve mixed race and mixed income neighborhoods. People have similar 
socioeconomic status and ethnic background live together, in relative isolation from the 
communities with other socioeconomic statuses. Those groups in the form of neighborhoods or 
super neighborhoods usually exclusively focus on their own neighborhood issues, making it 
difficult for residents to develop broader sense plans, as evident in many neighborhood plans in 
Houston.  
Many government interventions that are not directly related to conventional land use 
control regulations have impact on Houston’s land use and urban form. Some of the examples are 
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attractive tax service package, low taxes, other public interventions such as government subsidies 
and public investments. In contrast to Houston’s business elites’ argument, low tax social service 
does not lend to high competitions because Houston falls far behind cities such as New York, San 
Francisco, Los Angeles, according to the research on top ranked cities in the number of 
multinational headquarters. Houston’s low taxes and low public expenditures as strategies to 
attract investments are questionable. The U.S. cities illustrate that the best performing urban 
regions maintain the most robust public welfare and social service programs, while also being key 
global economic performers (Vojnovic, 2007). Houston’s needs to catch up in those areas if it 
wants to compete with high profile cities like New York, San Francisco and Boston.  
In a 2008 Houston Area Survey conducted by Rice University, the results show that more 
than half of the respondents would support zoning. However, the survey should be taken only as 
general concepts. When zoning ordinance details come to agenda, the reaction might be quite 
different, especially at such a point when voters see maps showing how the new rules might 
affect their own properties, like the situation in 1993. Both current mayor and mayoral candidates 
for 2009 election do not favor conventional zoning in Houston but believe some land use controls 
are essential to protect neighborhoods.   
 
Public Choice and Land Use Governance 
 
 Broader understanding of development controls implies a special polity, thus the 
important issue is to study the polity of Houston as a whole zone. Houston’s case provides an 
opportunity to examine the rules of participation in land use controls between private government 
such as homeowners’ associations and municipalities, where the city runs like an enterprise and 
market inequalities are translated into political inequalities in different areas of the city. 
When compared with formal government interventions, the involvement of homeowners 
associations has different roots and relies on different rules of public choice in making collective 
decisions. Those rules include who may participate, how to participate, and how to integrate 
individual preferences into a collective choice. Such distinctions make homeowners associations’ 
intervention in land use controls significantly different from formal government interventions as 
an institution in property rights attenuation. The difference results from the contrast between 
politics and markets as systems for public choices, where politics relies on the vote and market 
relies on the money. Therefore, politics and markets reply on different mechanisms and rules to 
make public choices. For homeowners associations, the covenants, the conditions, the restrictions, 
and the association bylaws are the governing rules. Those rules put limits on some individual 
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preferences as an attempt to maintain or increase property values in the community. In many 
cases, the rules include more details than city land use regulations that govern individual property 
rights choices. However, as the Houston case reveals, since the homeowners association rules 
such as deed restrictions are put in place by an developer whose goal is to sell the community, 
those rules might be better at facilitating property sales and maintenance than at improving 
community collective welfare and governance. Furthermore, homeowners associations’ rules 
have an “inward” focus, leaving many concerns in adjoining neighbors unaddressed. Therefore, 
ideal planning goals such as mixed race community and/or mixed income community are still 
difficult to achieve even in a city without zoning regulations. Houston’s mixed-use is more about 
the physical and functional pattern.   
The fact that demographic changes, economic fortunes, lifestyle, and values might 
influence citizens’ preference for more government interventions from time to time as evidenced 
by several voting for zoning in Houston’s history indicates a few issues about homeowners 
associations’ rules. Private controls like deed restrictions confer more stability, through 
prohibitively high cost for the homeowners associations to adjust to changing conditions, to the 
rules that regulate land use than to the rules that coordinate other concerns within the community 
or among with the nearby communities. With the limited intervention in private government such 
as homeowners’ associations from the municipality, private approaches like deed restrictions 
alone have their own limitations. Homeowners associations leave out the renters who do not have 
the rights to vote for the bylaws and regulations (e.g. deed restrictions) set by their homeowners 
associations. If homeowners associations cannot solve violations by themselves, they have to 
resort to the city attorney to sue to enforce the homeowners association bylaws and regulations. 
Different neighborhoods may have difference deed restrictions, they may vary significantly. This 
study also found the difficulty in getting access to homeowners association bylaws and 
regulations by the public. Even City of Houston has to solicit those bylaws on a voluntary basis 
for their recent initiative in digitalizing those deed restrictions.      
In a competitive market without zoning intervention, the burden of deed restriction cost 
falls on consumers and land owners, which produces distributive consequences by excluding 
moderate- and low-income families from the jurisdiction. Communities where moderate- and 
low-income families prevail may be less likely to rely on deed restrictions or they get expired 
without further renewals. In wealthier communities, exclusion of these groups might be achieved 
through the implementation of deed restrictions. The political, economic, and demographic 
composition of communities can be linked to preferences for land use controls. So there is a 
social class bias in the adoption of private land use controls. Homogeneous communities with 
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high income and educational attainment are more likely to commit to private land use controls. 
To certain extent, private land use controls are similar to government interventions like growth 
restrictions as a response to the market. For instance, research (Feiock, 2004; Lewis and Neiman 
2002) finds that counties with more industrial land apply more growth restrictions as a response 
to encroachment of industrial development on residential areas. The difference is about the 
affordability of the implementation for private land use controls—moderate- and low-income 
communities simply cannot afford to implement private land use controls like deed restrictions.  
The public choice is influenced by land-based elites who have influence on local governments 
and the final choice the public makes. The zoning referendums in Houston’s history are an 
example. The public choice might eventually produce benefits for some but also impose negative 
results on others. Stronger interest groups that could significantly challenge Houston’s pro-
growth coalition of business leaders and limited government intervention are missing. In the 
meantime, the organized manipulation of the urban economy by land-based elites through public 
regulation is hard to change. Land use reform (e.g. zoning) calls for strong interest groups and 
their stronger ties with public sectors and local governments. The success of the pro-growth 
coalition is based on the relative weakness of competing coalitions that have different priorities 
(e.g. environmental interest groups). Enhancement of the role of super neighborhoods could 
alleviate the transferring of the externalities from economic growth to the disadvantaged 
residents.  
For public choice perspective, while voters attempt to maximize individual benefits of 
public programs and put the burden of the negative results on the others (e.g. marginalized 
populations confront disproportionate exposure to environment hazards), politicians attempt to 
maximize votes and make the voting results meet their expectations. Thus, politicians including 
the anti-zoning interests tend to impose influences on the voting process by political campaigns. 
Government failure may emerge because of such institutional incentives in zoning referendums. 
The political equilibrium that results from the choices of public voters, interest groups and 
politicians are not as optimal as the pro-government intervention supporters expect. Campaigns 
and lobbies often play an important and sometimes decisive role.   
As a result of such institution, while Houston leaders maintain that Houston’s disinterest 
in social programs would be compensated by the support of pro-growth urban policies, such 
support of pro-growth urban policies, unfortunately, has been selectively targeted on certain areas 
while ignored others that are with low income or minorities but highly expect to have good social 
programs (e.g. affordable housing, neighborhood revitalization) and public services (e.g. good 
access to public transit and public amenities). This partially explains the close association 
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between neighborhoods’ diverse socioeconomic statuses and apparently different land patterns 
(e.g. functionally mixed use as well as external/internal connectivity, pedestrian access, density, 
etc.).  
While the absence of public land use regulations such as growth management generates 
high level of urban decentralization in Houston, many upper-scale income communities are still 
within or near downtown area. This helps in Houston’s great potential in downtown development 
and growth intentions. River Oaks is a case in point. Overall, Houston’s inner-city redevelopment 
has resulted in considerable social upgrading as new upscale condominiums and townhouses 
replace the oldest neighborhoods. The spatial reorganization of socioeconomic status increases 
land values in those neighborhoods. The residents in those neighborhoods then tend to resort to 
land use controls to maintain the land use patterns. The inner city redevelopment decision rests 
primarily in the hands of local officials who may be primarily concerned with the maximization 
of their political goals.  
In Texas, the limited government philosophy was clearly articulated by the ruling Texas 
Republican Party at the 2000 State Convention, where the first two party-principles adopted were: 
“we believe that the least government is the best government; the environment is best served by 
individuals working in their own best interest” (Mason and Berstein, 2000, P.16A). Despite of the 
minimal government philosophy, extensive public subsidies were granted to local businesses in 
history and currently are helping to define the major nodes and arteries of Houston. Therefore, on 
the one hand, federal, state, and local government intervention greatly contributes to the major 
nodes and arteries of the city. On the other hand, the city’s disinterest in social service and 
income maintenance program forms various neighborhoods with different socioeconomic statuses 
and thus different land use patterns. In fact, Houston presents a contradiction of limited 
government intervention (e.g. in land uses) and large scale and amount of public investments and 
subsidies (e.g. in infrastructure and major projects). Market behaviors with limited government 
interventions show certain coordination and coalition in Houston’s urban development. The 
individualism and disorder associated with purely market driven land development are not 
evident. 
 
Debate on Planning versus Market Revisited 
 
 Houston provides a case where private planning of individuals and firms in the market 
and public planning by planners in government coexist. The existence of one does not seem to 
exclude the existence of the other. There is no speculation that land use planning control by 
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means of private contract and planning control by government legislative intervention are 
mutually exclusive or immutable. Nor is there any suggestion that statutory planning is 
necessarily antagonistic to the regime of private property rights. Rather, more attention needs to 
focus on the often-ignored planning ‘character’ or ‘culture’ of a city and its neighborhoods with 
limited government legislative intervention. The government intervention versus anti-government 
intervention debate is meaningless as some level of government intervention is inevitable even 
for a model city of laissez faire and free enterprise like Houston. The arguments should be around 
how much intervention and how to intervene. Free enterprise economy is so ideal that it does not 
exist in real world. The problematic dichotomy between market economies and planned 
economies is misleading. A spectrum of market solutions and planning approaches at the ends is 
more relevant than the bipolarity view.  
 The case of Montrose super neighborhood indicates that market approaches provide the 
agents with a wider range of responses than in regulatory planning environment like zoning laws. 
In many situations deregulation worked marvels, but usually with institutional supervision. For 
instance, Houston’s city attorney helps enforce deed restrictions. Super neighborhoods often 
obtain help and guidance from the City. As Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer (1990) maintain that public 
authorities have an important role to play in a deregulated and privatized industry in maintaining 
competition in the privatized industry. Thus the institutional challenges of Houston’s limited 
government intervention in planning should not be overlooked. However, planning should not be 
equated to regulations and controls too much. The understanding of planning as government 
regulations is incomplete. Planners have roles in both public and private sectors. Many civic, 
community, private and special organizations in Houston make plans. Planning does not refer to 
public sector only. And the interchangeable use of planning and public intervention is misleading. 
Government, civil society, and the market complement each other in urban governance and 
development. Market approaches to land use issues do not necessarily weaken the need for public 
intervention. And the approaches may need more public oversight. Equity goals are typically not 
met in many of such market approaches. As the market not only involves efficiency and price, but 
also involves welfare and rights, public planning intervention is necessary. (However, 
government intervention such as zoning does not seem do any better in equity issues). 
If Houston needs to reconsider having zoning in future, there are a few issues need to be 
addressed such as high cost for ushering and implementing zoning, high cost for land use change 
from its current situation to its zoning defined use, and the fiscal burden of the zoning 
bureaucracies. All these can significantly divert scare public resources. In addition, the 
institutional reform in land use controls such as zoning might trigger higher unemployment or a 
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sluggish economy, as such reform has significant impact on the land market. The costs of meeting 
land use regulations can be prohibitive for small businesses who may eventually opt to close 
down or move out. Higher land value due to the zoning might drive up the housing costs in 
Houston. From the evidence in Houston’s previous zoning attempts, the reform in Houston’s 
development control system may involve drastic political reforms. Such reforms incur huge 
transaction costs of alternating current land use control institutions and beyond the authority of 
planning profession. The research helps to undergo close institutional analysis of Houston’s 
specific case. After so many years of lack of zoning, along with the critiques on zoning and the 
emergence of the reformed land use regulations, is zoning still the best choice for Houston’s 
future?  
Houston’s case provides a case for property right theory that explains the phenomenon of 
planning and variety in land use regulation implementation and results. For instance, Pearce 
(1981: p. 52) emphasizes property rights by stating “instead of a local authority protecting the 
public from external diseconomies, private agencies and individuals would be given the capacity 
to protect themselves via the ownership of certain ‘rights’ to prohibit others from causing them 
‘harm’, such rights being enforceable through legal actions”.  In reality, there are many factors 
impact property rights attenuation and its physical form results. The study of three super 
neighborhoods show that the factors can be neighborhood age, historical reasons for their original 
development, land development over decades, influences from nearby neighborhoods, 
neighborhood plan initiatives, and socioeconomic composition, just to name a few. Property 
rights attenuation does not always lead to negative urban forms-Montrose is a case in point. 
However, how sustainable Montrose’s land use pattern and urban form can be in long term is 
another story as the super neighborhood has already undergone some gentrification.   
 Although without zoning regulations, planning practitioners in Houston uphold a more 
physical outcome-oriented planning in the form of inner city development, low-density 
development (e.g. large minimum lot sizes, ETJ policy, annexation, etc.), and spatial and 
functional segregation (e.g. activity centers, mega projects, etc.). All these have little difference 
from the same outcome-oriented physical planning in the zoned cities. The analysis of Houston’s 
urban form and land use shows that the market for an alternative to zoning and planning cannot 
overcome the problem of homogeneity. The market might provide physical land use diversity, but 
it fails to support socioeconomic diversity. Government interventions and/or private-public 
partnership is needed in the effort to attract public subsidies for projects such as affordable 
housing in the super neighborhoods like Independence Heights.  
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 Houston’s land use has narrow spatial boundaries in plans for both super neighborhoods 
and ordinary neighborhoods. Planning in Houston need to break those boundaries, extend the 
process to avoid the homogeneity formed by spatial boundaries, and thus encompass 
socioeconomic diversities in the city. The limits of private covenant restrictions as a tool relate to 
the scale of the area within which they are applied. But such limits also apply to small and 
fragmented jurisdictions in metropolitan areas which fail to address cross-border neighborhood 
effects and interdependences. Fragmented neighborhood jurisdiction’s contribution to reducing 
market uncertainties is much smaller. Besides fragmented governance, the fragmentation is 
inherent in polycentric urban forms. In Houston, the centralities usually are poorly connected and 
car-dependent. Spatial disparities between rich and poor are often clearly geographically 
delineated. Gentrification through inner city regeneration and the privatization of public spaces 
can act to further fragment the city. Mass transit does not sufficiently integrate the poorer sectors 
of the urban population as in Independence Heights. Fragmentation occurs through laissez-faire 
planning or through interventions with the best of intentions, but with unintended consequences 
(e.g. inner city regeneration in Montrose has led to gentrification).  
 This calls for a higher level institution for better governance. The civic organization of 
super neighborhoods provide Houston’s planners an opportunity to act as a role to listen to 
residents’ concerns and help to form consensus among them instead of providing technical 
support only. However, the super neighborhoods’ involvement in land use and urban 
development in general is currently very limited. For a stronger role of super neighborhoods in 
Houston’s land use, planners need to bring different interests in super neighborhoods together to 
get people to agree and ensure that no group’s interest will dominate. In addition, super 
neighborhoods may take a broader view than homeowners associations in land use issues. It could 
be an intermediate level of civic organizations for land use controls between homeowners 
associations and the City. The super neighborhoods have an important potential role to play in 
this regard. Such role, however, needs to be nurtured and supported by the city. For super 
neighborhoods like Independence Heights, where the issues of displacement, high percentage of 
industrial land uses, and unwanted facilities are prevail, super neighborhoods have more 
responsibilities in dealing with systemic bias, inequality, and symbolic benefits for weak 
constituencies, as those are the roots of problematic land uses in the super neighborhoods.  
Supports and helps from planners are particularly important for those super neighborhoods as 
neighborhoods with more middle-class professionals are more likely to reach solutions than 
others (Fainstein and Hirst, 1996; Bright, 2000). Besides supports in planning process, other 
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supportive resources such as money, access to expertise, and media support are apparently 
significant in bolstering the traditionally excluded.  
 
Institutional Economics Theorem as Research Framework 
 
The theoretical analysis of Pigouvian and Coasian theorem in Houston’s case reveals the 
complexity when one applies them to an empirical case because of time, geography, political and 
economic environment and even lifestyles. For both Pigouvian and Coasian approaches to land 
use controls, it has never been easy to decide what, when, where and how to control as optimal as 
possible. Coasian and public choice analysis of land use control retain the Pigouvian proposition 
that government is generally in the best position to organize and deliver collective goods which it 
does by statute and political representation. Public choice theory goes beyond Pigovian analysis 
in addressing the question of the citizen’s demands for alternative policies, laws, and 
constitutions.  
Coase has two principal propositions relating to the externality debate. One is that 
government intervention need not be the only way of securing collective action: the scope for 
voluntary (market) agreements should be explored. The other is that government can facilitate 
efficient bargaining solutions by establishing a clear system of property rights. For Houston’s 
case, the issue might be for the government to focus more on facilitating a clearer system of 
property rights, especially for those land lots in lower-income and minority neighborhoods. Even 
for cities that have zoning, the zoning laws are not efficient as a method of allocating property 
rights.  
The neighborhoods in Houston can be viewed as an economic actor, competing with 
others in seeking to optimize their objectives in land use and urban development. Each 
neighborhood will have a preference for particular land use policy mechanisms as have been seen 
in the zoning referendums in Houston’s history and the land use practice in different 
neighborhoods. Their preferences are influenced by the actor’s socioeconomic status, objectives, 
the nature of ‘market failure’ it experiences, and the benefits and costs from political debates and 
outcomes.  
Coasian analysis predicts that, in the absence of legal constraints and other transaction 
costs, communities will find their own solutions to land use problems if they are allowed to 
negotiate and compensate over. In Houston, however, when land use issues come up between 
neighborhoods, those issues are usually released to the media and get attention from the 
government. In many cases, the power of media is greater than that of civic groups. In many 
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cases, municipalities give response to them, though not always protecting the marginalized 
neighborhoods, or not always through new land use regulations. Private negotiations may not be 
effective if without deed restrictions. Negotiations without either legal or private constraints in 
place are hard to reach solutions among affected parties. 
 Super neighborhoods, homeowners associations, and inward looking neighborhood plans 
bring up an issue of the optimal size of planning jurisdiction in Houston and whether participants 
like developers and residents have an incentive to follow the optimal rules. Coase does not seem 
to appreciate the importance of boundary delineation in land use regulations. However, land 
rights have an attribute of excluding others in the use of land. Such exclusive rights are 
inseparable from the concept of boundary delineation. The boundary delineation however is 
defined more by socioeconomic status than geographic boundaries, physical patterns or 
administrative districts. For Montrose and Independence Heights, despite their similar land use 
diversity index changes, they are very different super neighborhoods in terms of neighborhood 
historic evolution, demographic composition, and socioeconomic status. Private land use controls 
are in the hands of current residents and these residents act so as to maximize benefits to 
themselves, especially in an era when a growing neighborhood preference is for individual 
responsibility and self support in Houston.     
 The study of Montrose super neighborhood illustrates that the land use mixture creates 
many benefits like employment opportunity, pedestrian accessibility, denser housing 
development, etc. For years, this intermingling has been appreciated by Houston’s planners and 
some residents who choose to live in Montrose simply because of the lifestyle there. The negative 
costs brought by externality are probably exceeded by the benefits gained in Montrose. The 
Montrose case also indicates that elevating zoning to a status that it hardly deserves is misleading. 
However, the case of Independence Heights provides an opposite case where the costs of 
externality because of the admixture land uses probably exceed the benefits gained in the super 
neighborhood. The admixture of land use is not necessarily a negative thing, the issue is where 
and how. There is no general conclusion to be drawn about the pros and cons of land use mixture. 
Each situation has to be examined on its merits even for different neighborhoods within the same 
city. This occurs with Coase in maintaining that the benefits and costs of land use controls can 
only be demonstrated for individual situations. The cases of Montrose and Independence Heights 
show that at least in some cases private land use controls follow the market through the efforts of 
property owners to enhance the value of their holdings by pressing for their favored land uses. 
This is, however, not unique to cities without zoning laws as there are also arguments about 
zoning’s following/responding to the market.   
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 While some activities create costs, they might also generate a lot of benefits in a 
neighborhood. The government intervention may tackle the costs at the expense of the benefits. In 
the case of Houston, there maybe environmental concerns for minority and lower income 
neighborhoods like Independence Heights, but at the same time, the residents have the advantage 
of proximity to their workplaces in the same neighborhoods. This is particularly relevant given 
the fact that Independence Heights is poor in public transit access and low in private vehicle 
ownership whereas the residents may walk to their workplaces or run their own small businesses 
made possible by the mixed land uses. This benefit might be difficult to achieve if zoning laws 
are in place in such neighborhoods like Independence Heights. For a super neighborhood where 
unemployment and poverty are serious, the introduction of some industrial land uses with more 
job opportunities in a residential neighborhood for local residents would be a social benefit for 
the residents. Furthermore, for the residents in Independence Heights, the costs from 
environmental concerns could likely be offset by a comparatively affordable housing price or 
lower rent. For Houston, the negative effects of commercial and/or industrial mixed use with 
residential land are probably overstated. Some environmental concerns in Houston have been 
overly attribute to its lack of zoning. For instance, Lai’s (1997) study on Hong Kong’s 
environmental regulations and environmental complaints reveals that the relationship between 
number of environmental complaints and number of planning permissions granted is not 
considered significant. It falsifies the general hypothesis that planning areas with more approved 
planning schemes have less environmental complaints.   
 From public choice perspective, instead of their counterparts’ stronger administrative 
powers in conventional zoned cities, the services of bureaucratic elites and planners in Houston 
are more competed and challenged by the private sectors many of whom are potential powerful 
voters and decision making influencers. The private land use control system shows its weakness 
in terms of consistency, vulnerability to neighborhood socioeconomic status, and subservience to 
special interests under the market pressure. Private land use controls are geographically (and 
time, in some cases) limited. Therefore, their strengths are also limited. The Coasian arguments 
that the market can internalize uncompensated effects such as externalities are not able to fully 
address the land use issues in neighborhoods where private covenants are not available. For 
neighborhoods with better socioeconomic status, land market forces are not strong enough to 
change land use patterns. This observation is similar to cities with zoning laws where land market 
forces are strong enough for local officials to adjust regulation to accommodate the forces but it is 
unlikely to happen to upper scale income neighborhoods.  
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 While one argues that the long run locational equilibrium in a zoned community will 
consist of a configuration of land uses which is not very different from that which would have 
occurred had zoning never been introduced, such argument is nearly impossible to be tested for 
real cases and hence is irrelevant. From both institutional economics theory and evidence from 
this study, any analysis with such conceptual approach is problematic because of the 
geographical, time, political specifics with different cities. Even in the same city, land use 
patterns in different neighborhoods have evolved due to their various specifics.  
 The coexistence of ‘planning’ and ‘market’ challenges some of Coasian theoretical 
viewpoints. For instance, Coasian propose the comparison of the opportunity cost of alternative 
decisions made freely by individuals and firms versus decisions made by planners. In reality, 
there is few cases where both of them make land use decisions on the same lot of land, whereas 
geographical, spatial dimensions, political and socioeconomic specifics of different land lots in 
the city (or even in the same neighborhoods) make the comparison less convincible. Similarly, 
Coase argues that ‘a better approach would seem to be to start our analysis with a situation 
approximating that which actually exists, to examine the effects of a proposed policy change, and 
to attempt to decide whether the new situation would be, in total, better or worse than the original 
one’ (Coase, 1960: 43). Real world however makes such comparative test almost impossible. 
Even if Houston adopts zoning in future, the city would have to keep many existing land uses as 
it did in its former zoning proposals. In adopting a zoning law, it is usually the case that the state-
imposed uses follow the pre-existing ones, adopting the existing boundaries. Warner’s (1962) of 
the suburbanization of Boston in the late 19th century reveals that several suburban land use, often 
attribute to zoning, actually emerged without zoning at all.   
 Public choice theory assumes rational individuals acting in their own interests to account 
for the acceptance of private land use control system. Such system is the rule agreed upon by the 
stakeholder players-politicians seeking reelection, administrators expecting promotion, 
developers , property owners and users looking to protect property values and maximize their 
individual rewards. Those interest groups (e.g. developers, households, individuals, political 
units, and public agencies, etc.) in Houston’s land use are involved in both the economic and 
political markets. In the economic market, the interest groups attempt to maximize their land 
value and profits from land. In the political market, those interest groups have more incentives for 
competition through voting, legislative support, and other resources. Collective decisions and 
mutual adjustments are made through interactions among those interest groups. Houston’s zoning 
referendums are more an example of the political market than an example of the economic 
market.  
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Research Agenda 
 
 One of the future research attentions is on the presumptions of local regulatory systems, 
the existence of alternative rules, and the practices of variety of urban governance forms with 
respect to the debate of planning versus market and more government intervention versus limited 
government involvement in land use policies and development controls. The diversity of land use 
plan and development control practices in different countries has been, in one way, supported by 
the theories from an institutional economics perspective derived from transaction costs theory in 
economics. China’s urban land development controls take one of the forms of market supported 
bilateral governance. Houston takes the other form of market supported bilateral governance. A 
possible future research is geared toward a comparative approach to land use controls as Houston 
and Chinese cities (e.g. Nanjing-- Nanjing’s urban built area increased from 121 KM2 in 1986 to 
447 KM2 in 2004, which is among the largest urban expansion among Chinese cities.) fall within 
two of the three categories of land use controls from an institutional economics perspective. Part 
of this future research will build on the research on Houston’s urban form without zoning and its 
land use control alternatives such as deed restrictions. Despite the tremendous difference between 
two cities in different countries with completely different political regimes, the comparative study 
will have its merit in that it compares two forms of land use policies under the market supported 
bilateral governance. Its implications in urban planning governance theories and land 
development control policies may go beyond the conventional comparative research on cities 
within a specific country. Once this research is completed, it has the potential to be expanded to 
include the more conventional land development control approach such as zoning.  
 Land use policy and physical environment is just one aspect; others need to be included 
in future research, such as the study of Houston’s social sustainability (equity, social justice, 
poverty and social exclusion) and the study of Houston’s economic sustainability (income 
inequalities, employment, education and training, local business, services and facilities), both in 
relation to the city’s land use practice with limited government intervention. For instance, another 
potential research project on regulatory environment and land use is to explore whether private 
contractual zoning (i.e. Houston’s private covenants and deed restrictions) leads to more diverse 
housing types and whether private contractual zoning leads to greater socioeconomic diversity 
through its more mixed land use pattern. The study examines Houston city itself and compares 
Houston with a zoned city (e.g. Dallas) in America to explore if private contractual zoning is the 
cause of housing and socioeconomic diversity. Again, the research compares two of the three 
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development control approaches- statutory zoning (third-party governance) and private 
contractual zoning (market supported bilateral governance). 
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